
With weak property rights-imperfectly enforced property rules and liability rules with low damages-there is a concern about wasteful taking wars, namely, a party might take another's good, neglecting that the good will ultimately be taken back. Such taking wars would not occur with unbounded cognition, since it is irrational to engage in costly taking if the taker anticipates that the original owner will end up with the good. But wasteful taking might well occur with bounded cognition. This experiment shows that bounded cognition does indeed fuel taking wars. This result supports the theoretical argument in favor of strong property rights, which preclude taking wars regardless of any cognitive limits.
We examine how well citation metrics correspond to a market valuation of legal scholars in lateral hiring. We find that professors' citation counts are significantly correlated with lateral moves. Among those who made lateral moves, there is also a significant positive relationship between citation counts and the rank of the hiring law school. However, the correlation between citation counts and lateral outcomes is relatively weak, suggesting that scholarly rankings based on citation counts would deviate substantially from market valuations. Relative to the market valuation, citation counts undervalue junior scholars and research published in books, top law reviews, and prestigious peer-reviewed journals. An index based on citation counts, seniority, and prestigious publications aligns more closely with market outcomes. Our findings raise questions about the use of law school citation rankings, especially given their potential to distort publication and hiring decisions in the legal academy.
We report time-series evidence on the effects of expansion of Medicaid coverage under the 2014 Affordable Care Act (ACA), on healthcare and outcomes for persons with diabetes, including medium- and longer-term effects. We focus on diabetes, as a common, often-underdiagnosed condition for which effective treatments exist, and on childless adults, who were a particular target for ACA expansion. We use difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis applied to a longitudinal, uniquely detailed (relative to prior work) dataset that includes visit-level electronic healthcare records over 2011-2022 from the Medical College of Wisconsin (a major Milwaukee-centered health system) linked to Medicaid enrollment records. We compare a treatment group of 1,679 newly enrolled childless adults with diabetes to a propensity-score-balanced control group of 1,600 already-insured adults with diabetes (mostly parents with children at home). Gaining insurance leads to sharply higher utilization (outpatient, emergency department, and hospitalization); and large increases in new diagnoses of diabetes and other chronic conditions; related prescriptions; and testing rates. We find improvement in intermediate health outcomes (blood sugar, blood pressure, and cholesterol levels), and suggestive evidence of improved longer-term outcomes (macrovascular events; advanced kidney disease; amputations). We also compare persons with diabetes to other persons; DiD coefficients are generally larger for persons with diabetes, but percentage changes are often higher for other persons.
In recent years there has been a shift to less confrontational interrogation methods. One argument in favor of these methods is that they reduce the scope for false confessions. This paper explores this idea from an information perspective with rational agents. It studies a model that extends the plea-bargaining model of Baker and Mezzetti (2001) to one that is suitable for analyzing interrogation methods with evidence implying a continuum of probabilities that the suspect is found guilty at trial. In a benchmark model, in which police only interrogate suspects that the prosecutor is potentially willing to take to trial, the non-confrontational method weakly dominates the confrontational method. A similar result holds in a richer model, in which police may interrogate some suspects for whom the evidence will not induce the prosecutor to go to trial. The key intuition for why the non-confrontational method performs better in some cases in both settings is that the non-confrontational method is able to induce a confession from some guilty who the prosecutor would not take to trial following non-confession, and for some distributions this can result in a strictly higher expected payoff for society and the prosecutor.
Third-party litigation finance is an increasingly popular practice in commercial litigation. Despite calls for mandated disclosure, litigation funders are mostly anonymous to defendants, judges, and juries. We first present an equilibrium model of litigation, with endogenous settlement and trial, where plaintiff financing is private information. Defendants use the plaintiff's response to settlement offers to update their priors on a plaintiff's level of financing. We then contrast this equilibrium with one in which disclosure is mandated. Despite the common intuition that "plaintiffs prefer secrecy" and "defendants prefer disclosure," theory suggests that such preferences are more complex. The model is able to isolate when and why such preferences over disclosure regimes may vary, with some plaintiffs actually preferring disclosure and some defendants actually preferring secrecy.