Abstract This paper defends the model of Plural Cooperativism against criticism. Plural Cooperativism is a society-wide economic system of cooperative ownership that allows for limited private shareholding, counterbalanced by public shareholding and a more democratic reallocation of control rights, while universal inheritances enable broad-based investment in cooperatives. In response to Rutger Claassen’s critique, the paper clarifies the normative foundations of social ownership and argues that cooperatives can serve a wide range of values beyond workplace democracy, especially when a public shareholder complements them. It further defends the focus on cooperatives against Claassen’s proposal to rely more strongly on trust-owned firms, since the latter exhibit a structural deficit in workplace democracy and impose overly demanding altruistic requirements. Finally, it justifies the opportunity for private shareholding by addressing issues of entry costs, financing, and portfolio diversification, and it argues for a strong role of the public shareholder by showing that disinvestment threats from private shareholders persist under Plural Cooperativism.
Abstract Philosophical literature generally highlights three different aspects or dimensions of responsibility: 1. the attribution of authorship of actions and the liability of the actor for these actions; 2. the attribution of a duty of care for certain tasks or areas of responsibility; and finally 3. the obligation to justify one’s own behaviour and actions with good reasons. The discussion about the development and the use of artificial intelligence currently focuses on the first and, to some extent, the third aspect. However, the rapid pace of development and the now omnipresent use of AI also require ongoing critical examination and reflection on the normative framework. Responsibility must therefore be understood more broadly: with regard to the development and use of artificial intelligence, we bear a discursive shared responsibility that involves examining the development and use of AI systems against the yardstick of justice, as well as the normative framework itself that guides us in the development and use of AI systems.
Abstract In light of major societal challenges, the political debate on various forms of wealth taxation, or the ‘Tax the Rich’ strategy, has recently gained momentum in Germany. This article examines the arguments for and against taxing the wealthy, drawing on statistical data and some of the most significant scientific studies on current economic inequality and its history. In particular, it looks at the kinds of reasons used in the current debate. It is argued that the arguments in favor of specific forms of wealth tax outweigh the reservations.
Abstract The paper argues that the Classical Liberal Paradigm with its core tenet that the ‘invisible hand of the market’ allocates resources in a socially optimal way, has been the dominant paradigm of mainstream economics for more than 200 years, and has given rise to research associated with the names of Cournot, Marshall, Walras, Pareto, Arrow, Debreu and many others. However, the insights produced by economic theory by around 1970 must be regarded as a refutation of the invisible hand tenet. Nevertheless, propagandists of the neoliberal version of the Classical Liberal Paradigm succeeded in convincing political authorities around the world, ironically at about the same time, to implement policies suggested by the outdated paradigm. The tragedy of its late triumph lies in the fact that it has contributed to a political neglect of environmental pollution and ensuing global warming on the one hand, and to a bizarre degree of concentration of wealth and the power that comes with it, on the other hand.
Abstract Given the rapid advances in AI in predicting and controlling human behavior, the question arises as to whether the responsible use of AI might not best be regulated by law with the aid of AI itself. This question is guided by the expectation that two normative problems associated with legal norms can be definitively resolved with the help of AI: (1) that it might be possible to perfect legal norms through AI to such an extent that they provide a single correct answer for every application, and (2) that they can control the behavior of those subject to them in such a way that there is no longer any deviant behavior. This article situates these two expectations within the historical context of efforts to perfect legal norms and critically discusses the possible consequences for the democratic constitutional state.
Abstract This article outlines a new framework of computational fairness for the analysis of data-driven statistical discrimination. It begins by identifying the limitations of the still dominant paradigm of fairness through unawareness . Building on this critique, the article proposes an approach that distinguishes concerns of procedural fairness from questions of distributive justice when evaluating potentially discriminatory procedures. In contrast to a widespread view, it argues that procedural computational fairness rests on a single formal criterion. A computational procedure is non-discriminatory, it is claimed, if it achieves equal predictive values across demographic groups. In addition, two non-procedural requirements of distributive justice are advanced for selective procedures: the proportionality of individual burdens and their compatibility with a just overall social distribution of benefits and burdens.
Abstract Drawing on insights from sociology and science and technology studies, we develop an account of agency as an emergent and relational property constituted within hybrid configurations of humans and machines. We speak of co-agency to capture the ways in which responsible action is jointly produced within human-machine entanglements, with both parties demonstrating purposively intended as well as determined forms of action. By emphasizing the interdependence of sociotechnical systems, therapeutic practices, and institutional automation infrastructures, we argue that responsibility cannot be attributed to discrete actors – whether human or digital – but must instead be understood as generated within the relational processes through which co-agency emerges. This reconceptualization shifts attention from locating isolated bearers of responsibility to examining the socio-technical arrangements that structure action, thereby suggesting recommendations for ethical guidelines aimed at supporting responsible automation in healthcare.
Abstract This article responds to Quassim Cassam’s arguments for the claim that the only viable strategy for Israel in its conflict with Hamas is to continue the war begun in October 2023 until Hamas is “crushed.” It critically examines his reasons for claiming that Hamas fails to satisfy the five conditions he states for potentially successful peace negotiations. While it may be true that Hamas fails to satisfy the conditions, it is also true that Israel fails even more egregiously to satisfy them. And even if the satisfaction of the conditions by both sides were necessary for successful negotiations, which is not the case, peace negotiations are not the best alternative to continued war. The best strategy for achieving a lasting peace is for both parties to address what Cassam calls the “root causes” of the conflict. Israel could successfully do this entirely unilaterally. And the Palestinians could also act unilaterally in a way that would be the best they could do to eliminate the fundamental source of the conflict.
Abstract This paper identifies five normal pre-requisites for ending a war by a formal peace agreement and argues that none of the five conditions is satisfied by both sides in the war between Israel and Hamas. Each side must be a valid interlocutor (‘interlocuteur valable’) and must recognize the other side as a valid interlocutor. There must be a degree of mutual trust and a willingness to compromise on both sides. Finally, there must be mechanisms for enforcing the agreement. Hamas’s conduct on 7 October 2023 placed it beyond the pale of dialogue and negotiation. Governments should be willing to negotiate with some terrorists but not others. Hamas in its current form belongs in the latter category. An alternative to negotiating with Hamas is to crush it with massive military force. Although some terrorist groups have been defeated in this way, Hamas is unlikely to be one of them. A more realistic objective is to continue to degrade it with a view to rendering it politically and militarily impotent. It remains to be seen whether there is any level of military pressure that would induce it to change its approach and compromise for the sake of peace.
Abstract This article critically examines the methodology of Musa Al-Gharbi’s We Have Never Been Woke , which offers an ambitious sociological account of ‘wokeness’ as a performative ideology deployed by elite symbolic capitalists to consolidate their privilege under the guise of progressive politics. I argue that Al-Gharbi’s account is traversed by an unresolved tension between his methodological commitments that ultimately constrains the critical reach of his analysis. Drawing on both classical and contemporary authors of Frankfurt School Critical Theory, particularly Horkheimer, Adorno, Jaeggi, and Celikates, I show that Al-Gharbi’s exclusive reliance on material-economic explanations leaves the normative and transformative capacity of ‘woke’ concepts undertheorized. Subsequently, I argue that Al-Gharbi’s descriptive account of ‘wokeness’ can be framed as a description of first order ‘woke’ practices that subsequently calls for reconstruction through a second-order self-critique. Relying on Celikates, I conclude that doing so rehabilitates the emancipatory potential of ‘woke’ concepts while exposing their conservative social entanglement, grounding a discourse that moves beyond mere demystification toward a genuinely critical account of ‘wokeness’.
Rahel Jaeggi says of her book: “The Hegelian idea of a dialectically self-enriching experiential learning process thus emerges as central to the entire project.” I examine and compare Jaeggi’s own uptake of Hegelian themes and consider them in light of her acceptance of Philip Kitcher’s distinction between ‘progress from’ and ‘progress towards’ conceptions of progress. Although there are some obvious differences between Jaeggi’s and Hegel’s conception of progress, I conclude by arguing that her way of taking things gets at the deeper roots of Hegel’s views as a non-teleological conception of history that brings into relief what is immanent to human agency.
The text applies a functional ideology analysis to Rahel Jaeggi’s theory of progress in order to demonstrate its capacity to orient practices and values in modern societies. It examines the problem-solving competencies of her concept of progress within a context of highly differentiated social structures and shows that the ideologeme of functional learning proposed by Jaeggi could offer a comprehensive yet complex orientation toward progress due to its formal abstraction. However, this potential is still constrained by requirements of specification and the occurrence of learning conflicts, both of which are also rooted in society’s differentiation. Addressing these issues calls for further development of Jaeggi’s theory, particularly by elaborating a perspective on conflicts of learning processes.
The present paper calls into question one of the most prominent International Relations theories: John J. Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. By bringing to bear the conceptual apparatus of Austrian- and public-choice-style political economy, the article demonstrates Mearsheimer’s conception to be either substantively unsound or logically fallacious. More specifically, three of the notorious five ‘bedrock assumptions’ of offensive realism – uncertainty regarding other actors’ intentions, the primacy of survival, and the rationality of statesmen – are, depending on interpretation, either untenable or insufficient to support the conclusions Mearsheimer purports to have established. Thus, the article contends that offensive realism is a faulty approach to international politics. This is largely due to the neglect of economic science, which results in the latent assumption of the absoluteness of national survival as a goal of states. It is this assumption that underlies the entire edifice of offensive realism and simultaneously renders it surprisingly utopian and idealistic.
This paper examines the shifting semantics of ‘progress’ and ‘crisis’ as key frameworks for modern society’s self-description. Drawing on Rahel Jaeggi’s functionalist conception of progress and placing it in dialogue with Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory, it reconstructs how progress historically emerged as a synchronizing device under conditions of functional differentiation – particularly in science – before being gradually supplanted by crisis as a more inclusive semantic. By tracing the conceptual histories of both terms, the analysis reveals their roles in managing temporal complexity and societal coordination. While progress organizes change through asymmetrical inclusion, crisis flattens distinctions by encompassing all as affected, aligning more closely with the structural needs of a polycrisis-prone world society. The paper argues that any contemporary rehabilitation of progress must address its semantic selectivity, historical asymmetries, and the communicative functions it shares with the crisis narrative.
I argue that Rahel Jaeggi’s processual account of progress cannot support substantive judgments of progress without privileging liberal values and outcomes over their alternatives. To privilege those values is perhaps not to become a hegemon in the strongest sense, but it does nudge us uncomfortably in that direction. In this respect, I suggest, a comparison with a near cousin of Jaeggi’s approach – that of John Dewey – is informative. Dewey’s view also centers on a pluralistic model of ‘problems’ that yield diverse, context-sensitive improvements, and Jaeggi herself openly aligns herself with Dewey. But Dewey’s view depends on an open embrace of core liberal principles that seem to entail invidious cross-cultural judgments. Jaeggi thinks that she can avoid this prospect, but the comparison with Dewey presents a number of reasons to doubt this. On a speculative note, I conclude that the notion of progress itself, as a normative ideal, may be inextricably linked to certain core liberal commitments. In that respect the idea of progress may involve liberal hegemony by nature, in at least a weak sense of the idea.
How should be think about moral progress? In her book Progress and Regression , Rahel Jaeggi answers this question from the perspective of critical social theory. She claims that, if we want to avoid falling into the familiar traps of colonial and/or imperialist thinking, theorizing about moral progress requires that we proceed proceduralistically and negativistically: instead of identifying positive instances of substantive moral improvement, we should understand moral progress as a process of self-enriching experiential learning through which certain forms of regression are blocked. In this paper, I argue that these methodological commitments remain unjustified, and that there is nothing inherently objectionable about identifying cases of morally progressive social change.
The biblical command ‘Blot out the memory of Amalek’ surfaced heavily in Israel after October 7, 2023. UN institutions, international and Israeli human rights NGOs and scholars of genocide studies classified the wide use of the Amalek rhetoric across Israeli politics and the military as a clear incitement to genocide. It is acknowledged that such scientific and legal subordination of the present Israeli Amalek rhetoric to the concept of genocide is indispensably important for the Palestinian just cause. However, this paper further singles out this rhetoric to examine it through the analytical lens of political theology. Thus, it first highlights the political-theological carriage of the biblical narrations of Amalek. Second, it situates Amalek as an archetype of Carl Schmitt’s concept of the enemy. Third, the paper traces a genealogy of the Zionist construction of the Palestinian as an Amalekite enemy. Finally, it concludes by showing how this political-theological genealogy culminates in the erasure of the Palestinian from the memory of Western ‘civilization.’
The following reflections are provoked by, and focus on, one of the key statements of synthesis in Rahel Jaeggi’s treatise on Progress and Regression , namely ‘Societies do not have goals, they solve problems.’ The phrase serves to criticize philosophies of history that work with a strong conception of progress in its first part and announces the step to elaborate a more adequate concept in the second. While agreeing with the underlying diagnosis and quest, none of the two steps nor the connection between the two is found entirely compelling. An alternative approach, hinted at in conclusion, would need to connect socio-philosophical conceptions of progress not with philosophies of history in the conventional understanding of the term, but with global history and historical sociology.
This paper challenges both simplistic optimism and categorical rejection of the concept of progress. It argues that while historical and technological advancements – such as antibiotics or digital communication – are undeniable, they do not automatically equate to moral or social progress. Progress is not a linear or teleological unfolding of pre-defined goals but a normatively charged, processual concept rooted in problem-solving and experiential learning. The paper thus proposes a materialist and pragmatic understanding of social change, where forms of life evolve through crisis-driven responses to second-order problems – failures not just in addressing immediate needs, but in the systems meant to solve them. Progress, then, is a qualitative transformation that reflects not just adaptation, but learning how to learn – an accumulative, reflexive process that may or may not occur. Regression, by contrast, marks blocked or reversed learning, a breakdown in such problem-solving capacity. Ultimately, the paper offers a pluralist and non-essentialist theory of progress, preserving its critical and normative potential while rejecting deterministic or ethnocentric narratives. The approach repositions progress as a dynamic, reflective category necessary for critical social theory.
This article explores Rahel Jaeggi’s conception of the relation between progress and regression, highlighting her account of social transformation as a practical and reflexive learning process. In the first section, the article reconstructs Jaeggi’s argument that progress is never linear or necessary but contingent, multidimensional, and embedded in ‘forms of life.’ This perspective emphasizes that emancipatory change arises through crises and problem-solving practices, where gains and losses are simultaneously articulated. The second section places Jaeggi’s framework in dialogue with Brazilian critical theory, particularly the paradigm of formação [formation], which long framed the nation’s development as a progressive overcoming of colonial and slaveholding legacies. By foregrounding race as a decisive category, I argue that Jaeggi’s approach helps reinterpret Brazil’s history of incomplete modernization and persistent inequality. Anti-racist struggles, in this view, exemplify processes of experiential learning that create possibilities for emancipation while confronting enduring contradictions.
