In the context of contemporary politics, it is common to encounter seemingly empirical claims that actually serve an expressive function. This paper delves into this distinction between the descriptive and the evaluative within the political context. In particular, it introduces three general forms of non-cognitivism and explores which one could account for the distinction in relevant political cases. Two of these forms of non-cognitivism advocate for a sharp separation between the descriptive and the evaluative, while the other maintains that these dimensions cannot be disentangled in many instances. We contend that only the last one, which we call Fusion Non-Cognitivism, can successfully accommodate the relevant cases. In the second part of the paper, we dig into Fusion Non-Cognitivism by exploring how and when a particular statement counts as a factual or evaluative one. To do so, we introduce three types of normativity—Platonist Normativity, Community Normativity, and Judgment Normativity—and argue that Non-Cognitivism needs to embrace Judgment Normativity.
In this paper, I critically examine the conceptual move made by the Stranger in Plato’s Sophist when he subsumes both the angler and the sophist under the category of hunters, two kinds of entities that common sense would not initially classify in the same way. Taking this case as my point of departure, I develop a defence of common sense akin to that advanced by G. E. Moore, although it rests on different arguments. To this end, I contrast two pairs of philosophical styles: the reformist and the exploratory, on the one hand, and the dialectical style of Socrates and the synoptic style of Protagoras, on the other. Against abstract and revisionary generalisations, I argue for an approach that is attentive to the diversity of conceptual uses and to their connection with experience. My aim is neither to defend ordinary language against more technical vocabularies nor to endorse the linguistic turn, but rather to advocate a reflective equilibrium among concepts, practices, and reality.
“Thought experiments” are common in many scientific disciplines and can have significant theoretical consequences. However, we know they can fail, which leads to the question of how to establish that a thought experiment legitimately achieves its result. Given the modal dimension of thought experiments, one plausible option is to address this question within the framework of a particular modal epistemology. However, David Chalmers’ modal epistemology, incompatible with the currently most widely accepted view of thought experiments, could pose a significant obstacle to developing this option. Seeking to determine the viability of this option, in this manuscript I analyze and evaluate this form of modal epistemology, particularly whether it advances our understanding of modal thinking. My discussion will focus on notions crucial to Chalmers, such as “primary conceivability,” “ideal conceivability,” and “positive conceivability.” I will begin by presenting what is arguably the most widely accepted conception of thought experiments, and then move on to discuss Chalmers’ approach. Finally, I will consider some theoretical alternatives in the field of modal epistemology; the compatibility of one of them with the most accepted view on thought experimentas will allow us to conclude that the path is clear to develop the aforementioned option.
This paper makes two contributions to Frege scholarship. It provides an explanation of Frege's perplexing claim that the premises of an inference must be true, and an analysis and reconstruction of Frege's highly abbreviated proof of modus ponens in his Begriffsschrift. These two endeavours are intertwined. First, Frege insists that for something to be an inference, its premises must be acknowledged as true, and also that they must be true. Both claims are unusual. They have puzzled scholars for decades, with a satisfactory explanation still lacking. Based on textual analysis primarily of Begriffsschrift §§5‒6 and Frege's correspondence with Jourdain and Dingler, I argue that for Frege the truth of the premises is required for the validity of an inference — more precisely, of an inference whose premises are acknowledged as true. In this sense, in Fregean inference the truth of the premises is subordinate to the acknowledgment of their truth. Second, Frege's proof of modus ponens in Begriffsschrift §6 emerges as being grounded in a pragmatic incompatibility between the falsehood of assertible contents and their acknowledgement as true. (The parallel to the Begriffsschrift passage in Basic Laws I is treated in a companion paper.)
