Since the landmark 20th century cases of Conway v Rimmer and Wiley, courts have been the final arbiters of the public interest when a party asserts that relevant documents should be withheld on the basis of public interest immunity. In its recent decision in Thompson, the Supreme Court revisited both the structure of the public interest balancing exercise and the standard of appellate review. The Supreme Court held that appellate and reviewing courts must determine the balance for themselves, rather than confining review to ordinary public law principles. At the same time, it held that a first instance court conducting the initial balancing exercise may depart from a Secretary of States' assessment of national security risk only if that assessment is irrational in the public law sense. This note argues that, notwithstanding its formal reaffirmation of judicial primacy in determining the public interest, the judgment significantly recalibrates the Wiley framework in favour of the executive. By combining a merits-based appellate standard with a highly deferential approach to ministerial assessments of the national security risk, the Supreme Court narrows the practical scope for independent judicial balancing. The approach, it is contended, is a departure from the law to date.
International commercial arbitration ('ICA)' is often described as the preferred means of resolving cross-border disputes. In an effort to maintain its preferred status, and thereby best serve the needs of ICAs' merchant end-users, States regularly review and revise their arbitration laws. Amongst several ongoing reform initiatives, Singapore is considering introducing an award appeal regime into its International Arbitration Act 1994 (Singapore, 2020 rev ed.): whereby, on an opt-in basis, parties would be able to appeal against awards to Singapores' courts on questions of law. This reform was recommended by the Singapore International Dispute Resolution Academy ('SIDRA)'. This article argues that Singapore should not provide for such award appeals, for five reasons: award appeal systems are theoretically unsound; they remain exceptional internationally; SIDRAs' proposal does not align with Singapores' own ICA context and its particular positioning as a preferred ICA seat; appellate arbitration (involving second-tier tribunals) is already available in Singapore; and there is minimal demand for ICA merits review. If Singapore does accept SIDRAs' proposal, this article further argues that it should not adopt SIDRAs' award appeal model on a wholesale basis. Instead, that model should be limited in two key respects: award appeals should be available for questions of Singapore law but not foreign law; and there should be no legislative clarification that review waivers in institutional rules do not prevent award appeals where parties otherwise opt-in.
In April 2021, the Business and Property Courts implemented major steps to reform witness preparation practice in civil proceedings. Practice Direction 57AC authoritatively recognised the capacity of the interview process to corrupt the memory of witnesses and undermine accurate fact-finding in civil proceedings, and took a number of positive steps to address this. In January/February 2025, the author interviewed 35 judges, solicitors and counsel to assess how successful the practice direction has been in changing witness preparation practice. The results suggest that, while the practice direction has achieved positive change, the witness preparation process continues to be prone to taint witness memory and undermine the achievement of justice in civil proceedings. This article reports on these findings and calls for PD 57AC to be extended to provide greater transparency into the witness preparation process.
In Evans v Barclays Bank Plc and Others [2025] UKSC 48, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, clarified the factors to be taken into account when the Competition Appeal Tribunal determines whether to certify collective proceedings on an opt-in basis or an opt-out basis under s.47B of the Competition Act 1998 and r.79(3) of the Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015. In particular the Court clarifies the strength of the claim factor, the practicability of bringing opt-in proceedings factor, the ability of the claimants to vindicate their rights in competition law, and the deterrence effect of permitting opt-out claims. The Court emphasised balancing the risk of providing undue leverage to the claimants to force the defendants to settle, even where the claim is unmeritorious, with providing adequate access to justice to the claimants. The Courts' approach to the determination is restrictive, especially in the context of "follow-on" claims, exacerbated by the Courts' approach to the admissibility of similar Commission decisions and the value of the content of Commission object decisions giving rise to the claim in articulating the follow-on claim. This case note reviews the Courts' guidance on the CATs' discretion to take account of these factors and criticises the "balance" upon which the Court settled.
This note critically examines the recommendations of the CJCs' Review into Litigation Funding following the publication of its Final Report in June 2025. It welcomes the long overdue recommendation to reverse the UK Supreme Courts' decision in PACCAR as well as the recommendation to finally fix the Damages Based Agreements Regulations 2013 . Both recommendations will go a long way to restoring certainty in litigation funding arrangements, thereby increasing the range of funding options available to ordinary individuals who cannot afford the extremely high costs of litigation upfront. However the proposed regulatory framework outlined in the CJCs'Final Report requires much further policy work and consultation, whilst some of the recommendations should be rejected altogether as a severe threat to access to justice and discriminatory against those least able to access the justice system.
