Who is counted? To realize the “one person, one vote” principle and measure malapportionment, practitioners and political scientists have selected a population figure, or population count, arbitrarily or indifferently. Population figures include total population, eligible voters, registered voters, cast ballots, and valid votes. Focusing on population figures for measuring malapportionment, the paper demonstrates that the (in)different selection of the population figure matters theoretically and empirically. Normatively, who is counted brings us to mind who is included in demos. Thus, selecting different population figures mirrors different conceptualizations of the norm of representative democracy. Based on these conceptualizations, our formalization derives the conditions and policy responses causing differences in malapportionment calculated using different population figures. Furthermore, using the most popular database, we reanalyze existing findings to investigate whether they remain robust. The reanalysis simulates the data-selection process by generating 5000× 4 models sampled from 2^28 models using a malapportionment index while (in)differently choosing total population or registered voters as the figure. Our finding suggests that the probability of obtaining the same results as the previous research is like flipping a coin. Therefore, we cannot remain indifferent to the (in)different selection of the population figures.
This paper develops a game-theoretic and dynamic framework to analyse how judicial manipulation by governing parties alters political incentives in multi-party systems. The model shows that biased legal enforcement can prompt politicians - even if innocent - to switch allegiance to the ruling party to avoid penalties, with decisions shaped by reputational, voter and institutional frictions. Strong frictions can sustain pluralistic equilibria despite judicial asymmetry, while weaker frictions or stronger incentives lead to a single-party convergence. Moreover, not only formal institutions limit the judicial weaponization but also by voters’ responsiveness to imbalances in enforcement. The model therefore highlights how even modest judicial biases can erode political pluralism over time, while also identifying the political and electoral conditions under which such dynamics can be contained.
The variation in political regimes among Muslim-majority countries, some embracing democracy while others remain authoritarian, has been the focus of academic research for a long time. We argue that the alignment between democracy and Islamic political views can be traced to the historical pathways through which Islam became politically embedded within a state. Specifically, states where Islamic political views entered through diplomatic means, such as trade, tend to align more closely with democratic principles. In contrast, states where Islamic views entered through conquest and war often show a misalignment with democratic principles. We test this argument across 49 Muslim-majority states and find that states with a positive entry of Islamic views are more likely to uphold democratic principles. This relationship is driven by the states’ ability to foster freedom, which encourages positive political competition among elites, which is an essential component for maintaining a healthy democracy. Our findings suggest that the non-democratic nature of some Muslim-majority states can be better understood by examining the processes through which Islamic views entered these states.
Mixed electoral systems combine majoritarian and proportional rules within a single institutional framework, promising what Shugart and Wattenberg (2001) called "the best of both worlds": local accountability alongside representational fairness. This article surveys the family of mixed systems—parallel, compensatory, proportional, and combined—and examines whether their constitutional promise has been fulfilled. Simulations of seat allocation under alternative mixed designs demonstrate that these systems generate markedly different seat distributions, undermining any unified claim about their representational properties. A systematic analysis of the paradoxes that have emerged over a quarter century of practice—excessive complexity, decoy parties, manipulative coalition coordination, uncontrolled parliamentary growth, and "zombie" legislators—reveals that strategic actors routinely exploit the gap between constitutional aspiration and institutional detail. We conclude by assessing how variation in the constitutional entrenchment of mixed systems shapes both the scope for manipulation and the capacity for reform. A Glossary of key concepts is included as an Appendix.
Although not known for his constitutional theory, Adam Smith had an approach to constitutions that rivals that of Madison. In many ways, Smith’s approach is more coherent and complete than Madison’s, in part because the format of the Federalist Papers required that its authors attack the problem of constitutionalism piecemeal. Essential elements in the Smithian scheme include the familiar separation of powers with an independent judiciary, but also less familiar elements, such as the right of resistance and bright lines as a set of mechanisms for providing incentives to political officials to adhere to the rules.
