ABSTRACT This paper critically examines the conceptual overstretch of weaponized interdependence (WI) in analyses of China's dominance over lithium and rare‐earth element (REE) markets. Although WI has become a central framework for interpreting EU–China economic relations, its application to raw materials often extends beyond the theory's original scope. Drawing on Farrell and Newman's framework, the paper identifies three major overstretches—the State–Firm Alignment Fallacy, the Network Rigidity Illusion, and the Unilateral Dependency Bias—that undermine the analytical precision of WI and distort assessments of China's coercive capacity. Through qualitative evidence from REE and lithium markets, the paper shows that China's leverage is constrained by fragmented domestic governance, adaptive market responses, and reciprocal dependencies. Overgeneralized uses of WI risk legitimizing securitized “de‐coupling” strategies that exacerbate global policy fragmentation. The paper argues for a more differentiated understanding of interdependence, centered on cooperative resilience rather than on zero‐sum narratives of economic coercion.
ABSTRACT In September 2021, the European Union launched its Indo‐Pacific strategy, outlining its intention to strengthen its engagement in the region and add value to its partnerships there. The strategy, however, drew criticism from the Chinese side, particularly because it included Chinese Taiwan as a cooperating partner. To examine Chinese responses to this EU strategy, this study conducted in‐depth, one‐on‐one interviews with 23 Chinese elites from government, influential public figures, and academia. The findings show that Chinese elites place a high value on the bilateral relations and acknowledge the EU as a great global actor. However, the EU's Indo‐Pacific Strategy (EUIPS) has raised several Chinese concerns centered on national territorial sovereignty, global geopolitical dynamics, and regional security and stability. This indicates that the release of the EUIPS has negatively impacted EU–China relations. This paper suggests that the EU could place greater emphasis on its role as a normative power, contributing positively to global development while avoiding political friction and conceptual misunderstandings, thereby preventing unnecessary regional anxiety and tensions.
ABSTRACT Recent shifts in European security have placed resilience at the center of deterrence and defense strategies. While resilience has traditionally been understood as the ability to withstand disruption and sustain military operations, there have been calls for a whole‐of‐society approach that strengthens societies against hybrid threats and disinformation operations from NATO adversaries. In this view, societal resilience rests on social cohesion, trust, and government legitimacy, strengthening deterrence by denial. Drawing on NATO's strategic documents and the broader European security policy debate, we argue that societal resilience continues to be framed in masculine and militarized terms, privileging state preparedness over the social conditions that make societies resilient. This narrow framing contradicts the whole‐of‐society approach and hampers the very idea of a more resilient society based on social cohesion, equality, inclusivity, and trust. We connect feminist security and resilience scholarship, the Women, Peace and Security critique, and critical scholarship on deterrence, resilience, and hybrid threats to analyze the gendered assumptions of contemporary European security debates, including those inspired by Ukraine's wartime experience. In doing so, we advance a feminist conceptualization of societal resilience as deterrence that moves beyond state preparedness by pluralizing its actors, levels of analysis, and objects of security.
ABSTRACT By privileging the intervention of Canada's prime minister, Mark Carney, in his January 2026 Davos address, the work aims to re‐engage with the debate around middle powers extending from academic scrutiny to instrumental practice. On core themes, Carney's address provides exceptional focal points pertaining to the role of this category of countries. In terms of the demand to take advantage of a new middle power moment, Carney moves the narrative about change in the international system to ‘rupture’. In terms of the supply of middle power agency, Carney foregrounds the animation of an entrepreneurial credo in state practice. That said, this article argues that notwithstanding the catalytic effect derived from Carney's address, its ability to act as a valuable guide faces serious challenges. Cutting into the image of middle powers as a uniform and viable entity is the high degree of contestation around these thematic assumptions. With a considerable degree of exhortatory cogency, Carney's address lays out the markers why the re‐imagining of middle powers is crucial. What remains with respect to the agenda of ongoing engagement—both intellectually by academics and in practice by pivotal policy makers—is to parse out the how, when and where this process takes place and push past the conceptual and navigational operational tests.
This article examines Indian perceptions of the EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy through interviews with government officials and foreign policy influencers. Despite viewing the EU positively as an important economic and normative partner, many Indian respondents were critical regarding how the EU's approach aligns with India's strategic priorities. Three key findings emerge: First, respondents highlighted a persistent tension between the EU's normative aspirations and the pragmatic developmental needs of Indo-Pacific nations; second, the EU's predominantly economic focus was seen as insufficiently addressing defence and security dimensions critical to regional stability; and third, the EU's cautious balancing between China and other regional actors creates perceptions of strategic ambiguity. These findings yield three policy recommendations: Scale up maritime dialogue and interoperability, strengthen economic initiatives that leverage India's expanding network of partnerships, and deepen the social foundations underpinning the partnership beyond elite-level engagement.
This paper puts forward five principles for a new economic consensus, which could serve as a modern alternative to the Washington Consensus of 35 years ago. They are built on new ideas that have gained currency in economics over the past three decades. We also provide examples of the policies that could follow from these principles. The goal is not to advocate a particular constellation of policies pitched as global 'best practice', because a one-size-fits-all approach does not make much sense: As local circumstances vary, so should policies. Ultimately, it is up to each polity to decide for itself. Our hope is that the principles contained in this paper can help organise the thinking required to make those decisions.
ABSTRACT This article develops a philosophical framework for understanding transgenerationality as a foundational concept for intergenerational justice. Drawing on social ontology and the philosophy of action, it introduces the notion of transgenerational civitas —a temporally extended community composed of past, present and future generations. The paper argues that transgenerational actions, characterised by epistemic and agentic asymmetries, require a diachronic conception of justice that moves beyond reciprocity. By integrating ontological commitments with normative reasoning, the article proposes a model of vertical justice capable of addressing long‐term collective responsibilities and mitigating the populist risks inherent in democratic systems.
More than four years after the EU released its Indo-Pacific Strategy (in April 2021), the Council of the EU provided fresh 'Conclusions' (in October 2025) stating that the EU should 'further intensify its strategic focus, presence, visibility and actions in the Indo-Pacific'. These conclusions were issued against a dramatically altered geopolitical backdrop, including the onset of the Russia-Ukraine War, worsening Sino-American relations and the advent of Trump 2.0. This article assesses the 2025 Council Conclusions against empirical findings from more than 100 semi-structured interviews across eight Indo-Pacific locations: Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. While the Conclusions feature harder security language and an elevated economic security agenda, the empirical data reveals a persistent gap between EU ambitions and Indo-Pacific elite perceptions. The article concludes that the 2025 Council Conclusions represent a modest, incremental response to the changing geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific, but prevailing issues around the EU's global actorness mean it will continue to fall short in its efforts to assert geopolitical relevance.
ABSTRACT Governments increasingly recognise that the digital domain can both bolster and undermine regime stability. Authoritarian states have shown notable agility in harnessing digital technologies to consolidate power, whereas democracies, once seen as natural beneficiaries of digital innovation, often struggle to respond effectively. The convergence of rapid technological change, emerging authoritarian threats (both from within and from abroad) and persistent governance gaps underscores the urgency of developing more adaptive strategies. Without proactive policymaking, stronger and better harmonised regulatory frameworks and sustained multilateral cooperation, the unchecked expansion of digital authoritarian practices risks eroding democratic governance from both within and without. This Special Issue examines the evolving dynamics of digital authoritarianism at both domestic and international levels and explores the range of policy options available to mitigate and counter the effects of digitally enabled authoritarian practices, whether homegrown or externally driven.
ABSTRACT This introduction investigates the role of justice as reciprocity in intergenerational settings. It argues that the growing prominence of intergenerational framing in contemporary policy agendas is best understood in light of distinct questions emerging within the normative debate on intergenerational justice. Thus, a proper understanding of this subject requires a fine‐grained analysis of three key dimensions, namely: analytical units (age groups vs. birth cohorts), temporal perspectives (lifetime vs. contemporaneous life stages), and scope (overlapping vs. nonoverlapping generations). The article then critically examines reciprocity as a foundational principle in liberal egalitarian thought, with particular reference to Rawlsian scholarship, highlighting both its enduring appeal and its limitations in intergenerational settings. The very idea of reciprocity is therefore disaggregated into comparative and noncomparative conceptions: Each account responds differently to the challenges posed by both overlapping and nonoverlapping generations. By situating the contributions to this Special Section within this framework, the article shows that the relationship between reciprocity and intergenerational justice is more complex and contested than commonly assumed.
ABSTRACT Indonesia's policy towards the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has taken a notable turn in the past few years. Previously, Jakarta responded to developments by providing humanitarian assistance; it now concerns itself with security and military affairs, and has adopted a more activist posture. Moch Faisal Karim's concept of ‘layered incoherence’ provides insight into the shift, but would do better to underscore the detrimental impact that a high degree of informality has on policymaking.
The Russian Federation is a founding member of the BRICS association and has been one of its key driving forces. Moscow has historically shared other members' interest in using the BRICS to reform global economic governance. Later, it treated the association as a tool in the geostrategic competition with the West and for promoting multipolarity. Significantly, the BRICS has also been an important status symbol for Russia, as it sought to reestablish its place among the great powers of the day. This paper examines how, since the start of the Ukraine War, Russia's BRICS policy has evolved into a vehicle for challenging the West's high-status positions in global financial architecture and the liberal international rules-based order.
ABSTRACT Despite the large reappraisal of the EU's security and economic interests in Central Asia, its foreign policy impact has remained weak. This article develops a constructivist, multi‐level framework to examine how European and Chinese approaches to decarbonization are translated into policy in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. I argue that the EU and China advance fundamentally different conceptions of decarbonization, yet neither approach determines outcomes directly. Rather, domestic civil society organizations, policymakers, and local institutions selectively appropriate, reinterpret, and contest these competing ideas in light of local developmental priorities. The article advances the concept of problem linkage, arguing that the EU's effectiveness depends on its ability to connect decarbonization with broader developmental, distributional, and social priorities that matter to Central Asian governments and civil society, rather than treating climate action as a stand‐alone policy objective. By bringing everyday political economy into the study of climate diplomacy, the article demonstrates that decarbonization is not simply exported by major powers but co‐produced through interactions between their priorities and local agency.
The post-pandemic inflation surge in the Eurozone demonstrates that large-scale monetary expansion is not neutral. Drawing on empirical evidence from a Vector autoregression (VAR) analysis, this commentary demonstrates that money supply growth became a dominant driver of inflation as temporary supply disruptions faded, eventually explaining more than one third of medium-term price dynamics. The findings suggest that once the European Central Bank's balance sheet expands beyond a certain threshold, inflation increasingly takes on a monetary character. For policymakers, the episode highlights the necessity to reevaluate assumptions regarding unconventional monetary policy, incorporate monetary aggregates into forward-looking decisions, and reconsider the limits of large-scale interventions to safeguard long-term price stability and institutional credibility.
In this paper, I look at how justice as reciprocity, once applied to the intergenerational domain, defines our duties in view of demographic fluctuations. I argue that the idea of direct reciprocity between birth cohorts, but also the ideas of direct and indirect reciprocity between age groups, should be abandoned. This leaves things open for an approach in terms of indirect reciprocity between birth cohorts. I explore what fluctuations in birth rate between successive birth cohorts entail from the perspective of justice as indirect reciprocity between generations. I argue that to find out whether fluctuations in natality have implications in terms of what generations owe each other, we should approach the matter in priority through the prism of justice between birth cohorts. Any repercussions at the level of duties between age groups will have to partly depend on how duties that birth cohorts have towards each other adjust to demographic change.
Given rising concerns regarding the potential role of artificial intelligence (AI) in diffusing nondemocratic governance principles, the import of AI technologies by African states has intensified scrutiny of China's expanding influence in global AI governance. This article examines whether the People's Republic of China (PRC) has effectively exported its unique AI governance principles through its Digital Silk Road and other global initiatives. The article makes two primary contributions. First, it traces the core tenets of Chinese AI governance and the channels through which Beijing seeks to disseminate them internationally, drawing on a systematic analysis of Chinese-language policy documents and official sources. As a second step, it assesses the extent to which these principles are reflected in African AI strategies, looking at continental and national AI strategies adopted by African democracies, focusing particularly on Ghana as a case study, and examining select AI cooperation projects involving Chinese partners. The findings indicate that AI governance strategies in African democracies largely align with Western-derived normative frameworks. African states exhibit strategic agency by selectively engaging a diverse array of external partners, including Chinese firms, to mitigate the risk of overdependence. Consequently, China's influence on AI norm diffusion in Africa should not be overstated.
The Norwegian Transparency Act, adopted in 2021, requires companies to undertake due diligence regarding human rights in their operations and global supply chains and disclose their efforts publicly. The authors assess compliance with the Transparency Act through a granular analysis of the mandatory accounts of due diligence published by a sample of 50 Norwegian consumer goods companies. Coding information from these accounts, the authors construct three indexes: minimum compliance, supply chain risk analysis, and due diligence program elements, to provide a descriptive analysis of corporate reporting under the Transparency Act. They find company performance is, at best, mediocre, and suggest that these accounts of due diligence do not provide enough information regarding risks to human rights in supply chains. The implications for improving compliance are discussed.
This article develops a conceptual framework that links the governance of and by artificial intelligence (AI) into a single continuum that varies across political regime types. Although existing scholarship typically treats governance of AI-oversight, regulation and ethical alignment-and governance by AI-the embedding of algorithms into decision-making-as separate domains, this article argues that such a dichotomy obscures their mutual dependence. It introduces the framework of Reflexive Polycentric Control (RPC), which views AI governance as two coupled feedback loops: an outer loop of societal oversight and an inner loop of operational deployment. Drawing on reflexive modernization, cybernetic control theory and polycentric governance, RPC specifies three design principles-distributed authority, requisite variety and reflexive checkpoints-that enable stability and adaptability. The framework further highlights how regime type conditions loop dynamics. Democracies exhibit resilience but fragmentation, autocracies achieve coherence at the cost of brittleness, and transitional regimes face volatility because of inconsistent feedback. RPC thereby provides a logically coherent, testable baseline for analysing AI governance across diverse political contexts and for guiding future empirical research.
Growing awareness of social and environmental risks in global supply chains has driven a shift from voluntary corporate responsibility toward mandatory due diligence legislation. These emerging regulatory frameworks require businesses to identify, prevent, and mitigate adverse human rights and environmental impacts, thereby redefining the boundaries of corporate accountability. Within this evolving context, voluntary sustainability standards (VSS), which have hitherto functioned as central actors in transnational governance through standard-setting, certification, and capacity building, must reconsider their roles and strategic orientations. This paper examines the implications of due diligence legislation for VSS through a qualitative case study of the Global Organic Textile Standard (GOTS), a leading certification scheme in the textile sector, leading to two key findings. First, rather than weakening VSS, public regulation can strengthen voluntary standards by establishing a legal floor that empowers private regulators to raise sustainability requirements more ambitiously than market constraints allow. Second, international organizations, through the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), play a critical role in orchestrating public-private alignment through benchmarking and guidance, mitigating risks of fragmentation in complex governance regimes. The paper thereby contributes to debates on hybrid and "smart mix" regulatory approaches.
