
Background: Incident reporting is central to safety management and learning in high-containment laboratories. However, not all incidents are recognized, not all recognized incidents are reported, and not all reported incidents are published. Methods: We presented a tentative iceberg model at the European Biosafety Association conference in 2025, characterizing degrees of recognition and visibility for different incident types. Our aim was to conduct a proof of concept rather than a formal validation of the model. Data were gathered from delegates through informal discussions and an online form. Results: We recorded 50 case examples, of which 48 were suitable for analysis. The model was well received. We learned that iceberg layers can be skipped, with external parties playing important roles in this process. Recognition and visibility are not fixed properties but are shaped by perspective and context. Almost half of the cases were categorized as “recognized but not recorded,” and only three had been reported to national authorities. The model accommodated all cases without requiring strict definitions of incident, hazard, or accident. Conclusions: The Iceberg Model offers a simple, practical tool for laboratory professionals to discuss and identify incidents. It can be used alongside other established biorisk management methods. Success depends on managers promoting a blame-free culture. By understanding incident types that are often unreported or under-recognized, laboratory professionals can address cultural and systemic barriers to transparency and learning. The model’s flexibility makes it applicable across different international contexts and regulatory frameworks.
Background: ISO 35001:2019 and ISO 15190:2020 introduced proactive, risk- and performance-based approaches to laboratory biorisk management (BRM) but do not provide scored, field-ready audit instruments. Uganda’s Ministry of Health lacked a single quantitative tool for equitable BRM assessment across a tiered, multisectoral One Health laboratory network. This study developed and evaluated a quantitative BRM audit checklist aligned with ISO 35001:2019 and ISO 15190:2020 and assessed its suitability for national benchmarking. Methods: A 19-domain, 413-mark checklist was developed by cross-mapping ISO 35001:2019, ISO 15190:2020, ISO 15189:2022, WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual (4th edition), CWA 15793/16393, and ISO 9000/14001/45001 into scoreable Yes/Partial/No criteria verified through document review, observation, and interview. A dynamic denominator excluded nonapplicable items to enable equitable scoring across facility tiers. The tool was applied in national baseline (2022, n = 91) and follow-up (2023, n = 111) audits. Results: Mean national BRM performance increased from 26.3% (very high risk) in 2022%–39.7% (high risk) in 2023. The tool distinguished performance by facility tier, sector, ownership, and accreditation status in the expected directions. Persistently weak domains included management of compressed/liquefied gases and performance evaluation, while lighting and electrical safety remained consistently strong. Conclusion: The checklist operationalizes ISO, WHO, and World Organization for Animal Health BRM requirements into a reproducible, tier-adjustable scoring instrument that showed consistent, expected-direction differences across facility groups and a documented improvement in national performance across two audit cycles, pending formal psychometric validation, offering a transferable model for multisectoral low- and middle-income countries laboratory networks.
Background: U.S. biosafety practice depends heavily on risk group and biosafety level concepts developed for biomedical and clinical laboratory work. These concepts are essential for agents that threaten laboratory workers, patients, and the public. But they are less adequate for plant pests and some agriculturally significant veterinary pathogens where the principal concerns are escape, establishment, spread, agricultural disruption, ecological harm, regulatory consequences, international trade consequences, or intentional misuse, rather than human disease. Approach: This conceptual framework article examines the fit and limits of existing U.S. risk group logic for agricultural biological agents. It draws on the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Guidelines, Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) 6th Edition, USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) plant pest authorities and containment guidance, phytosanitary risk concepts, Federal Select Agent Program scope, arthropod and animal containment literature, international biorisk frameworks, and practitioner experience with institutional review of agricultural agents. Analysis: Existing mechanisms partly address agricultural biorisks. However, they do not provide a professional vocabulary comparable with NIH risk groups for widely prevalent, nonpermitted agricultural agents that may still require consequence-based containment decisions. Extending biomedical risk group terminology to agricultural consequence can support local decision-making. But doing so also risks conceptual confusion, because NIH risk groups are defined by human disease risk. Conclusions: Biosafety programs would benefit from a consequence-based agricultural biorisk framework that supplements existing biomedical systems without redefining them. Agricultural Biorisk Categories and a dual-axis model, separating direct biosafety risk from agricultural, environmental, regulatory, trade, and biosecurity consequence, offers a starting point for professional discussion, institutional documentation, and containment decisions.
Purpose: Biosafety risk assessment traditionally relies on categorical scales embodied by the four World Health Organization (WHO) Risk Groups (RGs) and biocontainment levels. Mapping such categories to quantitative metrics is an open problem for the field: the classifications are too coarse for operational decision-making, yet strictly probabilistic language remains inaccessible to most safety professionals, laboratory managers, and decision-makers. Major Findings: To bridge these gaps, the present work develops a quantitative Bayesian framework for laboratory risk management that combines WHO RG classification as a prior with a Markov chain model of the incident–disaster escalation chain. Risk is reported on a log-risk scale that transforms multiplicative probabilities into additive quantities, mirroring the decibel scale in acoustics. The framework accommodates longitudinal updating with local incident data and quantifies the separate contributions of training, preventive maintenance, and inspection to system-level safety. Optionally, resource allocation recommendations providing auditable, evidence-based prioritization can be issued. The framework is illustrated on synthetic biosafety level-3 scenarios. Conclusions: The presented framework shifts the perspective of biorisk governance from static compliance assessment to dynamic risk and resource management.
Introduction: Evidence-based research (EBR) is essential for strengthening agricultural biosafety, biosecurity, and biocontainment by ensuring that operational practices are informed by validated evidence. However, persistent research gaps limit the implementation of evidence-informed biological risk management across laboratory and agricultural settings. Discussion: This commentary examines a programmatic approach to operationalizing EBR to address priority gaps in agricultural biorisk management. An iterative funding strategy was developed to align research priorities with recommendations from the Research Alliance for Veterinary Science and Biodefense BSL-3 Network (RAV3N) Applied Biorisk and Biosafety Gap Assessment and the National Science and Technology Council’s Evidence-Based Laboratory Biorisk Management Science and Technology Roadmap. Funding priorities were further refined to reflect evolving needs identified by the biosafety and biosecurity community. By highlighting this programmatic approach and the resulting portfolio of funded projects, the commentary illustrates how targeted investment in applied biosafety research can generate evidence and strengthen agricultural biosafety, biosecurity, and biocontainment practices. Conclusion: Operationalizing EBR requires sustained mechanisms to support applied research, collaboration, and knowledge dissemination. This programmatic approach demonstrates one way of translating national recommendations into coordinated action and offers a framework that may inform future efforts to strengthen evidence-based agricultural biorisk management and support more resilient biosafety and biosecurity systems.