
The relationship between criminal law and social change has conventionally been conceived as unidirectional: penal statutes reflect, rather than shape, the normative hierarchy of a given society. This article examines the conditions under which the promotional function of criminal law – its deployment, in Bobbio’s sense, as an instrument for installing new social norms rather than merely conserving existing ones – can be considered legitimate. The affirmative consent model in sexual criminal law, as enacted in Spain, serves as the test case against which three analytical perspectives map the boundaries of permissible penal promotion. First, the declaratory perspective holds that, with respect to negative sexual autonomy, the affirmative consent model performs a conservative function, declaring a pre-existing public wrong by reference to shared civic values, while assuming a constitutive function with respect to positive autonomy, thereby exceeding the declaratory warrant of criminal law. Second, the conditioned promotional perspective identifies four cumulative legitimacy criteria and finds the affirmative consent model only partially compliant with them. Third, the normative framing perspective contends that the political rationality structuring affirmative consent reform is oriented toward the legal entrenchment of an interpretative grammar rather than behavioral transformation. The three perspectives converge in finding that the promotional justification of affirmative consent fails to meet the legitimacy requirements applicable to each. The shared conclusion is that whereas criminal law may legitimately perform a conservative function in protecting negative sexual autonomy, it may not legitimately be deployed to entrench a specific communicative model for exercising positive sexual autonomy. The subsidiarity principle is advanced as the criterion that confines criminal law to a consolidating role in cultural transformation, allocating its promotional ambitions to the domain of social and educational policy.
This article challenges the widespread tendency to frame forgiveness either as a moral alternative to punishment or as a practice set in opposition to and disconnected from criminal law. It instead focuses on the tension between punishment, forgiveness and justice by examining the work of Jacques Derrida. The paper argues that the prevailing readings of Derridean forgiveness as unconditional and alien to any legal logic overlook its place within the broader deconstructive task, particularly in the constitutive tension between law and justice. In light of this reconsideration, the article explores the critical scope of deconstruction to interrogate the role of forgiveness, both within punitive logics and within frameworks that advocate responses to harm beyond punishment, including transitional justice and restorative justice.
Public discourse and academic debate on the permissibility of social punishment range from strong endorsement to categorical rejection. This paper defends a moderate view: social punishment practices such as shaming, canceling, or deplatforming may be legitimate, but only under certain conditions. It focuses on one key criterion: the social status of the wrongdoer and asks whether celebrities and non-celebrities should be treated differently. I argue that the epistemic power of celebrities justifies greater exposure to social punishment, whereas non-celebrities should generally be subject only to private punishment. The paper outlines the normative implications of this distinction. Due to the subject of this paper and given that it is a work in political philosophy, the method used here is reflective equilibrium.
The dominant paradigm of justice in Western thought is retributive, framed through an economic logic of debt, guilt, and proportional punishment. Retributive justice promises balance but perpetually postpones its delivery. This article argues that this deferral is not a failure but a structural feature: justice conceived as debt can never be settled in the present. This holds an analogy with Christian eschatological temporality, reproduced in secularized juridical forms. The deferral is actively maintained by what Walter Benjamin identified as “mythical violence,” that is, the foundational and preservative force of law that reduces life to administrable “mere life” and functions as a freezer of political time. Through a Benjaminian lens, the article critiques this apparatus and posits an alternative: prospective justice. Reconceived not as a future ideal but as a messianic intervention in the “now-time” [Jetztzeit], prospective justice involves the collective redistribution of agency to repair harm, the restoration of inviolable human dignity, and the use of a “divine violence” directed not at individuals but at the systemic structures of legal domination. The conclusion asserts that true justice requires a shift from inhabiting the frozen time of debt to seizing the charged possibility of the Jetztzeit.
This paper develops a utilitarian case for prison abolition grounded on utilitarianism’s commitment to the reduction of pain, challenging the traditional forward-looking utilitarian justifications of punishment, whose empirical foundations are increasingly contested. To construct the utilitarian abolitionist argument, traces of an abolitionist theory are identified in Bentham’s penal thought, especially in his neglected analysis of indirect legislation as a means of crime prevention. His theoretical analysis is integrated with contemporary debates on punishment, incarceration and restorative justice. The paper argues that a consistently utilitarian approach should prioritize harm reduction through social restructuring, transformative approaches, and restorative responses to wrongdoing, rather than relying on incarceration and deterrence-centred punishment.