W AGE-incentive plans have operated under great strains during the past decade, and the productivity standards on which wage payments are based have deteriorated faster than in normal years. Because loose standards usually result in low worker productivity, a review of the conditions contributing to this accelerated decline is timely for those managements currently using wage-incentive plans but even more important for those managements considering their adoption. Statistics are not available to measure the depth or prevalence of standards deterioration in the economy. However, an informal survey conducted by this writer indicates that only a very few companies using wage incentives have maintained adequate productivity standards during recent years. Although the degree of looseness does vary considerably from one company to another, the condition does not seem to be confined to certain industries or geograpical areas. In this article the writer summarizes his observations in twelve companies, selected from a larger survey for more intensive study, and points out those problem areas which require management's attention if adequate productivity standards are to be maintained.
EXCEPTING such global data as those ~presented by C. K. Hobson in his ~L~s Export of Capital, readily available statistics on income derived from investments made by Britishers overseas have been scanty until very recently. Among the compilations that have appeared in print since the termination of World War II, the most comprehensive is the one published in 1950 by the Bank of England under the title United Kingdom Overseas Investments, 1938 to 1948. Although this compilation does not include rates of return, it does present data from which such rates can be ascertained by means of patient and persistent calculation, and it not only classifies the in considerable detail, according to both its nature and its geographical distribution, but takes account of companies registered abroad as well as at home, separating the investment in government securities from the investment, usually more profitable, in business enterprises, and listing the latter under two headings, namely, capital, customarily more remunerative, and loan capital (debentures and bonds). It is the purpose of this essay, which is based upon the data supplied by the Bank of England and has involved an almost incredible number of computations, to summarize British overseas investment during the decade starting with 1939 and ending with 1948, emphasizing rates of return, in the hope that a summary of this kind may have significance for the current program of stimulating the economic development of the underdeveloped (or, perhaps, improperly developed) countries of the world. A few comments on the nature of the data dealt with must be made at the outset. The figures presented for the investment represent par values and not market values and are somewhat incomplete (only some three-fourths of the total), insurance companies, maritime shipping companies, some private firms, and several other enterprises of minor importance being omitted. Moreover, aggregates are given in round numbers, and figures for rates of return take no account of share bonuses or losses and represent the approximate income actually received in the United Kingdom, whether by the investors or by the commissioners of inland revenue. Capital losses, however, were by no means as great as the contraction of the investment over the decade might suggest, since the was reduced mainly by the sale of assets. Capital statistics refer to the end of the years specified. This large segment of the overseas investment of residents of the British Isles shrank from ?3,490 million in 1939 to ?1,960 million in 1948, and income actually received declined from ?143.8 million to ?116.4 million. The average nominal rate of return for the decade was approximately 4.4 per cent annually, *Professor of American history, University of Chicago.
W~T7ITH the impending expiration XX! of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act the debate about possible changes in that triennial piece of legislation has again become quite active. And there now seems to be a greater awareness generally regarding the importance of raising the volume and value of imports coming into this country. The time has passed when one could dismiss lightly the idea that lies behind the slogan of Trade, Not Aid. Firmly adhered to in many countries, this principle cannot be tampered with any more without risking grave and unpredictable economic and political consequences. Since agreement on the value for more imports can be taken for granted, we must balance it against the interest of the domestic producer whose business existence, while perhaps not terminated, will be made uncomfortable for a time at least by any appreciable trade liberalization. Closely tied in with the interests of the producer-employer are of course those of the workers whose jobs such a trade liberalization would threaten. This may therefore be an opportune moment for bringing into focus an idea which has had a way of hovering over trade-policy discussions but hardly ever seems to have held still long enough to be grasped and dissected. The idea refers to the granting of assistance toward lightening the burden of adjustments' to be made by industry and labor on account of reductions in rates of prevailing tariff duties for competing goods.2 The remainder of this paper will try to show that a fairly good case can be made for a conceivably workable method of handling claims for assistance in making adjustments to tariff reductions on a case-by-case basis. If such a program were authorized, and furnished with an appropriation, it seems likely that it could then be operated without need of further legislative action. If it proves acceptable, the method presented here may offer some guide lines for a more elaborate program of granting such assistance to business enterprises and workers.' The
