The Handala Hacker Group is as a sophisticated and advanced cyber-attack group, tied to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence. Handala allows Iran to conduct information warfare against Israel and the Iranian opposition, joining Iran's existing roster of offensive cyber strike units. Beginning in 2023, Handala conducted numerous cyber-attacks, primarily against targets in Israel, with several incidents also reported in the United States and Europe. Targets included healthcare facilities, information technology, electronics, education, government and defense. While other state-operated hackers (such as those known to operate in Russia, North Korea, Syria, China and elsewhere), are clandestine and almost invisible, Handala operates openly, following a released plan, exposing and taking responsibility for each of their achievements. This mode of operating openly allows researchers to study the strategies and tactics used by these types of cyber attackers. This study's research question is to what extent does the Handala hacking group engage in cyberterrorism as opposed to using hacking primarily as a tool of psychological warfare? The study is based on a database of publicly available content associated with the Handala hacker group. We applied a qualitative content analysis of posts by the Handala hacker group, employing natural language processing (NLP) analysis in Google Colab in order to identify patterns and trends in the data, while relying on inductive manual coding. The findings indicate that Handala's activity focuses more on psychological warfare than on damaging the systems they have penetrated.
After the military defeat of the Islamic State (IS) in the Middle East, the primary activity of this terrorist organization has shifted to African countries. Similar to al-Qaeda, from which it originally emerged, IS has in recent years aimed at establishing cooperation or incorporating African Islamist extremist movements under its own brand. Currently, the majority of originally insurgent Islamist movements in Africa (at least formally) fall under the franchise of either of the two aforementioned global jihadist terrorist organizations. The article focuses on three case studies-Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama'ah in Mozambique-and analyses possible changes in the strategies of these Islamist insurgent movements after they began cooperating with international terrorist organizations. The article also examines the counterinsurgency strategies of these countries' state actors and focuses on possible changes in their approaches toward the insurgent movements reflecting their respective shifts in strategy.
This study qualitatively examined factors shaping disengagement from violent extremism. Fifteen former extremists participated in interviews about their experiences of radicalization, engagement, and disengagement, The current study focused on factors that motivated leaving. Four push factors emerged: (1) social and interpersonal repercussions, (2) personal risks and consequences, (3) intra-group conflict, and (4) cognitive shift related to ideology and morality. Three pull factors were also identified: (1) humanizing experiences with diverse individuals/out-group members, (2) social support, and (3) life changes and new priorities/opportunities. The findings improve our understanding of the psychosocial and contextual factors that motivate individuals to leave extremist organizations.
Fire has long been recognized as holding a wealth of symbolism across disciplinary contexts. However, its symbolic role in political violence has yet to be evaluated. This theoretical contribution explores a range of contexts in which fire is employed as a figurative or literal device in acts and threats of political violence. Through an evaluation of nine instances across a variety of extremist ideologies, we identify six thematic messages conveyed with and through invocations of fire: fire as threat; fire as destruction; fire as protest; fire as sacrifice; fire as restoration; and fire as performance. We argue that evaluating the ubiquity of fire symbolism across extremist ideologies has the potential to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of extremist messaging. By considering the symbolic value in the means as well as the ends of political violence, we can better understand how such acts constitute "bloody theater".
This study examines the factors predicting perceived paramilitary influence in Northern Ireland more than 25 years after the Belfast-Good Friday Agreement. Drawing on data from the 2024 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (N = 1,199), our analysis reveals that perceptions of paramilitary control are primarily associated with urban residence, heightened subjective insecurity, and younger age cohorts, rather than traditional sectarian identities or political affiliations. Specifically, urban residents were six times more likely to perceive paramilitary influence, while respondents feeling unsafe in their neighborhoods showed elevated odds of reporting such control. Younger adults (18-44 years) were significantly more likely than older cohorts to perceive paramilitary presence, suggesting generational differences in exposure to contemporary forms of coercion. These findings indicate a qualitative shift in paramilitary activity from conflict-era political violence to localized criminal governance embedded in everyday insecurity. Theoretically, the study contributes to scholarship on social embeddedness in post-conflict societies, demonstrating how (erstwhile) armed actors sustain authority through local networks and informal control mechanisms long after formal decommissioning of weapons. The Northern Ireland case illustrates that formal peace does not eliminate coercive actors; rather, it signals their transformation into subtler, socially embedded forms of informal governance.
Instead of examining the well-studied questions of why rebels pursue diplomacy or what its outcomes are, this study centers on how rebels carry out diplomatic practice. It examines the Syrian Democratic Forces' (SDF) efforts to secure US support. The paper explores its' diplomatic timing, targeting, and rhetorical strategies. The findings suggest the SDF's diplomacy was shaped by politics as much as battlefield conditions in Syria. While the rebels mimicked state diplomacy, their lobbying tactics closely resembled those of conventional US interest groups, raising important questions about how we conceptualize the hybrid practices of rebel diplomats.
Traditional views hold that militant groups ally based on shared ideology. This study examines how high-threat environments, such as civil wars, state repression, and episodes of inter-group competition, influence alliances between ideologically dissimilar militant groups. Using the MGAR dataset, we test four hypotheses and find that civil conflict and the presence of rival militant groups increase the likelihood of inter-group alliances, while state repression predicts the provision of operational support across ideologically diverse groups. These findings highlight the flexibility of ideology under extreme pressure, demonstrating that strategic considerations often override ideological commitment. We present theoretical refinements for understanding militant decision-making and practical guidance for predicting patterns in conflict environments.
Extremist milieus are highly dynamic and continuously evolving. The COVID-19 pandemic beginning in 2020 had a strong impact on many such environments. German sovereign citizens, commonly referred to as "Reichsb & uuml;rger" and "Selbstverwalter", have frequently integrated pandemic conspiracy theories into their worldview. With the pandemic, conspiracy theories from the QAnon movement have arrived in Germany as well. Initially emerging in 2017 in the digital space, QAnon narratives have spread globally in recent years and motivated people worldwide to commit criminal and violent acts. This article explores the ideological convergence between German sovereign citizens and the QAnon movement using a qualitative content analysis of extremist primary material. The study underscores the need for further interdisciplinary research to fully understand the implications of this ideological fusion and to develop effective prevention and intervention strategies.
This article examines the evolution of interoperability within the European Union (EU)'s counterterrorism policy framework, arguing that recent developments represent a paradigmatic shift rather than incremental institutional change. Drawing on historical and constructivist institutionalism, we contrast the limited policy outcomes following the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) terrorist attacks with the ongoing implementation of a centralized EU interoperability framework since the Paris (2015) and Brussels (2016) attacks. Utilizing empirical data from EU documents and expert interviews, we identify cognitive reframing, strategic policy entrepreneurship and positive feedback mechanisms as drivers of this transformation. Our findings suggest that, while the interoperability agenda promises to enhance cross-border security coordination, it also raises critical concerns regarding data protection and purpose limitation. As such, interoperability illustrates both the potential and the tension of EU internal security integration: it offers functional gains in counterterrorism governance, but also reveals the normative and operational challenges of embedding supranational data infrastructures in a fragmented political and legal environment.
This article discusses the distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare as being descriptive terms that can be viewed as being mainly dependent on the targeting preferences that violent non-state entities exercise. It is premised on the notion that target types, combatant or noncombatant, determine whether the spectrum of violence employed by groups is heavily prone toward one form of warfare or the other. The purpose of the paper is to stimulate debate among scholars as well as laypersons. It also has policy implications insofar as a definitional continuum may aid decisions about legitimacy of a movement, economic sanctions, and whether intervention on behalf of, or against, an entity is morally grounded.
Despite a strict prohibition on shedding Muslim blood, Jihadi groups engaged in violent conflict in Syria from January 2014. Drawing on social movement theory and collective action framing, this article analyzes 25 texts issued between January and May 2014 by Jabhat al-Nusra, the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, al-Qaeda Central, and independent ideologues, and examines how these actors legitimized intra-jihadi violence and sought to mobilize participation. It argues that framing intra-jihadi violence is best understood as a dynamic process in which meaning making results from the intersection of cultural toolkits interpreting reality, framing contests, and frame-event feedback.
This article reassesses the resurgence of left-wing terrorism in contemporary Western societies through a strategic lens. It argues that terrorism studies, shaped by post-Cold War liberal orthodoxies, have systematically neglected or misclassified violence emanating from the political left. Defining terrorism as a tactic-violence and fear for political communication-helps strip away moral or ideological bias. Tracing leftist militancy from the 1960s to today and situating its return within broader cultural and institutional dynamics the article explains both the phenomenon and the epistemic asymmetry that obscures it. Restoring a strategic conception is essential to recovering analytical balance.
This article reassesses claims that the Incel movement constitutes a form of terrorism by examining its ideology, patterns of violence, and empirical case data. Drawing on an original dataset of US federal Incel-related cases from 2020-2023, alongside comparative analysis of prominent attacks, the study finds that Incel-linked violence lacks the strategic intent, coherent ideology, and communicative political purpose central to terrorism. Instead, such violence aligns more closely with grievance-driven, misogynistic hate crime and non-ideological mass killing frameworks. The findings caution against conceptual inflation and argue for preserving analytic distinctions between terrorism and other forms of extremist or idiosyncratic violence.
This study examines the barriers family members face in recognizing and reporting indicators of radicalization and mobilization to violence. We conducted in-depth life history interviews with 23 family members of 16 ideological extremists. Our thematic analysis revealed significant obstacles family members face in acknowledging or reporting suspicious behaviors, which are organized into two primary categories: (1) adverse childhood experiences and conduct problems, and (2) observed yet misunderstood warning signs. We frame our findings through symbolic interactionism and family systems theory. We conclude with policy implications, emphasizing the importance of early intervention and rehabilitative services over punitive measures in counterterrorism efforts.
Why did Hamas attack Israel on October 7? The core argument of this article is that at the most overarching level, Hamas had gradually come to view the structural strategic conditions in the Middle East as a realistic opportunity to militarily defeat Israel and to bring about its collapse. The article outlines the contours of the evolution of the strategic landscape in the Palestinian arena and the region in the years that preceded the war. Building on an original analysis of the prewar dynamics that shaped the Israel-Hamas conflict, and drawing of Hamas documents seized by Israel during the war, the article explains the shifting balance of power between Israel and the Gaza Strip, and between Israel and the Axis of Resistance prior to the war. Having become strategically tethered to the Axis, Hamas apparently intended to detonate, as it were, this strategic infrastructure and plunge Israel in an existential war.
Community-based militias have received increasing attention in the literature. However, research on why civilians choose violence over nonviolence against rebels remains limited. This article argues that communities are more likely to organize a militia when they face an insurgency with a negative reputation for its arbitrary use of violence, unresponsiveness, and incapacity to protect the population from state repression. The empirical test uses original data on resistance campaigns in Colombia and exploratory factor analysis to model rebel reputation as a latent construct. Both aggregated and individual measures of negative reputation, such as rebel massacres, are robustly associated with civilian choice for violent resistance. Competing explanations do not find support. These findings contribute new knowledge on how rebel governance and administration of violence against civilians shape the emergence of militias in civil wars.
This paper presents an empirical examination of the Arsal hostage crisis in Lebanon, when Jabhat Al-Nusra and Islamic State kidnapped over 35 soldiers and police officers in 2014. Following interviews with 30 hostages' families and analysis of the jihadists' propaganda, three themes emerge. First, the hostage-taking had intrinsic emotional value for the jihadists and was not only a means to secure extrinsic concessions. Second, the crisis was often shaped by local, micro-level factors that guided how and when violence was used against hostages. Third, the jihadists coerced the captives' families, leveraging them against the Lebanese State and local communities.
Who is "Rustam": Enablers' Role in the Islamic State Khorasan's Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Since 2022, The Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K) has shown an increasing intent to strike at the West. One method they employ is using enablers to identify radicalized individuals and small cells, recruit susceptible individuals, and provide command and control: thereby increasing IS-K's global presence while seeking to improve perpetrators' capabilities. Through the examination of three case studies, this paper analyzes the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by IS-K to increase their capability in external operations targeting the West. This study relies on integrating analytic reports from thinktanks, international and government reports with court documents to explain IS-K's use of enablers with the context of a shifting extremist landscape and it global strategy. It defines the external handler threat by examining IS-K's strategy and tactics, the risks to the West, and the challenges these operators pose to law enforcement and the intelligence community. It concludes with recommendations to combat this threat.
This article investigates how foreign fighters (FFs) affect the cohesion of rebel organizations. Using cross-national data on 222 rebel groups active between 1989 and 2011, it finds that groups with FFs face a significantly higher risk of fragmentation-even when fighters share ethnic ties. A case study of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its splinter, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, illustrates how preference divergence, segregation and member "foreignness" undermined cohesion and fueled division. These findings underscore the destabilizing effects of FF participation and advance understanding of how transnational mobilization shapes rebel unity.
The "tradwife" movement is a conservative social movement that promotes "traditional" lifestyles. Whilst other research has studied the movement across social media, finding extremist and white supremacist content, the movement's use of imageboards is understudied. Therefore, this exploratory research analyzed content posted with the hashtag "tradwife" on Pinterest and Whisper. While neither dataset contained overtly extremist themes, anti-feminist themes were present, with the findings suggesting that imageboards attract different communities, which curate distinct norms, vocabularies, and interpretations of the movement, and contain confusion as to what tradwife means, how it differs from being a housewife, and what feminism stands for.
