Legal transitions are inherently costly and salient in frontier contexts, where a public legal authority is imposed for the first time. Transitions between private and public systems of ordering provide an illustrative example of private ordering as the foundation of law, in contrast with other studies that identify private ordering as either a complement, substitute, or competitor. This study of a transition from private to public ordering examines judicial techniques of the Supreme Court of Colorado that reduced transition costs. Initially, judicial faithfulness to local decision-making invoked custom, but this diminished over time. Simultaneously, the Court was deferential to local land office determinations, notwithstanding documented problems with this office’s reliability and efficacy. The cases here suggest that recognition of custom and rewarding formal claimants each played a role in minimizing legal transition costs, with mineral rights custom proving to be the foundation for the nascent legal system.
This article examines the relationship between theory, teaching, and political engagement in Antonio de Viti de Marco during the late 19th century. The article examines his distinction between the monopolistic and the cooperative or democratic state. It then compares it with Herbert Spencer’s distinction between military and industrial societies, showing both the affinities and the limits of the British philosopher’s influence on de Viti de Marco. The article then reconstructs how de Viti de Marco’s theoretical framework was translated into concrete fiscal and economic proposals regarding indirect taxation on basic consumption, minimum income protection, and customs policy. Finally, it shows how these ideas informed his campaigns in the Giornale degli Economisti during the Italian fin de siècle crisis. De Viti de Marco interpreted the crisis as the outcome of a monopolistic, class-based state, in which taxation, protectionism, public expenditure, and restrictions on civil liberties served narrow interests rather than the general interest. The article argues that his political commitment aimed at defending free trade, fiscal justice, and civil liberties can only be fully understood in light of the evolution of the state’s tasks outlined in his studies of public finance.
The ratchet effect is a theoretically fragmented concept in public administration, referring to either macro-historical, crisis-driven state growth or micro-behavioural strategic underperformance. This article addresses this research gap by developing a unified, multi-level framework. Through a thematic analysis of 88 articles, we identify a fundamental principle of ‘asymmetric lock-in’ underpinning the phenomenon. We propose the ‘model of systemic entrapment’, arguing that the macro-ratchet of state expansion and the micro-ratchet of strategic inaction are theoretically linked through a dynamic feedback loop: crisis-driven expansion often introduces control systems that can trigger micro-level underperformance. This systemic inertia appears to reduce adaptive capacity, potentially making large-scale intervention in the next crisis more likely. The model synthesises disparate theories, offering a unified framework for understanding administrative inertia.
This article argues that the elimination of Chevron deference marks a significant institutional shift in bureaucratic control. With the Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the judiciary now assumes an active role in legislative interpretation. The article outlines four existing theories: self-control, congressional control, presidential control, and interest group control. These theories fail to fully capture the judiciary's enhanced role following the elimination of Chevron deference. It then introduces a new theory of bureaucratic control: judicial control theory. Here, rather than being passive reviewers, judges now have the opportunity to assert primary control over the interpretation of vague and ambiguous legislation. This new institutional environment alters the incentives of other actors and does not represent a return to the pre-Chevron deference status quo. By identifying the judiciary as a strategic actor with the ability to steer legislative interpretation, this article reframes how bureaucratic control operates under current institutional constraints.
This article examines the factors that influence competition and how competition affects prices in public contracts in Burkina Faso. It is based on a data set comprising 1,604 contracts awarded by various contracting authorities between 2016 and 2018. Two models are used: a negative binomial model to identify the determinants of competition, and an instrumental variable model based on heteroskedasticity to analyze the impact of competition on the winning bid price. The results show that an optimal number of seven to nine bidders is crucial to maximize competition, whereas the current average is only five. Achieving this range could lead to average savings per contract of between 0.5 percent and 3.15 percent, or approximately 3.7 million CFA francs. These savings highlight the need to reform public procurement policies to promote greater competition and improve efficiency.
