This chapter offers a eulogy for Leonid Hurwicz, who was a transforming figure in modern economic theory. His early theory has found more resonance today among some game theorists, under the name of “algorithmic game theory.” In 1972, Hurwicz restated the problem of choice in decentralized systems. He added the important condition of incentive compatibility to the criteria for a suitable allocation system with decentralized information. He also emphasized the game-theoretic formulation, now as a matter of design. Important as Hurwicz’s work on allocation mechanisms was, it was far from exhausting his contributions to economics. The chapter is augmented by a postscript, a tribute from 1977 when Hurwicz was elected a Distinguished Fellow of the American Economic Association.

Do information differences across US physicians contribute to treatment disparities? This paper uses a unique new dataset to evaluate how changes in physician access to a decision-relevant drug database affect prescribing decisions. Our results indicate doctors using the reference have a significantly greater propensity to prescribe generic drugs, are faster to begin prescribing new generics, and prescribe a more diverse set of products. These results are consistent with database users responding primarily to the increased accessibility of non-clinical information such as pricing and insurance formulary data, and suggest improvements to physician information access have important implications for aggregate healthcare costs. (JEL D83, I11, I18, L65)

During an Industrial and Corporate Change conference at the University of California, Berkeley in December 2016, a roundtable discussion on The Legacy of Nathan Rosenberg and the Importance of Economic History was held on December 12th, 2016. The discussion was chaired by Professor David J. Teece and included Professors David C. Mowery whose introductory comments form the basis of the present Introduction to this Nathan Rosenberg Memorial Issue. It also included roundtable interventions by Professors Kenneth Arrow, Giovanni Dosi, Uve Granstrand, Richard R. Nelson, and Gavin Wright. The following text constitutes a revised version of the contributions by each participant.

This chapter shows how China's welfare state is partially responsible for its imbalanced economic growth model, characterised by an overreliance on export-led manufacturing industries and the laggard development of the service economy. It argues that the expansive Chinese pension system facilitates the expansion of the manufacturing sector by subsidising the training of workers with industrial specific skills, as this system is designed to do, but it has an unintended consequence. The political-economic logic has shown that China's pension system is dictated by the need of the Chinese economy. Rebalancing the Chinese economy, the overriding priority in Chinese government's post-crisis macroeconomic policy, therefore requires adjustments to the Chinese pension system. The chapter examines the structure of the Chinese economy through the lens of this study's political-economic framework. China's …

In 1951 Kenneth Arrow published a book in which he proved that social choice was impossible. There was no way to amalgamate individual preference orderings into a social preference ordering in such a way that certain rational and normative conditions were met. Later Gibbard and Satterthwaite proved that any such amalgamation of individual preference orderings in which there was no advantage to any individual to use strategy to order their preferences insincerely in order to get a better result for themselves was impossible or led to the selection of a dictator. These impossibility theorems have been thought to rule out economic direct democracy and also welfare economics giving credibility to the implication that representative democracy and capitalist economics are the best systems that can be devised. Instead of simple amalgamation, we have devised a more general information processing system which accepts inputs from individual choosers as either preference orderings or ratings and outputs a social choice which may consist of one or more outcomes and can be in the form of either cardinal or ordinal information. This system is utility based but processes the information in such a way as to alleviate concerns about interpersonal comparisons of utility. It is a hybrid utilitarian approval choosing system. Instead of the individual choosers using strategy, the system itself maximizes the efficacy of each individual input thus disincentivising individuals from choosing insincerely. It also meets Arrow's five rational and normative conditions thus proving that social choice is not impossible. The result is that a utility based social choice system has been devised which negates both impossibility theorems and should give new life to welfare economics and economic direct democracy.

Research subject represented by the theoretical and practical issues use of information resources in the agricultural business. Research aim is to formation of a conceptual model of information system of agricultural enterprises according to the requirements of sustainable development. Research methods. The work is prepared on basis of several scientific methods and approaches including monographic, analytical, computational and constructive methods of mathematical and structural logic simulation of information systems. Research results. Based on the assessment of the results of research information systems in agribusiness, as reflected in the theoretical review, the author designed principles of the information system for the agricultural enterprise for sustainable development of agribusiness. Sphere of application of the research results. State and regional authorities of economic regulation. Agricultural enterprises and farmers.

The conceptual framework of political effectiveness, political stability and political adaptability has revealed the nature of corporate governance in multiple dimensions within a broader and evolving institutional context. Compared with organisational embedment, the Chinese Communist Partys ideological penetration has a more far-reaching effect on corporate governance. The concept of political adaptability demonstrates the role of corporate governance as developmental integrator in the context of the party-state–society synergy. The Chinese model of corporate governance involves elite-guided forced saving through which economic growth can be technically spurred by a technocratic system in an instrumental manner. To improve the effectiveness of corporate governance, policy design should therefore focus on keeping a dynamic balance between exercising state ownership rights to reduce agency costs and …

The role of information as a commodity in economic system is studied. It is shown that the information can influence the economic models consequences as well as the behavior of economic agents. The role of information on the markets is studied, in particular, the influence of information on the crises. The problems of information acquisition are considered and mechanisms of economic decision making under asymmetry of information are discussed.