In this paper we apply Anscombe's account of human linguistic practices and of intentional action in a novel way-to the acts, by members of the Ng & amacr;i Tahu tribe in colonial-era Aotearoa New Zealand, of writing Letters to the Editor of local and regional newspapers. We identify the salient contexts of those acts and then draw on Anscombe's work to identify intentional and moral actions that otherwise risk going unnoticed. Our analysis exemplifies Anscombe's and Wittgenstein's view that we can read off intentional action from behaviour in context and also yields a rich historical and conceptual account of the letter-writers. We argue that this approach has theoretical advantages for Indigenous and Postcolonial Studies.
This paper proposes a method to infer intention from observation and specific theoretical assumptions. This approach is grounded in counterfactual reasoning, similar to that underlying contemporary causal research. Causation is not directly observable, but empirical evidence- experimental or sometimes purely observational data-can support causal hypotheses. We propose extending this framework to formally represent interventions upon causal systems by identifying their intended effects. To achieve this, we introduce the concepts of final model and want-operator.
Elizabeth Anscombe criticizes Aristotle for his failure to account for the person who forms a perfectly clear-headed akratic intention, and yet she agrees with him that the weak-willed do not make what he calls a 'choice'. She concludes that akratic intentions are not rational, for an intention is rational only when it is conducive to or a part of what one 'regards as doing well'. Based on the 'brute facts' of practice that provide the 'context of normal procedure' for human action, akrasia is simply an error in practical reasoning. However, Anscombe also assumes that intentions are analogous to orders, but if they have the same mode of operation then, as I shall try to show, the intention to phi is rational insofar as there is a binding reason to phi and one is trying to get phi, regardless of whether there are more important reasons (or intentions) to phi. Hence, an akratic intention is rational, and a valid feature of everyday practice.
The normative approach to Milgram's experiment argues that participants do not obey because of submission to authority, but because they are following explicit and previously justified rules. However, this approach remains theoretically ambiguous and empirically imprecise, due to a confused use of the concept of normative necessity. In this article, I draw on Anscombe's account of practice to clarify this concept and to develop a more precise interpretation of the subjects' behavior within Milgram's experimental framework.
In this paper, I will focus on the notion of relational practices starting from the analysis of some of G.E.M. Anscombe's contributions. The aim is to provide a broader and clearer framework of the concept of relationality and its grammar, moving from Anscombe's philosophical approach. The goal is to discuss the notion ofrelationality, beginning by dialoging with a selection of recent literature on the author. According to the perspective of this study, a reading of the author oriented from a relational point of view provides tools to investigate the theme of relationality and broadens its understanding within the human form of life. This proposal aims to provide an introduction to this subject and is committed to providing a conceptual framework for it to be further discussed. Of particular interest is the introduction, starting from this Anscombean framework, of the notion of shadow-implications linked to that of relationality. I will start by introducing Anscombe's grammatical method, discussing a selection of recent literature (1 and 1.1), and then I will discuss it concerning Anscombe's On Brute Facts (2). Next, I will focus on the kind of background that is at stake (2.1), the way we learn a concept (2.2), and the context of our institutions (2.3). Following, I will attempt to examine the notion of relational practices (3) regarding the relationship between the different descriptions of our actions (3.1), the possible answers to the question Why? (3.2), and the risks related to the relational dimension, i.e., its shadow-implications (3.3).
