The longstanding debate over U.S. isolationism has intensified amid recent foreign-policy choices, especially under Donald Trump’s presidency. Yet many contemporary invocations continue to use the term without explicit criteria for identifying isolationist policy, while more analytically developed accounts disagree over its domain, manifestations, and appropriate level of application. This article reviews these competing approaches and develops a revised conception of isolationism as an episode-based foreign-policy response. Grounded in observed policy steps, this conceptualization distinguishes isolationism from adjacent terms and related grand-strategy alternatives. It also treats actor-, administration-, and period-level characterizations as inferences from patterns across foreign-policy episodes rather than as fixed and largely abstract labels. The article then assesses the revised concept against Gerring’s criteria and illustrates its classificatory value through recent U.S. foreign-policy episodes. Although it does not eliminate all interpretive ambiguity, this behavior-centered conception improves definitional and domain clarity and differentiation, providing a stronger foundation for future comparative analysis of foreign-policy engagement and withdrawal.
As cognitive warfare increasingly emerges as a distinct concept amid the convergence of artificial intelligence (AI) and neurotechnology, its conceptual differentiation from hybrid warfare raises ontological questions concerning subjectivity and security itself. This paper argues that attempts to conceptualize cognitive warfare ultimately expose the metaphysical limits of security by presupposing a stable and self-identical subject capable of securing its own mind. Drawing primarily on Slavoj Žižek’s Hegelian-Lacanian psychoanalytic framework while engaging post-structuralist insights, the paper critiques the Cartesian conception of the irreducible and indubitable self (the Strong “I”). It argues that the subject is instead ontologically incomplete (the Weak “I”), creating a fundamental dilemma: either cognitive warfare loses its conceptual distinctiveness, or subjectivity is displaced altogether through the transformation of the subject into a simulated object (the Hyperreal “I”), rendering the project of securing the mind self-undermining and ultimately self-consuming. To demonstrate the practical implications of this argument, the paper critically examines adaptive security and its practice of transmorphance (the capacity of a system to adapt to uncertainty while preserving its core identity) as an emerging systems-level approach to cognitive defense, arguing that this practice culminates in the transformation of the system into a Hyperreal “I,” thereby exposing the metaphysical limits of security itself.
This article examines the European Union’s collective securitization of Russia across two critical junctures: the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Why did the EU, long energy-dependent and internally divided, adopt substantial but fragmented measures that changed little in 2014, yet achieve unprecedented unity, scope, and institutionalization after 2022? Applying a tailor-made version of Sperling and Webber’s six-stage collective securitization framework, the analysis traces how precipitating events, institutional securitizing moves, member-state audience responses, and policy outputs interacted differently in each phase. Through qualitative analysis of EU institutional documents, Council conclusions, and member-state discourse, the article identifies three factors that account for the variation in outcomes. First, the greater salience and interpretive clarity of the 2022 invasion generated broader and more durable audience acceptance than the hybrid and ambiguous conflict of 2014. Second, higher levels of intra-EU alignment after 2022, including the convergence of previously cautious governments, reduced veto constraints and enabled cohesive collective action. Third, the expanded availability of policy instruments anchored securitization into routinized governance rather than crisis-driven reaction. The findings sharpen the scope conditions of collective securitization theory by demonstrating how event salience, member-state alignment, and the instrumentalization of capacity jointly determine whether securitizing moves translate into thick and enduring collective securitization.
European security policy increasingly relies on comprehensive defence and responsibilisation, expecting households to follow contingency protocols and sustain themselves for at least 72 hours. Using 2025 urban survey data from Helsinki (Finland), Riga (Latvia) and the German cities of Berlin, Hamburg and Munich, this article shows that urban populations are underprepared. Further, we examine whether threat salience, identifying a hazard as a personal concern, translates into threat‑appropriate preparedness. We assess both material and cognitive indicators. Findings show a persistent perception–action gap across all sites. Helsinki exhibits comparatively higher cognitive awareness but low material readiness; Riga and the German cities display even weaker alignment across cognitive and material domains. Among respondents worried about specific hazards, preparedness does not improve for recommended actions. We argue that responsibilisation is under‑communicated and under‑operationalised for urban realities even in high responsibilisation models like Finland. Meeting EU/NATO ambitions requires clear thresholds, local scaffolding and behaviourally savvy interventions that make preparedness feasible within the everyday constraints of city life.
This paper examines how Russia appropriates Western academic knowledge as a tool of influence in its communication with Western audiences. It pursues three main objectives. First, it argues that the concept of soft power has been widely misunderstood due to its intangible, non-kinetic nature, often being mischaracterized as disinformation and manipulative practices associated with Russian influence. Second, the paper offers a refined interpretation of sharp power. While sharp power has typically been examined in political, institutional, normative, or economic contexts, this study calls for an ideational—or even ideological—approach. Third, it argues that Russia exploits the intellectual strengths of Western democratic societies, namely the knowledge field. In order to explain the last point, this study offers a discourse analysis of Vladimir Pozner and Fyodor Lukyanov, Russian intellectuals who frequently present themselves as independent commentators, alongside Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Minister. The aim is to demonstrate, both the similarities in their discursive strategies, and how they directly draw on concepts originating in the Western academic tradition. These concepts and theories, particularly those rooted in international relations and political science, are selectively appropriated, re-signified, and mobilized to ‘speak the language’ of Western audiences, with the intention of legitimizing Russia’s foreign policy positions.
