In ethical debates on moral status, a common assumption is that in cases of uncertainty it is safer to be over-inclusive rather than under-inclusive when defining the boundaries of our moral community. Some argue that, since it cannot be definitively ruled out that AI might one day possess morally relevant capacities—such as consciousness or the ability to feel pain—a more ethically cautious approach may be to treat AI as a moral patient. But is over-inclusiveness truly the more cautious approach to AI? I argue that the risks associated with the over-attribution of moral status to AI are more likely in the short term, as they are already materializing. This is illustrated by cases of so-called AI psychosis, as well as by the potential to divert resources and care away from beings that clearly need them toward parasocial relationships with AI. By contrast, the risks associated with under-attributing moral status to AI—existence of which I do not deny—can, to a certain extent, be mitigated by other ethical reasons for refraining from interacting with AI in problematic ways. Such reasons (e.g., concern for one’s own moral character, respect for norms governing certain social practices, or aversion to symbolic violence) do not, however, require attributing moral status to AI itself.
Interest in legal regulations and ethical standards regarding the use of animals in scientific research remains constant. Changing societal attitudes and the development of alternative research methods have contributed to the increased importance of transparency and effective communication in this field. International standards of openness are gaining acceptance among many institutions, although they have not yet been fully implemented in the public sphere in Poland. Social media have enabled faster information exchange, but also raised challenges related to the reliability of the message. Data from reports on the use of animals in research, collected between 2011 and 2022, are redefining the boundaries of acceptable practices and highlighting changes in the language that reflect a modern approach to human-animal relationships. A key challenge remains building public trust, which requires methodological transparency, effective communication, and education on alternative research methods. Creating communication groups for animal experiments that separate the responsibility of researchers from institutions could improve informational processes and support young researchers. Changes in the approach to animal welfare and the minimization of suffering require legislative, educational, and open dialogue between science and society. Only through the integration of different perspectives can a balanced approach to animal research be achieved.
The principle of parsimony in relation to medical diagnosis states that a physician should always choose simpler diagnostic hypotheses. This principle is the subject of analysis not only by philosophers of science but also by clinicians. The article will demonstrate that the significance of this principle is not based on its a priori justification (the perspective of philosophers) but on the fact that it can serve as a starting point for a better understanding of the process of generating new hypotheses in medical diagnosis. It will be shown that in this process, the diagnostician is guided by three main rules of data management: the principle of errors avoidance (PEA), the principle of epistemic benefits increase (EBI) and the disease prevalence condition (DPC). These rules have different roles in diagnostic decisions in various epistemic contexts.
Community, which occupies a central place in Gerald Allan Cohen’s political philosophy, is characterized by the mutual care that individuals extend to each other. This study illustrates this often-overlooked value across different contexts and proposes a new conceptual model of how the (in)equality of economic distribution influences its viability. I argue that the realization of the value of community can be undermined by two interrelated elements: an objective element, the hierarchical stratification of life experiences, and a subjective element, the perception among the disadvantaged that the better-off choose not to assist them. Building on this, I contend that, compared to alternative distributive principles such as utilitarianism, sufficientarianism, limitarianism, maximinism, and prioritarianism, egalitarianism most robustly sustains the community value. Accordingly, community itself furnishes a powerful rationale for endorsing egalitarianism over competing distributive principles, a conclusion further corroborated by the core insights of relational egalitarianism.
Roman Ingarden's ontological conception of relations constitutes a complex and unconventional approach to this issue. Nevertheless, it has not become a central focus for researchers’ interest in Ingarden's work, nor does it serve as a significant point of reference for contemporary ontologists exploring relations. Therefore, given its indisputable value on the one hand, and the limited scope of existing research on the other, an analysis of Ingarden's theory of relations, along with an attempt to situate it within a broader context, seem justified. I begin this work by presenting, in the first chapter, three fundamental ways of conceiving relations: as polyadic properties, as sui generis properties, and as reducible to ordinary non-relational properties. The second chapter is devoted to an introduction to Ingarden's theory of relations, in which I discuss both a number of formal-ontological issues as well as the problem of the existential status of relations. The third chapter provides a detailed examination of the multi-element formal structure of relations according to Ingarden's view. Finally, in the fourth chapter, Ingarden's theory is compared with the previously discussed approaches to understanding relations, which highlights its synthetic character
In this commentary on Giubilini et al.'s 2025 paper, Expertise, Disagreement, and Trust in Vaccine Science and Policy: The Importance of Transparency in a World of Experts, I argue that building public trust during health emergencies requires more than addressing uncertainty, expert disagreement and gaps in knowledge-it demands trustworthy public health advocacy. Such advocacy must be explicit, transparent, and evidence-based. I expand Giubilini's et al. argument and I focus on additional issues specific for epidemiology and public health. I point out that trust hinges on recognizing the multiple roles epidemiologists play in public discourse, that epidemiologists should be explicit about assuming the role of an advocate for specific public health policies, and that these policies are not only compulsory but also oriented toward public health rather than individual interests.
This special issue of Diametros critically examines the evolving relationship between bio-ethics and political philosophy, focusing on the limitations of autonomy-centric and neutrality-based liberalism in addressing contemporary bioethical challenges. Through four contributions, by Greg Bognar, S & oslash;ren Holm, Jurga Jonutyt & edot;, and Thaddeus Metz, the issue explores the normative tensions surrounding genetic enhancement, the exclusionary use of public reason in bioethics, the ontologi-cal dimensions of identity under institutional humiliation, and the moral justification of healthcare allocation. Drawing on real-world examples such as vaccine hesitancy, conscientious objection in healthcare, disability activism, and treatment prioritization, the authors argue for a rethinking of liberal frameworks in light of biopolitical complexity.
This paper discusses the use of public reason requirements as a tool for boundary work within academic philosophical bioethics. The concept of "public reason" as a requirement for legitimate interventions in policy debates in liberal democracies has been received into bioethics from political philosophy. The version of public reason requirements that is most often referred to in bioethics is the version developed by John Rawls. However, the concept that has been received, its scope, and the way in which it is applied have arguably changed through the reception process. The relation between the original Rawlsian concept, and the "Rawlsian" concept that is used in bioethics is therefore not straightforward. The paper first analyzes some of the changes that have happened in the reception process and then moves on to a discussion about the use of public reason as a boundary setting tool demarcating proper bioethics activity. It is argued that this boundary setting is problematic philosophically, since it relies on a misapplication of the public reason requirements as they have been developed in political philosophy; and that it is also performatively self-defeating in any context where religious arguments de facto play a role in public, democratic policy-making discourse.
The text discusses and critically examines the concept of medical populism that appears in the works of Gideon Lasco. The author uses this concept to describe political strategies directed against medical activities. The concept of medical populism seems to be a useful research tool, but due to the assumptions adopted by Lasco, it has certain limitations. First, it does not take into account the structural relationship between politics and science that exists in modern democratic states. Second, it ignores the complex and controversial history of medicine and its inherent power. The omission of these aspects results in very limited results achieved by using this concept, namely, the term populism continues to be used as a stigmatizing tool, not as an explanatory one. This does not mean that this concept should be abandoned, but rather that its meaning should be modified.
Biomedical research involving minors or other persons incapable of giving consent raise many complex ethical issues, particularly when the research offers no prospect of direct therapeutic benefit to the participants. To protect such individuals from exploitation and undue risks that compromise their dignity, integrity, rights, and well-being, most ethical and regulatory standards prohibit the enrollment of incompetent subjects in studies that have no therapeutic potential, unless participation involves only minimal risk and burden. This well-established standard has also been adopted by Regulation (EU) No 536/2014 on Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for Human Use, and Repealing Directive 2001/20/EC, which recently entered into force. However, the provisions of the Regulation defining the minimal risk threshold are so ambiguous and confusing that they can easily be interpreted in ways that are unethical and inconsistent with the overall goals of the legislation. This paper critically analyzes the minimal risk requirement of the Clinical Trials Regulation and offers an ethically and legally sound interpretation of the threshold in “non-therapeutic” clinical trials involving selected categories of vulnerable subjects.
In this article, I analyze a conflict between two general moral intuitions. The first, formulated by Max Scheler as the principle of solidarity, states that we are all responsible for the moral worth of every other person. According to the second, the moral condition of an agent can only be taken care of by himself. I present an attempt to reconcile the above two principles using the category of moral vulnerability. In the first part, I present the main conflict points between the principle of solidarity and the principle of individual self-responsibility. In the second - I identify the concepts of moral vulnerability present in the ethical literature and analyze the corresponding modifications of the principle of solidarity. In the third, I offer a definition of moral vulnerability as a relational phenomenon in which one agent, through their actions or omissions, can influence whether another will find themselves in or be able to recover from a situation of moral conflict. I argue that this understanding of moral vulnerability allows for the formulation of a convincing version of the principle of solidarity consistent with the principle of individual self-responsibility.
I argue that strong intuitions about how the state ought to allocate healthcare are incompatible with quite influential autonomy-centric and neutral strains of liberal political theory. Specifically, I maintain that it is uncontroversial that we should routinely distribute medical treatments in public hospitals in ways that have little to no bearing on patients’ ability to pursue a wide array of ends and further that we cannot easily avoid making judgments of which ways of life are good (or bad) when making such distributions. These intuitions tell against the principles that the state in general should aim merely to protect individuals’ rights to choose their own ways of life and should not take sides on which lives are good (or bad) when adopting policy or law. I show that this tension, which has notbeen addressed in the literature, manifests in at least three types of healthcare decisions, viz., which types of treatments should be offered to patients, how to prioritize among types of treatments, and who should receive a certain type of treatment. I do not prescribe how to resolve the tension, that is, whether to reject autonomy-centric and neutral forms of liberalism or revise judgments about how public medical facilities should allocate healthcare, but instead I establish the point that one must choose between them.
The aim of the article is twofold: to analyze the different possible reactions of a subject to institutional humiliation, and to ground these reactions in different habits of self-ontologization, differentiating between weak and strong models of identification. In order to illustrate the analyzed theoretical distinctions, I use two cases in the article: two narratives of individuals who experienced the disdain of officials because of their non-normative bodies. Both people were confronted with the norms and concepts prevailing in society that humiliate them in the most symbolic expression of normativity. However, this encounter led to completely different attitudes towards social order and modes of self-identification. The article consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, I will discuss two basic conceptions of identification and raise a question about their forms in practice. In the second chapter, I relate one of these ways to the concept of process ontology (and particularly to the concept of the incorporeal) and discuss the different possible types of self-ontologization in situations of official disdain. The third chapter is devoted to the relationship between power and the subject: the ambiguous character of power is revealed and two different reactions (surrendering to power, and assuming resistant power) are related to the modes of self-ontologizing. I also rethink the concept of vulnerability in two different ways, revealed by the cases analyzed: vulnerability is discussed in relation to either the concept of resistance or the concept of resilience, which lead back to different conceptions of identity.
In this paper, I address the familiar argument that heritable genome editing will lead to a dystopian future in which there are two classes of human beings: an elite with enhanced mental and physical abilities and a vast underclass of ordinary humans who do not enjoy the advantages of genetic enhancement technologies. Contrary to previous discussions, however, I assume that this development takes place in a decent, liberal democratic state. This allows ideas from political theory to be applied to the argument. I begin by describing a possible pathway to the dystopian future, building on the ideas of knowledge resistance, social distrust, and cognitive biases that lead a large part of the population to reject beneficial genetic technology. Then I ask: How should a liberal state respond to the resulting inequalities? Does liberal political theory have the resources to give us some guidance? I examine the issues from the perspective of both distributive and relational egalitarianism.
The paper discusses the notion of medical populism appearing in the work of Gideon Lasco. This notion is used to describe recent protests against some medical decisions. Medical populism appears to be a useful research tool, but due to the assumptions made by Lasco, it has some limitations. Firstly, it does not take into account the structural relationship between politics and science existing in modern democracies. Secondly, it ignores the complex and controversial history of medicine and its inherent power. By excluding these aspects, the concept of medical populism cannot bring but limited results. However, the term itself should not be abandoned, but rather its meaning should be modified.
This paper introduces the special issue of Diametros devoted to discussing “Expertise, Disagreement, and Trust in Vaccine Science and Policy. The Importance of Transparency in a World of Experts” by Alberto Giubilini, Rachel Gur-Arie, and Euzebiusz Jamrozik. In their article, Giubilini et al. argue that expert transparency—particularly regarding disagreements among experts—is ethically crucial for securing public trust in vaccine policy. Several contributors to this issue expand upon that claim. For example, Maciej Macuga proposes that transparency is necessary to make coercive vaccination policies morally legitimate, and Lucie White interprets the core disagreement surrounding vaccine recommendations as a divergence in underlying values. Other authors challenge aspects of Giubilini et al.’s position: Udo Schüklenk and Ben Almassi caution that greater transparency may not bolster trust or improve vaccine uptake, while Ezio Di Nucci presents an analytical argument showing that a purely epistemic notion of expertise leads to paradoxical conclusions—namely, that experts should care neither about trustworthiness, nor trust. Jamie Watson emphasizes that it is the reliable process of producing scientific knowledge that grounds expert trustworthiness. Finally, Elena Popa and Richard Matthews argue that redistributions of power, both in society at large and within expert communities, are necessary to foster genuine trust.
