ABSTRACT We examine how the prevalence of gossip about peers' performance (peer performance gossip), a form of informal communication, influences employees' performance manipulation. Gossip is often viewed as a mechanism that disciplines behavior and deters misconduct. Yet, it may also serve as a salient cue of social evaluation, heightening employees' concerns about appearing incompetent to others. We predict that the prevalence of peer performance gossip increases employees' fear of negative social evaluation, which in turn leads them to inflate their reported performance to protect their social image. We further predict that this effect is weaker for employees with higher self‐monitoring, as they are more adept at tailoring their behavior to social cues and managing impressions. Data from two field surveys and an experiment support our predictions. Peer performance gossip increases performance manipulation by heightening social image concerns, particularly among employees with lower self‐monitoring. We contribute to the accounting literature by uncovering a social motive for performance manipulation and highlighting how informal social dynamics can shape reporting behavior beyond formal control systems. Accordingly, leaders should explicitly consider gossip when designing compensation systems, training programs, and internal communication practices. If left unaddressed, gossip may encourage performance manipulation and distort performance evaluations.
ABSTRACT Prior research finds that the textual content of Item 1A risk factor disclosures in 10‐K filings provides valuable information about firm risk. However, less is known about whether the ordering of these disclosures conveys useful information. We examine whether the relative prominence of individual risk factors within Item 1A reflects firms' exposure to the underlying risks and predicts future adverse outcomes. Focusing on credit and goodwill risk disclosures, we find that risk factor prominence is associated with proxies for the underlying risks and predicts credit rating downgrades, bankruptcy filings, and goodwill impairments. We further find that prominence is more informative during periods of high information uncertainty, when the benefits of risk disclosure are predicted to be greater. Overall, our findings suggest that risk factor prominence offers a valuable signal of firm risk that complements the textual disclosures in Item 1A. Accordingly, investors, analysts, lenders, auditors, boards, and regulators should consider both the level of, and changes in, risk factor prominence when evaluating firm risk.
ABSTRACT Whereas prior studies primarily examine how environmental shocks affect manufacturing, distribution, and supply chains, we examine a distinct and understudied channel: the effect of wildfire smoke on human capital operating from firm headquarters. Using satellite‐based smoke plume measures, we show that wildfire smoke exposure in a firm's headquarters county is associated with lower operating income, with effects strengthening as smoke becomes more frequent and severe. Exposure is associated with increased employee health concerns, higher employee turnover, and shorter tenure. The negative association is stronger for firms that rely more heavily on skilled employees, and it is concentrated in higher operating costs. Collectively, these findings are consistent with wildfire smoke impairing workforce stability and productivity. Our study points to the need for enhanced climate‐risk and human‐capital disclosures. It also informs HR managers' planning for absenteeism and employee well‐being, and helps investors, audit committees, and auditors better assess smoke‐related operating risks.
Accounting standards require firms to distinguish recurring revenues and expenses from nonrecurring gains and losses, which are often referred to as special items. However, not all special items are genuinely nonrecurring. Exploiting the setting of earnings conference calls, we explore whether analysts can identify opportunistic special items, as evidenced by asking for more information about them. We find evidence that managers' discussions of special items more often relate to predicted special items, whereas analysts have more questions about potentially opportunistic special items. Managers adopt a relatively more negative tone and use more words when answering questions about potentially opportunistic special items. Finally, we find that analysts who question potentially opportunistic special items have fewer opportunities to speak in the subsequent call, consistent with managerial retaliation. Les normes comptables exigent des entreprises qu'elles distinguent les recettes ordinaires et les charges r & eacute;currentes des pertes et gains non r & eacute;currents, souvent qualifi & eacute;s d'& eacute;l & eacute;ments exceptionnels. Toutefois, certains & eacute;l & eacute;ments exceptionnels ne sont pas r & eacute;ellement non r & eacute;currents. & Agrave; partir de donn & eacute;es issues de conf & eacute;rences t & eacute;l & eacute;phoniques sur les r & eacute;sultats, cette & eacute;tude examine la capacit & eacute; des analystes & agrave; identifier les & eacute;l & eacute;ments exceptionnels opportunistes, mise en & eacute;vidence par un accroissement de leurs demandes d'informations. Les r & eacute;sultats d & eacute;montrent que les discussions des gestionnaires sur les & eacute;l & eacute;ments exceptionnels portent plus souvent sur des & eacute;l & eacute;ments exceptionnels pr & eacute;vus, tandis que les analystes posent davantage de questions sur les & eacute;l & eacute;ments exceptionnels pr & eacute;sum & eacute;s opportunistes. Les gestionnaires adoptent un ton relativement plus d & eacute;plaisant et utilisent davantage de mots lorsqu'ils r & eacute;pondent & agrave; des questions sur des & eacute;l & eacute;ments exceptionnels pr & eacute;sum & eacute;s opportunistes. Enfin, l'& eacute;tude r & eacute;v & egrave;le que les analystes qui remettent en question des & eacute;l & eacute;ments exceptionnels pr & eacute;sum & eacute;s opportunistes ont moins d'occasions de s'exprimer lors de la conf & eacute;rence t & eacute;l & eacute;phonique ult & eacute;rieure, ce qui correspond & agrave; une forme de repr & eacute;sailles de la part de la direction.
ABSTRACT This study investigates the adoption and implications of Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 842 lease accounting standards in private loan contracts. Analyzing a comprehensive sample of material loan contracts from 2011 to 2023, we document a pervasive reluctance to adopt ASC 842. Specifically, we find that for loans issued prior to, but maturing after, the standard effective date, only 41% of loans adopt the standard. For loans issued after the standard effective date, only 46% of loans adopt the standard. Our determinants analyses reveal that for loans issued prior to the effective date, the reluctance to adopt ASC 842 is associated with (1) a preference for using consistent lease classifications over time, (2) concerns about borrower opportunism, and (3) the costs of negotiating or renegotiating lease‐related loan terms within lending syndicates. In contrast, for loans issued after the effective date, only negotiation costs are associated with the reluctance to adopt. Our findings suggest that the costs of adopting ASC 842 in private loan contracts often outweigh the benefits and that contracting parties prefer a stable accounting standard environment.
This paper examines private meetings between company managers and institutional investors as part of the broader financial reporting environment. Using direct observations of 39 such meetings across four large, listed companies-complemented with the study of preparatory work and internal documents-the paper investigates how these meetings help build and maintain relationships between companies and investors. The analysis shows that the importance of these meetings lies not primarily in the exchange of new information but in the creation of familiarity, focused engagement, and exclusivity, which strengthen social ties and reinforce participants' positions in the capital market. Drawing on interaction ritual theory, the paper identifies three forms of ritual work through which these outcomes are produced: assembly work, conversational work, and bodily work. The study contributes to research on the social embeddedness of capital markets and suggests that private reporting meetings should be understood not only as informational events but also as relational mechanisms that shape access, trust, and network persistence. Cet article porte sur les r & eacute;unions priv & eacute;es entre dirigeants de soci & eacute;t & eacute;s et investisseurs institutionnels, dans le contexte & eacute;largi de l'information financi & egrave;re. En s'appuyant sur l'observation directe de 39 r & eacute;unions de ce type au sein de quatre grandes soci & eacute;t & eacute;s cot & eacute;es - compl & eacute;t & eacute;e par l'& eacute;tude de travaux pr & eacute;paratoires et de documents internes - l'article analyse la mani & egrave;re dont ces r & eacute;unions visent & agrave; & eacute;tablir et & agrave; entretenir les relations entre les soci & eacute;t & eacute;s et les investisseurs. L'analyse montre que l'importance de ces r & eacute;unions ne r & eacute;side pas principalement dans l'& eacute;change de nouvelles informations, mais dans la cr & eacute;ation d'une familiarit & eacute;, d'un engagement cibl & eacute; et d'une exclusivit & eacute;, qui renforcent les liens sociaux et consolident la position des participants sur le march & eacute; financier. En se basant sur la th & eacute;orie du rituel d'interaction, cet article identifie trois cat & eacute;gories de rituels de travail par lesquels ces r & eacute;sultats sont produits : le travail d'assemblage, le travail conversationnel et le travail corporel. Cette & eacute;tude contribue & agrave; la recherche sur l'int & eacute;gration sociale des march & eacute;s financiers et sugg & egrave;re que les r & eacute;unions priv & eacute;es consacr & eacute;es & agrave; l'information doivent & ecirc;tre consid & eacute;r & eacute;es non seulement comme des & eacute;v & eacute;nements informationnels, mais aussi comme des m & eacute;canismes relationnels qui fa & ccedil;onnent l'acc & egrave;s, la confiance et la p & eacute;rennit & eacute; des r & eacute;seaux.
ABSTRACT This article explores how accounting ideas travel to unfamiliar environments and instigate new modes of calculation therein. The empirical focus is on the food balance sheet, a key calculative technology in the realm of food security. Drawing on Said's four‐stage schema for analyzing the movement of theories and ideas, this investigation traces the journeying of the balance sheet to the field of food security from the First World War, culminating in the institutionalization of the food balance sheet as a standardized and universal practice from the late 1940s. The study reveals the conditions that facilitated acceptance of the balance sheet idea in a new field—specifically, its alignment to the problem of managing the national and global supply of food, as well as the presence of individual actants who recognized its utility for communicating and addressing the problem of food insecurity during periods of global conflict and humanitarian crisis. These key individuals emanated from the United States, the dominant power in an age of internationalism. It is shown that conceptual traveling involved the jettisoning of core elements of the accounting construction of the balance sheet, but also their selective reimportation once the balance sheet became domesticated in its new location. The article offers original insights to the forces that generate calculative innovations in epistemic communities beyond accounting.
ABSTRACT Although cyber risk is widely recognized as a critical organizational threat, how firms configure internal roles and practices to address it remains poorly understood. This study offers insights into that question. In practice, two professional roles share the job of cyber risk assessment and assurance: cybersecurity specialists, who focus on the technical side of assurance, and internal auditors, who focus on governance, processes, and compliance. Drawing on 36 interviews across a range of organizations, we explain how these professional roles collaborate, when collaboration breaks down, and why working together is often difficult. We identify five common patterns of working across professional boundaries, ranging from rival parallel assessments to genuinely integrated work. As exposure to cyber threats rises because of regulation, critical operations, or greater digital dependence, accountability pressures increase, and managers and professionals spanning across the two professional roles act as connectors and engage in coordination across domains. We also show how standard risk‐management templates and reporting tools can shift from being symbolic checklists to becoming practical coordination mechanisms. Overall, the study offers a framework for building more integrated cyber risk assessment and assurance, with relevance for other emerging risks that demand cross‐functional expertise.
ABSTRACT A concentrated debt structure can facilitate creditor coordination, which reduces the financial distress cost in a liquidity default but also increases the risk of a strategic default. Debt concentration affects the sensitivity of leverage to tax through these two forces. We show that firms with a more concentrated debt structure are more responsive to state corporate income tax rate increases in increasing financial leverage, suggesting that when the tax rate increases, debt concentration's role in reducing the financial distress cost matters more. The impact of debt concentration on leverage is more pronounced when firms are subject to a high default risk, have low asset redeployability, or have a low liquidation value. Additional debt covenants can facilitate low debt concentration firms to increase leverage after tax rate increases. Our findings suggest that debt concentration is an important factor influencing the tax sensitivity of financial leverage.
This article studies how the mandatory disclosure of audit risk and targeted regulatory inspections influence audit quality. We develop a model in which the auditor tests a firm's internal control over financial reporting before auditing the financial report and must issue an opinion on both. Due to higher regulatory scrutiny received by audits with weak internal control opinions, we show that targeted inspections generate countervailing effects: they reduce the auditor's internal control audit effort while increasing substantive testing effort. We show that a positive level of targeted inspections can improve audit quality when the level of random inspections is high. Furthermore, we show that targeted inspections are not always consistent with risk‐based inspections, due to the auditor's strategic response to the oversight measures. Nevertheless, such targeting can still result in higher audit quality. Our results suggest the need to exercise caution when using audit risk disclosures as a basis for enforcement.
Exploiting the staggered rollout of third-generation (3G) mobile broadband networks across 40 countries between 1999 and 2012, we examine how technological progress affects capital markets. We find that the introduction of 3G networks is followed by a reduction in bid-ask spreads and an increase in price informativeness. These effects are more pronounced among firms with lower institutional ownership, indicating that information access through mobile broadband networks disproportionally benefits retail investors. We further show that these effects are concentrated in countries with well-functioning markets, as characterized by transparent accounting information, broad investor participation, and strong legal protections for investors. Taken together, our findings suggest that mobile broadband connectivity reduces information frictions and improves price informativeness. They further highlight the institutional conditions under which these benefits materialize. & Agrave; l'aide du d & eacute;ploiement progressif des r & eacute;seaux mobiles & agrave; large bande de troisi & egrave;me g & eacute;n & eacute;ration (3G) au sein de 40 pays entre 1999 et 2012, cette & eacute;tude analyse comment le progr & egrave;s technologique influe sur les march & eacute;s financiers. Les auteurs d & eacute;montrent que l'implantation des r & eacute;seaux 3G est corr & eacute;l & eacute;e avec une r & eacute;duction des & eacute;carts acheteur-vendeur et une augmentation de la valeur informative du cours des actions. Ces effets sont plus marqu & eacute;s chez les entreprises dont l'investissement institutionnel est inf & eacute;rieur, sugg & eacute;rant de tr & egrave;s fortes in & eacute;galit & eacute;s dans l'acc & egrave;s & agrave; l'information via les r & eacute;seaux mobiles & agrave; large bande au profit des investisseurs particuliers. En outre, l'& eacute;tude souligne que ces effets se produisent surtout dans les pays dot & eacute;s de march & eacute;s matures, caract & eacute;ris & eacute;s par une transparence comptable accrue, une participation & eacute;largie des investisseurs et des protections juridiques efficaces pour ces derniers. Dans l'ensemble, les r & eacute;sultats tendent & agrave; d & eacute;montrer que la connectivit & eacute; & agrave; large bande mobile r & eacute;duit les frictions informationnelles et accro & icirc;t la valeur informative du cours des actions. Enfin, les auteurs mettent en avant les conditions institutionnelles n & eacute;cessaires & agrave; l'obtention de ces avantages.
We study how analysts' inherited cultural attitudes to time orientation affect their production of long-term information and the profitability of their stock recommendations. We find that analysts from long-term-oriented cultures exhibit a longer forecast horizon and issue more long-term forecasts. They also produce more accurate long-term forecasts and ask more long-term-focused questions during conference calls, eliciting greater long-term disclosure from managers. In addition, they are more likely to use discounted valuation models that explicitly incorporate expectations about firms' long-term prospects. Further, their stock recommendations are more profitable, consistent with their production of long-term information enhancing valuation. Our findings highlight the role of cultural long-term orientation in shaping analysts' information production in capital markets.
We study how insider trading based on private cost information affects product market outcomes when firms differ in cost variance. In our model, managers exploit firm-specific cost information to pursue short-term trading gains, leading them to adjust output decisions and reshape product market competition. We show that trading opportunities have heterogeneous effects on firms' production and value: firms with high cost variance overproduce, whereas those with low cost variance underproduce; correspondingly, the value of firms with high cost variance rises, while that of firms with low cost variance declines. These results demonstrate how heterogeneous costs and private cost information create real economic consequences by linking insider trading incentives to distortions in product market competition and firm value. Les auteurs se demandent comment l'op & eacute;ration d'initi & eacute; li & eacute;e aux renseignements confidentiels sur les co & ucirc;ts influe sur les effets du march & eacute; des produits lorsque les entreprises pr & eacute;sentent des diff & eacute;rences de co & ucirc;ts. Ils proposent un mod & egrave;le dans lequel les gestionnaires utilisent des renseignements sur les co & ucirc;ts propres & agrave; leur entreprise pour r & eacute;aliser des op & eacute;rations & agrave; court terme, ce qui les incite & agrave; r & eacute;& eacute;valuer leurs d & eacute;cisions de production, modifiant ainsi les dynamiques de concurrence sur le march & eacute; des produits. Les auteurs d & eacute;montrent que les possibilit & eacute;s de n & eacute;gociation ont des effets h & eacute;t & eacute;rog & egrave;nes sur la production et la valeur des entreprises : les entreprises pr & eacute;sentant un haut degr & eacute; de diff & eacute;rence de co & ucirc;ts tendent & agrave; surproduire, tandis que celles pr & eacute;sentant un faible degr & eacute; de diff & eacute;rence de co & ucirc;ts tendent & agrave; sous-produire ; par cons & eacute;quent, la valeur des premi & egrave;res augmente, tandis que celle des secondes diminue. Ces r & eacute;sultats d & eacute;montrent la mani & egrave;re dont l'h & eacute;t & eacute;rog & eacute;n & eacute;it & eacute; des co & ucirc;ts et des renseignements confidentiels sur les co & ucirc;ts entra & icirc;ne des cons & eacute;quences & eacute;conomiques r & eacute;elles, en faisant le lien entre les incitations & agrave; l'op & eacute;ration d'initi & eacute; et les distorsions de la concurrence sur le march & eacute; des produits et de la valeur des entreprises.
The rise of independent oversight of the accounting profession has attracted considerable research attention. Much of this research has studied how professional accounting bodies and the Big 4 firms have shaped the mandate and capabilities of independent oversight bodies. Less is known about how independent oversight has affected the workings of professional accounting bodies, particularly their capacity to simultaneously govern and represent their members. This paper advances our understanding of this dynamic through a longitudinal, interpretive case study of how the Dutch professional accounting body, the NBA (the Royal Netherlands Institute of Chartered Accountants), adapted and developed its regulatory intermediary role during a lengthy period of intense oversight by the Dutch regulator, the AFM (the Authority for the Financial Markets), and shifting levels of Big 4 firm discord. Drawing on extensive archival materials and insights gained from in-depth interviews with key participants, the study advances existing theorizations of the work of regulatory intermediaries by highlighting both their functional variability and fragility. In responding to recurring crises and critique, the NBA's intermediary role shifted from facilitation to curation and ultimately to orchestrating the Big 4 firms' regulatory response. Such shifts were neither smooth nor predictable-characterized by a sense of "role limbo" as the NBA battled to bolster its identity and authority when sidelined by the AFM or dictated to or impeded by the Big 4 firms. In examining such shifting intermediation and contesting levels of influence, the NBA's governance and representation functions emerge as more symbiotic than oppositional, with the NBA using its fulfillment of one as a means of strengthening its execution of the other. Overall, the paper's analysis uncovers the functional fragility of the NBA, which questions whether repeated calls for professional accounting bodies to rediscover their public interest mandate have adequately appreciated the complex, contested nature of the regulatory environment in which they operate.
This study examines whether competition in the form of emerging threats from rivals' overlapping product strategies has explanatory power for future performance and volatility, beyond existing competition measures and firm life cycle proxies. We proxy for emerging threats using product market fluidity, which captures competitive pressures and instability arising from rivals' evolving product overlap. Specifically, higher fluidity (i.e., higher product market threats) is negatively associated with future profitability and operating cash flows and positively associated with the variability of future profitability and operating cash flows. We also find fluidity is negatively associated with future asset turnover, margins, and expenses, and only moderately positively associated with future sales, shedding light on the mechanisms through which product market threats manifest in future performance. However, capital market participants do not fully incorporate this information, leading to predictable future stock returns and analyst forecast errors. Overall, our findings suggest that the dynamism and fluidity in a firm's product market space convey valuable and distinct information to capital market participants.
I use downloads of regulatory filings by SEC employees as a measure of SEC attention and find that SEC employees are disproportionately less likely to review the filings of firms with names later in the alphabet. Additional tests show that alphabetical order determines a firm's priority when the SEC follows up on common shocks among peer firms and that the strength of the SEC's alphabetical bias does not vary with the intensity of resource constraints. Further, the SEC appears to be more surprised by the restatements of end-of-the-alphabet firms. These results are consistent with a cognitive bias that leads SEC employees to pay more attention to firms at the top of alphabetically sorted lists. Last, using shocks to alphabetical order caused by firm name changes, I find that alphabetically induced increases in SEC attention are linked with lower future noncompliance, suggesting that the regulatory effects of alphabetical order are material. Overall, this study highlights the "human" element of regulatory attention. L'auteure utilise des t & eacute;l & eacute;chargements de d & eacute;clarations effectu & eacute;s par les employ & eacute;s de la SEC comme indicateur de l'attention de la SEC, et constate que les employ & eacute;s de cette autorit & eacute; de r & eacute;glementation sont nettement moins enclins & agrave; examiner les d & eacute;clarations des entreprises dont le nom se situe & agrave; la fin de l'alphabet. Des tests suppl & eacute;mentaires d & eacute;montrent que l'ordre alphab & eacute;tique d & eacute;termine la priorit & eacute; accord & eacute;e & agrave; une entreprise lorsque la SEC assure le suivi de chocs communs aupr & egrave;s d'entreprises homologues. La forte pr & eacute;sence, & agrave; la SEC, d'un biais associ & eacute; & agrave; l'ordre alphab & eacute;tique reste persistante, ind & eacute;pendamment de l'intensit & eacute; des limites financi & egrave;res. Par ailleurs, la SEC semble plus & eacute;tonn & eacute;e des retraitements comptables des entreprises situ & eacute;es & agrave; la fin de l'alphabet. Ces r & eacute;sultats corroborent la pr & eacute;sence d'un biais cognitif incitant les employ & eacute;s de la SEC & agrave; pr & ecirc;ter davantage attention aux entreprises figurant en t & ecirc;te des listes alphab & eacute;tiques. Enfin, en utilisant les chocs sur l'ordre alphab & eacute;tique caus & eacute;s par les changements de nom d'entreprise, l'auteure constate que les augmentations du niveau d'attention de la SEC g & eacute;n & eacute;r & eacute;es par l'ordre alphab & eacute;tique sont corr & eacute;l & eacute;es & agrave; une baisse future de la non-conformit & eacute;, sugg & eacute;rant que les effets li & eacute;s & agrave; l'ordre alphab & eacute;tique sont significatifs au sein des autorit & eacute;s de r & eacute;glementation. En somme, cette & eacute;tude met en & eacute;vidence la dimension & laquo; humaine & raquo; inh & eacute;rente & agrave; l'attention des autorit & eacute;s de r & eacute;glementation.
This paper examines how accounting and control practices constitute and distribute agency and responsibility for sustainability in global supply chains. Drawing on a field study in the fashion industry, we describe the sustainability control practices used by a major buyer firm vis-& agrave;-vis its suppliers and trace their evolution from a "compliance-based" to a more "collaborative" regime. We find that these controls did not simply guide, monitor, or assess supplier firms; they responsibilized them in a more fundamental sense, namely by virtue of scripting the suppliers' actorhood. We show how such scripting evolved in ways that enabled the buyer to progressively distance itself from certain sustainability and control problems, as emergent controls produced the legitimate supplier as an actor who can, and should, address sustainability in an increasingly autonomous and entrepreneurial manner. A key argument that we therefore develop is that sustainability control practices operate as technologies of actorhood that not only address sustainability problems but also redistribute locales of moral authority and responsibility in interorganizational settings-not only among actors but also into the invisible hand of the market. We further show how such constitution of organizational actorhood relies on, and triggers, processes of subjectivation at the individual level, as members come to embody their organization's imagined actorhood.
This study examines whether common ownership by institutional investors is associated with auditor sharing among their investee companies. Auditor sharing can enhance audit quality through facilitated monitoring and improve financial reporting comparability-two benefits that enable common owners to internalize externalities across their portfolio firms (i.e., to reduce negative spillovers from audit failures and to capture positive spillovers from improved comparability across commonly owned peer investees). Using same-industry company pairs in the United States, I find that common ownership is positively associated with the likelihood of sharing the same audit firm, and this association is stronger when co-owners have longer investment horizons or more aligned incentives. A quasi-experimental test leveraging BlackRock's acquisition of Barclays provides consistent evidence. Additional analyses indicate that shared board members serve as a potential channel through which auditor sharing arises. Finally, commonly owned, auditor-sharing companies exhibit higher audit quality and are more likely to collectively dismiss auditors following revealed failures, consistent with improved oversight. These findings contribute to the literature on shared auditors, auditor choice, and common ownership by showing how a noncontractual relationship induced by common ownership shapes auditor sharing across companies and influences the shared auditor's incentives. Cette & eacute;tude examine si la propri & eacute;t & eacute; commune des investisseurs institutionnels est corr & eacute;l & eacute;e au service d'audit partag & eacute; au sein de leurs entit & eacute;s & eacute;mettrices. Le service d'audit partag & eacute; peut augmenter la qualit & eacute; des audits en facilitant le contr & ocirc;le et en am & eacute;liorant la comparabilit & eacute; de l'information financi & egrave;re. Ces deux avantages permettent aux propri & eacute;taires communs d'internaliser les externalit & eacute;s de leurs portefeuilles (c'est-& agrave;-dire d'att & eacute;nuer les retomb & eacute;es n & eacute;gatives li & eacute;es aux & eacute;checs de l'audit tout en profitant des retomb & eacute;es positives attribuables & agrave; une meilleure comparabilit & eacute; entre les entit & eacute;s & eacute;mettrices). & Agrave; partir d'un & eacute;chantillon de paires d'entreprises aux & Eacute;tats-Unis op & eacute;rants dans le m & ecirc;me secteur d'activit & eacute;, l'auteur d & eacute;montre que la propri & eacute;t & eacute; commune est positivement corr & eacute;l & eacute;e & agrave; la probabilit & eacute; de mandater le m & ecirc;me cabinet d'audit. Cette corr & eacute;lation est plus forte pour les copropri & eacute;taires dont les horizons d'investissement sont plus & eacute;loign & eacute;s ou dont les int & eacute;r & ecirc;ts sont plus convergents. Un essai quasi exp & eacute;rimental portant sur l'acquisition de Barclays par BlackRock corrobore ces r & eacute;sultats. Des analyses plus pouss & eacute;es indiquent que la pr & eacute;sence d'administrateurs communs au conseil contribue & agrave; mettre en place un service d'audit partag & eacute;. Enfin, les entreprises sous contr & ocirc;le commun et utilisant un service d'audit partag & eacute; assurent une meilleure qualit & eacute; des audits et sont plus susceptibles de r & eacute;voquer collectivement les auditeurs & agrave; la suite d'& eacute;checs av & eacute;r & eacute;s, ce qui t & eacute;moigne d'une am & eacute;lioration des dispositifs de surveillance. Ces conclusions viennent enrichir les connaissances sur les auditeurs communs, le choix des auditeurs et la propri & eacute;t & eacute; commune en d & eacute;montrant comment une relation non contractuelle, fond & eacute;e sur la propri & eacute;t & eacute; commune, influe sur la mise en place d'un service d'audit partag & eacute; entre les entreprises et sur les incitations associ & eacute;es aux auditeurs communs.
This study investigates the adoption and implications of Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 842 lease accounting standards in private loan contracts. Analyzing a comprehensive sample of material loan contracts from 2011 to 2023, we document a pervasive reluctance to adopt ASC 842. Specifically, we find that for loans issued prior to, but maturing after, the standard effective date, only 41% of loans adopt the standard. For loans issued after the standard effective date, only 46% of loans adopt the standard. Our determinants analyses reveal that for loans issued prior to the effective date, the reluctance to adopt ASC 842 is associated with (1) a preference for using consistent lease classifications over time, (2) concerns about borrower opportunism, and (3) the costs of negotiating or renegotiating lease-related loan terms within lending syndicates. In contrast, for loans issued after the effective date, only negotiation costs are associated with the reluctance to adopt. Our findings suggest that the costs of adopting ASC 842 in private loan contracts often outweigh the benefits and that contracting parties prefer a stable accounting standard environment. Cette & eacute;tude examine l'adoption de la norme Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 842, relative & agrave; la comptabilisation des contrats de location pour les pr & ecirc;ts priv & eacute;s, et ses incidences. L'analyse d'un vaste & eacute;chantillon d'importants contrats de pr & ecirc;t conclus entre 2011 et 2023 r & eacute;v & egrave;le une forte r & eacute;ticence & agrave; adopter la norme ASC 842. Plus pr & eacute;cis & eacute;ment, les auteurs observent que, pour les pr & ecirc;ts accord & eacute;s avant la date d'entr & eacute;e en vigueur de la norme, mais dont l'& eacute;ch & eacute;ance est ult & eacute;rieure & agrave; celle-ci, le taux d'adoption de la norme n'atteint que 41 %. Quant aux pr & ecirc;ts accord & eacute;s apr & egrave;s la date d'entr & eacute;e en vigueur de la norme, le taux d'adoption de la norme n'atteint que 46 %. Des analyses approfondies r & eacute;v & egrave;lent que, pour les pr & ecirc;ts accord & eacute;s avant la date d'entr & eacute;e en vigueur, la r & eacute;ticence & agrave; adopter l'ASC 842 est corr & eacute;l & eacute;e (1) & agrave; une pr & eacute;f & eacute;rence, au fil du temps, pour l'utilisation d'une classification rigoureuse des contrats de location, (2) aux pr & eacute;occupations que soul & egrave;vent le comportement opportuniste des emprunteurs et (3) aux co & ucirc;ts associ & eacute;s & agrave; la n & eacute;gociation ou ren & eacute;gociation des conditions de pr & ecirc;t li & eacute;es aux contrats de location dans le cadre de pr & ecirc;ts syndiqu & eacute;s. En revanche, pour les pr & ecirc;ts accord & eacute;s apr & egrave;s la date d'entr & eacute;e en vigueur, seuls les co & ucirc;ts associ & eacute;s & agrave; la n & eacute;gociation sont corr & eacute;l & eacute;s & agrave; la r & eacute;ticence & agrave; adopter la norme. Les conclusions des auteurs sugg & egrave;rent que les co & ucirc;ts inh & eacute;rents & agrave; l'adoption de la norme ASC 842 pour les contrats de pr & ecirc;t priv & eacute;s exc & egrave;dent souvent les b & eacute;n & eacute;fices, soulignant une pr & eacute;f & eacute;rence des parties contractantes pour un environnement stable en mati & egrave;re de normes comptables.
We conduct two experiments to examine whether and how the framing (bonus vs. penalty) of a target-based incentive contract affects knowledge sharing and knowledge seeking. In the first experiment, we predict and find that penalty-framed contracts increase employees' stress due to the fear of potential loss, which in turn reduces their willingness to share knowledge. Additionally, consistent with loss aversion, employees under penalty-framed contracts are more likely to seek knowledge than those under bonus-framed contracts. The second experiment corroborates our theoretical arguments by demonstrating the crucial role of stress in reducing knowledge-sharing behavior. The results show that, when stress is alleviated through an informal control mechanism, penalty-framed contracts no longer reduce knowledge sharing. The implications of our findings for research and practice are discussed.
