
Since 2008, excise taxes on gasoline, diesel, and other motor fuels—motor fuels taxes (“MFTs”)—have failed to raise enough revenue to support the construction, maintenance, and repair of U.S. highways, bridges, and roads. This shortfall has been caused by a combination of stagnating MFT rates, inflation, increasing fuel efficiency in the nation’s automobiles, and, to a far lesser degree, increased usage of hybrid and electric vehicles (“EVs”), which use little or no motor fuel. Governments and legal scholars have introduced three proposals to remedy the shortfalls in MFTs that focus on requiring owners of EVs and hybrids to pay additional fees and taxes. This Article evaluates these three proposals and demonstrates that they are ineffective, impractical, and disincentivize drivers from purchasing electric and hybrid vehicles without raising enough revenue to justify this interference. When appropriate, the Article offers solutions to improve the proposals. Finally, it discusses two proposals to address the shortfall in MFT revenue as effective solutions that do not disincentivize EV and hybrid adoption: raising MFT rates and funding roadwork through general revenue.
This Article takes a fresh look at the problem of taxpayer heterogeneity—how the same good or service can have very different value depending on who receives it. This issue is well known in the fringe benefits context. Every tax student wrestles with Benaglia, trying to figure out how much income someone receives from free room and board. But the problem goes far beyond fringe benefits. It also shows up when a parent loans money to a child, when luxury brands offer employee discounts, or when tech workers receive stock options. These examples come from separate corners of the tax literature, but they all point to the same underlying issue: income is hard to measure when value varies by taxpayer. Taxpayers vary not just in their consumption preferences, but also in their creditworthiness, likelihood to switch jobs, and other characteristics that affect the accurate measurement of income. This Article makes two main contributions. First, it identifies taxpayer heterogeneity as a cross-cutting problem that links many of tax law’s toughest income measurement questions. Although each area has been studied separately, prior scholarship hasn’t connected them through the common thread of heterogeneity. Recognizing that connection opens the door to broader insights and more unified solutions. Second, the Article explores a practical and intuitive way to deal with this problem: focusing on setting floor valuation using minimum benefits. Many goods or services provide at least a baseline value to any taxpayer. The tax code already hints at this approach in a few places but fails to make the floor explicit. This Article shows how building minimum benefit “floors” into the law can improve both the accuracy and the fairness of the income tax—while also making the rules simpler to administer.
This Note examines the constitutional concerns raised by a proposed consent decree in recent litigation challenging the Johnson Amendment, which bans electoral intervention by 501(c)(3) organizations. It argues that the Amendment’s justification as a conditional government subsidy mischaracterizes case law and the tax code, and that the Amendment is not narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny. It then argues that the consent decree proposed by the IRS and plaintiff organizations, which creates a carve-out exempting only religiously motivated speech from a religious leader to their congregation, violates the Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause of the Constitution by privileging religious viewpoints. The decree also fails to address the Johnson Amendment’s defects: it preserves vagueness and risks distorting the political landscape by channeling electoral advocacy into entities that are already exempt from disclosure requirements applicable to other 501(c)(3)s, while continuing to silence secular nonprofits that must comply with such requirements. Finally, this Note proposes a neutral, activity-based legislative alternative that would protect free speech for all 501(c)(3) organizations while safeguarding against large-scale, tax-favored electoral campaigning through targeted taxation and disclosure requirements.
This Article points out the legal and ethical exposure American workers’ and retirees’ preparation of tax withholding forms presents when they seek to take advantage of a tax payment deferral technique the forms so readily offer. It details three withholding settings and how each presents potential legal risk for the worker or retiree. Two of the settings exploit a frequently touted safe harbor that allows withholding to occur very late in the year to eliminate penalties that normally apply for not having paid the taxes earlier in the year. This safe harbor presents a multi-billion-dollar time-value-of-money loss to the government. Besides legal risk for Americans who inaccurately complete the forms, this Article argues that the tax ethics and nascent tax-related Environmental, Social, and Governance (“ESG”) literature has not yet judged the behavior of those who delay a tax payment (even when done in full legal compliance), as opposed to those who engage in tax avoidance or evasion. It also argues that the government’s approach to withholding and its inconsistent and confusing forms are tantamount to the government becoming complicit in Americans’ deficient submissions. In some cases, the government is laying a perjury trap, especially for Americans in financial straits looking to their withholding form as a lifeline. The 2022 increase in the information that retirees must provide on their forms, now matching the details employees have always provided, expands prosecutorial reach to retirees. This Article offers numerous recommendations to improve the withholding process and forms to reduce the temptation to engage in the criticized behavior.
Tax policy offers a core tool for mitigating the sweeping public policy challenges of generative artificial intelligence (“AI”). Specifically, we propose a tax that would allow the public to own a share of AI itself, not just through future income tax liabilities or new excise taxes, but a proposed ownership structure that requires a one-time tax payment by generative AI firms in the form of equity. Fractional public ownership of AI would directly address four of the key harms of AI that have been well-documented in a deep and still expanding literature. First, many types of AI were built through the unauthorized use of millions of copyrighted works, allegedly amounting to copyright infringement on an unprecedented scale. Sharing ownership of AI would compensate injured creators alongside the broader public whose data was nonconsensually harvested. Second, AI is expected to pose massive labor market disruptions, but shared ownership would allow displaced workers to benefit from the profits of the technology substituting for their labor. Third, greater public voice in the corporate governance of AI could lead to greater scrutiny and bolder interventions in the ways AI has been shown to reproduce and compound many existing forms of discrimination. Finally, sharing the ownership of AI through government’s principal tool for redistribution, taxation, directly addresses the rapid wealth concentration and monopolization already underway with AI developers. This proposal can also work in tandem with targeted regulation of AI and private law remedies addressing AI’s many harms. Ultimately, the original contribution of this Article is to propose a unique in-kind tax payment structure that would require firms with ownership of AI to remit equity shares to the public. The Article describes multiple structures for this arrangement, drawing from existing models of fractional ownership used in private investment to serve as a paradigm for a partial public interest in AI. In total, this Article argues that many of the greatest concerns related to AI can be solved through sharing AI. And tax policy is the best tool to achieve this goal.