Abstract This paper defends the model of Plural Cooperativism against criticism. Plural Cooperativism is a society-wide economic system of cooperative ownership that allows for limited private shareholding, counterbalanced by public shareholding and a more democratic reallocation of control rights, while universal inheritances enable broad-based investment in cooperatives. In response to Rutger Claassen’s critique, the paper clarifies the normative foundations of social ownership and argues that cooperatives can serve a wide range of values beyond workplace democracy, especially when a public shareholder complements them. It further defends the focus on cooperatives against Claassen’s proposal to rely more strongly on trust-owned firms, since the latter exhibit a structural deficit in workplace democracy and impose overly demanding altruistic requirements. Finally, it justifies the opportunity for private shareholding by addressing issues of entry costs, financing, and portfolio diversification, and it argues for a strong role of the public shareholder by showing that disinvestment threats from private shareholders persist under Plural Cooperativism.
Abstract Philosophical literature generally highlights three different aspects or dimensions of responsibility: 1. the attribution of authorship of actions and the liability of the actor for these actions; 2. the attribution of a duty of care for certain tasks or areas of responsibility; and finally 3. the obligation to justify one’s own behaviour and actions with good reasons. The discussion about the development and the use of artificial intelligence currently focuses on the first and, to some extent, the third aspect. However, the rapid pace of development and the now omnipresent use of AI also require ongoing critical examination and reflection on the normative framework. Responsibility must therefore be understood more broadly: with regard to the development and use of artificial intelligence, we bear a discursive shared responsibility that involves examining the development and use of AI systems against the yardstick of justice, as well as the normative framework itself that guides us in the development and use of AI systems.
Abstract In light of major societal challenges, the political debate on various forms of wealth taxation, or the ‘Tax the Rich’ strategy, has recently gained momentum in Germany. This article examines the arguments for and against taxing the wealthy, drawing on statistical data and some of the most significant scientific studies on current economic inequality and its history. In particular, it looks at the kinds of reasons used in the current debate. It is argued that the arguments in favor of specific forms of wealth tax outweigh the reservations.
Abstract The paper argues that the Classical Liberal Paradigm with its core tenet that the ‘invisible hand of the market’ allocates resources in a socially optimal way, has been the dominant paradigm of mainstream economics for more than 200 years, and has given rise to research associated with the names of Cournot, Marshall, Walras, Pareto, Arrow, Debreu and many others. However, the insights produced by economic theory by around 1970 must be regarded as a refutation of the invisible hand tenet. Nevertheless, propagandists of the neoliberal version of the Classical Liberal Paradigm succeeded in convincing political authorities around the world, ironically at about the same time, to implement policies suggested by the outdated paradigm. The tragedy of its late triumph lies in the fact that it has contributed to a political neglect of environmental pollution and ensuing global warming on the one hand, and to a bizarre degree of concentration of wealth and the power that comes with it, on the other hand.
Abstract Given the rapid advances in AI in predicting and controlling human behavior, the question arises as to whether the responsible use of AI might not best be regulated by law with the aid of AI itself. This question is guided by the expectation that two normative problems associated with legal norms can be definitively resolved with the help of AI: (1) that it might be possible to perfect legal norms through AI to such an extent that they provide a single correct answer for every application, and (2) that they can control the behavior of those subject to them in such a way that there is no longer any deviant behavior. This article situates these two expectations within the historical context of efforts to perfect legal norms and critically discusses the possible consequences for the democratic constitutional state.
