Kim’s supervenience argument is often taken to show that metaphysical emergence is incompatible with Ontological Physicalism. A growing literature, however, has argued that this conclusion is not established by empirical evidence alone, but depends on prior ontological commitments embedded in Kim’s framework. Building on this literature, this paper identifies three commitments that jointly preclude emergence by construction: (i) the assumption that the identity and causal profile of the entities populating the fundamental domain are fixed independently of organization; (ii) the exclusion of relations and organization from the fundamental ontological furniture; and (iii) the assumption that determination is exclusively bottom-up. I argue that these commitments are formally encoded in the supervenience relation itself and therefore render Ontological Physicalism an anti-emergentist framework from the outset. This diagnosis is supported through two empirical case studies—Rayleigh–Bénard convection and Global Neuronal Workspace Theory—which show that organization reconfigures the dynamically accessible degrees of freedom of both systems and their constituents, altering their actual and potential causal profiles. On this basis, I propose a minimal organizational account of emergence. The proposal characterizes emergence as an organizational-causal transformation of a system’s causal-dynamical regime, grounded in context-dependent identity, relational organization, multilevel determination, and the reconfiguration of accessible degrees of freedom. The framework is intended not as a complete metaphysics of emergence, but as a minimal positive characterization capable of accommodating paradigmatic cases of emergence without begging the question against their metaphysical possibility.
A characteristic form of progress in the natural sciences consists in replacing one theory of a domain with another that posits a radically different ontology. I call such episodes “ontological breakthroughs”. They are possible because many natural phenomena can be individuated and re-identified through empirical procedures, enabling reference to remain stable even when explanatory categories change. Drawing on Wilhelm Dilthey, I argue that the situation is different in the human sciences. There, phenomena are individuated interpretively, and their identification cannot be detached from the conditions under which they become intelligible. This interpretive tether, I suggest, helps explain why progress in the human sciences does not take the form of ontological breakthroughs.
This article seeks to integrate the concept of “technodiversity” or “cosmotechnics,” initially developed by Yuk Hui, in the broader context of “ontological pluralism,” which in recent years has been condensed into reflections on the concept of “mode of existence.” To do so, it will start from On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects by Gilbert Simondon, perhaps the first to place reflection on technology in the context of conscious ontological pluralism. The article unfolds using the arguments of Bernard Stiegler and Yuk Hui himself to criticize the following, interrelated aspects of Simondon’s proposal: the limitation, in the third part of the book, of the role of technology to one mode of existence among others; the postulation of a “pre-individual,” univocal, and indeterminate being that constrains his ontological pluralism; the choice to make magic, and therefore non-Western culture, the generic counterpart of this impersonal being, which is incompatible with the latest developments in anthropology. Instead, it will be argued that technology plays a “transcendental” role in the structuring of cosmologies (Stiegler), and that therefore modes of existence can be considered “technical objects” in their own right; and that technology itself is not univocal, but is always relative to a certain cosmology (Hui), an insight which must open up a ‘diplomatic’ approach. Once Simondon’s proposal is integrated with these insights, it once again becomes a crucial paradigm for the philosophy of technology, ontological pluralism, and anthropology.
Contemporary philosophy of technology has developed sophisticated accounts of infrastructures, algorithms, and socio-technical systems, yet it rarely addresses the interior conditions through which a technological world becomes intelligible. This paper argues that technological civilization is grounded in an epistemic interior: a horizon in which significance is disclosed, possibilities are differentiated, and action becomes meaningful. Dominant frameworks, shaped by representational epistemology, presuppose a separation between cognition, value, and praxis, and thus struggle to explain technological trajectories that do not emerge from this lineage. Drawing on Wang Yangming’s philosophy of mind, the paper reconstructs an alternative epistemic architecture—the Wang Yangming Cognitive Infrastructure Model (WY–CIM). Rather than treating intention, cognition, and praxis as sequential stages, WY–CIM conceptualizes them as a recursive movement through which technological worlds are constituted. Intention functions as an ontological orientation, cognition as world-constituting differentiation, and praxis as the transformative site where understanding is enacted and revised. Together, these dynamics form a generative interior that existing theories cannot adequately articulate. The paper argues that technological civilization emerges from this recursive coupling of value, understanding, and material enactment, and proposes WY–CIM as a civilizational epistemology capable of accounting for technological plurality without cultural essentialism.
Large language models can generate historical texts with causal organization and narrative coherence, yet their generative process involves no understanding subject in the hermeneutic sense. This phenomenon marks the first occasion on which interpretive structure appears in the absence of understanding proper, raising the question of what epistemic status should be assigned to historical narratives that were once taken to require understanding for their production. The paper further asks what this question reveals about the conditions of historical understanding itself. Drawing on Dilthey, Gadamer, and Ricoeur, the paper distinguishes between understanding proper, referring to the subjective conditions of a historical horizon, belonging to tradition, and epistemic responsibility, and interpretive structure, referring to the structural organization exhibited by output texts, including temporal synthesis, causal connection, and the narrative organization of historical agents’ reasons. On this basis, the paper introduces the concept of Distributed Interpretation to analyze how AI-generated historical narratives acquire interpretive structure through a data layer, a model layer, and a human layer, and to show how the epistemic accountability that was originally unified within a subject becomes dispersed in this process. The paper then advances a weak epistemological position, arguing that such outputs constitute constrained interpretive outputs, an epistemic category between instruments and historical knowledge, which can participate in knowledge production only through the critical intervention of historians. Finally, the paper argues that the CIO case re-illuminates the irreducible functions of subjectivity, historicity, and dialogicality in historical understanding: the core of historical interpretation lies not only in generating narrative structure, but in bringing interpretive results into an epistemic commitment that can be examined, revised, and held responsible.
Marcello Oreste Fiocco’s book Time and the World. Every Thing and Then Some (Oxford University Press 2024) is a prime example of how to do metaphysics (and – I would venture to say – philosophy in the most proper sense). The book can be divided into three intertwined parts. Although Fiocco does not use the term ‘metaphilosophy,’ I think the first part can be understood as a reasoned exposition of his concept of philosophy, more precisely his concept of metaphysics. The second part presents Fiocco’s ontology, understood as what is revealed about the structure of reality through the above-mentioned metaphilosophy. The third part deals with metaphysics of time. In this part, Fiocco provides an account of time itself, appealing to the ontological principles previously laid out. Fiocco’s metaphysics of time is based on his ontology, which in turn is based on his metaphilosophy. My criticism will mainly focus on the latter, i.e., on the very ground of his commendable philosophical enterprise.
This paper addresses a tension in Sunni philosophical theology. Scripture predicates that God is One. Saʿad al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī negates that God is a thing numbered and so excludes numerical quantity from the divine. The thesis is that this tension can be resolved without interpretive parameterisation by modelling theological inference as open and defeasible. The argument first sharpens the issue by treating "one" as a univocal numerical property, which yields an explicit contradiction between divine Oneness and non-numerability. It then uses Gödel’s incompleteness theorems methodologically to motivate restraint when deductive closure is demanded. From this meta lesson, I build a preferential consequence relation with a selection function that chooses the most theologically acceptable models. Models are ranked by Taftāzānī’s constraints of non-composition, non-quantification, and uniqueness of God. On this ranking, metaphysical unity is selected and numerical oneness is defeated. When residual inconsistency is forced, a paraconsistent closure blocks triviality while recovering classical reasoning for consistent premises. The conclusion is that the framework preserves divine transcendence, avoids logical overreach, and formalises the epistemic humility Taftāzānī recommends when reasoning meets paradox. It also explains why traditional readings prevail without stipulation and why theological inquiry can remain disciplined.
This paper examines the fundamental limitations of artificial intelligence in mathematics through the lens of Norbert Wiener’s warning that automation’s danger lies not in its failures but in its successes. Through analysis of recent developments—automated theorem proving, AI-generated proofs, and machine learning in mathematical discovery—I demonstrate that even in mathematics, the domain most amenable to formalization, essential aspects of mathematical practice resist mechanization. Drawing on philosophy of mathematics, particularly recent work on value judgments in mathematical practice, I argue that mathematical understanding requires three capacities that AI systems cannot achieve: (1) grasping why theorems are true rather than merely verifying that they are true, (2) recognizing mathematical significance through insight rather than pattern recognition, and (3) exercising value judgments about which problems, methods, and frameworks merit attention. These limitations are not temporary technical constraints but structural features of what mathematical understanding requires. The paper concludes that optimizing mathematical practice for AI capabilities risks transforming mathematics itself, privileging aspects amenable to automation while marginalizing those requiring human judgment about meaning and significance—precisely the transformation Wiener warned against.
The relationship between Experimental Philosophy and Philosophy of Mind has been recorded in research conducted by well-known experimental philosophers like Sytsma (2014), Buckwalter and Sytsma (2016) and others. Based on this, we attempted to put to test, two vignettes to see whether our ‘intuitions’ about theory-use and mental simulation in the understanding of other minds matched with our subjects’ intuitions. We designed the two vignettes on the basis of our study of the Theory Theory and the Simulation Theory in the philosophy of mind, which present hypotheses about how people understand others’ mental states and actions, i.e., how they explain, predict or ascribe mental states and behaviour to others. We selected subjects in such a manner that a majority of them had no exposure to the philosophy of mind module during any part of their course and as many of them were freshmen, they would not have heard about the issues from their immediate surroundings. The vignettes were randomly distributed among the subjects and we sought responses to pre-formulated questions based on the two vignettes. We received a good percentage of ‘expected’ responses for both the vignettes, but more for the vignette representing theory-use. Following this pilot study, we concluded that the two vignettes or more like them may be used for further experimental studies in the theory of mind domain, with appropriate modifications where necessary.
The fundamental conflict between natural rights theory and institutional determinism(or legal rights) regarding human rights has persisted for a long time. Searle proposes that his theory of status functions can expose the superficial contradiction between these two positions while preserving their respective rational explanations. However, his theory is applicable only to particular instances (tokens) of human rights and significantly lacks explanatory power for human rights as types. This limitation arises from Searle’s rejection of the reducibility between individual and collective intentionality. Through a detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Searle’s theory, we propose two amendments: first, an ontological revision aimed at dissolving the cognitive illusion of the subjectivity of the mind; second, an epistemological approach that reduces collective intentionality to a collection of individual intentionalities. These amendments address the deficiencies in the theory of status functions and offer a more coherent theoretical framework to better understand and resolve central issues in contemporary human rights theory. They also provide new directions for exploring the nature of human rights and their implementation.
Debates over whether Big Data has replaced theory often obscure a deeper epistemological fault line: a shared technocratic pursuit of certainty, whether through statistical regularization or narrative coherence. This paper contends that the quest for epistemic stability can flatten social complexity, with significant democratic consequences. Through a sociotechnical analysis of machine-learning models in Indian agriculture, this paper investigates how predictive success is often attained by converting contingent realities into computationally interpretable forms, a process that can marginalize situated forms of knowledge and normalize algorithmic authority. In response, this paper proposes a framework for engaging with uncertainty not as a flaw to be eradicated but as an inherent epistemic condition. Drawing on Popperian falsifiability (which institutionalizes doubt), Buddhist impermanence (anicca) (which emphasizes continual change), and Confucian relational judgment (ren, shu) (which embeds evaluation in context-sensitive reciprocity), the framework maintains a productive tension among these traditions without synthesizing them into a single unified position. It does not resolve uncertainty but offers evaluative orientations for navigating it in ways that promote epistemic humility, democratic contestation, and resistance to algorithmic dogma and theoretical closure.
As artistic research grows into an established mode of academic inquiry, it has become possible to distinguish a ruling metaparadigm which we denote as the practice paradigm. This paradigm is to a large extent based on the argument that artistic research is not equipped to produce standalone theories, but instead offers ways to develop and disseminate knowledge through sensory media and embodiment. The foundations for this argument are not grounded in actual expressions of artistic reasoning and reflection in a wider perspective. The enforcement of this paradigm furthermore concerns the challenges that maturing artistic research faces in co-existing with scientific research in institutional settings. We argue that the fixation on personal practice imposes unnecessary restrictions on artistic researchers and that the reduction of exploratory artmaking to applied practices is superficial, as it ignores the way artistic theorizing has tended to be done earlier in non-institutional settings. In this position paper, we review epistemological and methodological claims made by influential promoters of the metaparadigm and critique the justification of the approach. Moreover, we propose a way to move beyond the practice paradigm by reconnecting exploratory artmaking to a kind of artistic theorization that generates creative frameworks for conceptual ideas, styles, and formats rather than a catalogue of implemented works by individual practitioners. We also speculate that the articulation of the philosophical underpinnings of artistic research in its first phase might be a premature response to a theoretical crisis in the arts in general—a crisis that indeed calls for creative solutions, but has so far been met primarily with a defense of practice.
Theory of data analysis as a young discipline is still immature, in particular with respect to the ontological breakdown of data analysis: that is, breaking down data analysis as a whole to it constituting parts. Relying on the Aristotelian notions of intension and extension, this study examines the most well-established ontological breakdown of data analysis into exploratory data analysis (EDA) and confirmatory data analysis (CDA), to show that several practices known as data analysis are neither EDA nor CDA. The study then contributes to the theory of data analysis by providing an ontological breakdown that includes all data analysis practices.
The paper infers from the success of a religion to its truth. The first premise is that if a religion is true then probably it is successful. Drawing on Plato, it is shown that religion aims at friendship between the divine and the human. Friendship requires likeness, and human beings are like the divine by being ethically good. So, religion aims to foster ethical virtue and to shape social institutions in ethically positive ways, and these as extensively as possible. A true religion should be successful in these aims, since divine beings are potent. The second premise is that if a religion is false then probably it is unsuccessful. There are many religions. A small cluster stand out in their success. So, the background probability of failure is high. So, learning that a religion is successful should raise our credence that it is true, since its success is unsurprising if it is true and surprising if it is false. The third premise is that Christianity is a successful religion by the criteria offered, raising the probability that Christianity is true. Eleven objections are answered.
Fine’s reformulation of McTaggart’s paradox may be the most important development in the philosophy of time in recent years. After reformulating this paradox as a contradiction among four principles, Fine identifies four possible theories that can avoid it. This paper focuses on two of them: standard realism and fragmentalism. Fine argues that one advantage of fragmentalism over standard realism is its ability to offer a better account of temporal passage. I argue that this argument fails. On the one hand, standard realism can adequately capture the passage of time by the primitive tense, but only if the tense is understood as describing the tensed way reality is constituted, rather than referring to tensed facts that constitute reality. It is this tensed constitution of reality that captures temporal passage. On the other hand, fragmentalism fails to account for temporal passage because, within its framework, the constitution of reality is fundamentally tenseless.
This paper explores the moral worldview contained in The Huarochirí manuscript, a Quechua text written in the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century that records the beliefs and customs of the ancient people of Huarochirí in the highlands of Lima, Peru. Drawing on Nicolás Beauclair’s interpretation, I first present his view that Huarochirí morality constitutes a compact ethical system whose central principle is reciprocity—the source of the moral rules “do not steal,” “do not lie,” “do not be idle,” and “do not commit adultery.” I then develop my own reading, which, without denying the particularities of this Andean ethics, interprets it as a manifestation of a broader, global morality akin to what C. S. Lewis called the “Tao of Right and Wrong.” In doing so, I analyze the principle of reciprocity, examine the presence of the Golden Rule—the core principle of Lewis’ Tao—in The manuscript, and compare the two.
This paper explores the epistemic and philosophical significance of perspectival frameworks across perception, art, and mathematics, advancing a defense of perspectival realism. Beginning with Renaissance perspective and the analysis of impossible objects exemplified by Escher and the Penroses, we will see that perceptual intelligibility is structured by local and global rules that mediate cognitive engagement. Extending this insight to mathematics, I argue that the applicability of formal structures in science is contingent upon conceptual frameworks that highlight empirically salient patterns, rendering abstract systems intelligible and operationally effective. Artistic practice further illustrates the mediating role of frameworks: compositional rules such as symmetry, proportion, and projective geometry generate coherent and aesthetically compelling representations, mirroring principles of intelligibility in perception and mathematical reasoning. Perspectival realism integrates these domains, maintaining that knowledge is framework-dependent while preserving objective access to phenomena. By emphasizing the structured, selective, and historically situated nature of frameworks, this approach provides a unified account of intelligibility, applicability, and epistemic engagement, with implications for philosophy of science, epistemology, and aesthetics.
Building on Wittgenstein’s differentiation of science and religion as disparate discourses, the aim of this paper is to argue that, for Wittgenstein, humility constituted a key presupposition for the religious way of life. Furthermore, various Wittgenstein’s remarks on religion, like ones about wonder and gratitude, can be interpreted through the lens of humility as their presupposition. As Wittgenstein considered religious discourse as a way of life in which concepts like belief play a completely different role than they do in scientific discourse, the religious way of life would also need a way in which we achieve it, something what would parallel the methods of science. My suggestion is that changing one’s life plays such a role in Wittgenstein’s treatment of religious discourse. Furthermore, in changing one’s life, one has to have a guiding principle by which the life will be changed and the role of such a guiding principle is played by humility.
