Marine ecosystem services underpin human wellbeing and support resilient socio-ecological systems, yet existing vulnerability assessments remain fragmented, often focusing on isolated industries and overlooking the whole-system socio-ecological context. To bridge this gap, we develop a comprehensive Vulnerability Index to assess marine ecosystem service vulnerability to emerging climate stressors in the Atlantic. Using high-resolution ocean simulations and moving beyond traditional long-term projections, we employ the Time of Emergence metric to address actionable decision-making timescales (2–3 decades). We found that all Atlantic marine ecosystem services are projected to be exposed to multiple emerging stressors before 2100, though the sequence and the timing of emergence are highly heterogenous. Overall vulnerability is highest in tropical West Africa due to the early emergence of hypoxia and sea level rise extremes compound by low adaptive capacity. Additional hotspots are found in subpolar and polar regions driven by rapid sea ice retreat and the sensitivities of region-specific habitats alongside a high dependence on marine ecosystems. Coupled with socio-ecological data, we determined which services (provisioning, regulatory and cultural) are most sensitive to potential impacts in each EEZ. We anticipate this index to be a starting point to develop targeted vulnerability indices for specific ecosystem services and regions. Mitigative and adaptive efforts must be multi-scale and tailored to national and local contexts, addressing not only socio-economic differences but also variable climate stressors and their impacts. Uncertainties associated with time series data gaps and indicator aggregation, particularly for island and remote territories, highlight the need for targeted national adaptation.
The nexus between climate change and armed conflict has received considerable attention by scientists and decision makers. Existing evidence highlights that the impact of climate disasters on insurgencies is not unidirectional. Droughts, floods, and storms can have positive as well as negative impacts on armed groups. We study why and under what circumstances rebel groups benefit from or are constrained by climate disasters. To do so, we draw on unique empirical material that brings forth the perspectives of those affected by climate extremes and engaged in insurgencies. Specifically, we conducted 55 interviews with former rebels in Colombia (FARC/EP), Nepal (CPN-M/PLA), and the Philippines (CPP/NPA). We find that insurgents frequently engage in disaster risk reduction activities and can hence be important non-state environmental governance actors. Our results also provide support for various causal mechanisms connecting disasters to improved or worse prospects for rebellion. Territorial control, strong capacities (not in general, but only in the disaster realm), and good rebel-civilian relations allow insurgents to benefit from climate disaster-related opportunities and to cope with adverse disaster impacts. When studying the climate-disaster-conflict nexus, it is therefore key to understand the structure and social relations of non-state armed groups.
Mitigating net CO2 emissions under socioeconomic development and climate variability is essential for climate action and sustainable development goals. Here, focusing on anthropogenic emissions and terrestrial ecosystem sinks, we construct a national-scale account of China's net emissions from 1980 to 2020, examine their evolution, and quantify the contributions of drivers and mitigation measures. We found that anthropogenic emissions dominated the long-term increase in net emissions, while ecosystem sinks offset only ∼12–32% of the increase in anthropogenic emissions. Meanwhile, the sensitivity of ecosystem sinks to climate variability introduced interannual fluctuations in net emissions, especially through responses to irradiance and precipitation anomalies. By combining an extended Logarithmic Mean Divisia Index decomposition with scenario simulations of ecosystem sinks, we found that rising affluence was the main driver of increasing net emissions, whereas declining energy intensity was the main mitigation measure. Land-use management and vegetation-related sink efficiency generally reduced net emissions, but their contributions weakened over time. The direct climate-related effect on ecosystem sinks differed across periods and was comparable to some anthropogenic drivers. By linking anthropogenic emissions, ecosystem sinks, and climate variability over four decades, this study provides a basis for assessing net-zero pathways under socioeconomic development and climate variability.
Climate change and violent extremism represent intersecting global threats, yet their relationship remains under-examined. This preregistered systematic review synthesizes 45 studies across disciplines to develop an integrated conceptual model of climate-extremism pathways based on the current literature. Our synthesis shows that climate variability correlates with terrorist attack frequency, climate shocks create governance vacuums exploited by extremist organizations, environmental degradation fuels extremist narratives, and climate threat cues increase authoritarian attitudes and out-group hostility. These pathways are moderated by various factors including state capacity, community resilience, and pre-existing ideologies. Our proposed Integrative Climate-Extremism Model distinguishes between extremist endorsement (attitudinal support), advocacy (recruitment and propaganda), willingness (behavioral intentions), and execution (violent acts), outlining how each is influenced by different pathways. This synthesis reveals climate change as a threat multiplier rather than direct cause of violent extremism, operating through material, institutional, psychological, and ideological mechanisms. We identify critical research gaps, propose targeted interventions to disrupt climate-extremism pathways, and discuss anticipatory governance strategies.
Losses and damages from the impacts of climate change are already reshaping economic development pathways. However, so too are mitigation and adaptation actions taken in response to climate change. As countries implement climate policies with increasing ambition and scale, cross-border effects arise for other countries. Building on evolving conceptualisations of transboundary climate risk we set out a framework to map policy measures, transboundary flow alterations and transmission mechanisms that give rise to international risks and opportunities. Drawing empirically from observable effects across five Low-and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs), we identify that climate-related responses in other countries across domains such as energy, industrial, migration and defence policy, can transmit effects through a range of flows (trade, finance, people, biophysical, technology) and mechanisms (prices, production factors, norms, security). Failure to adequately conceptualise how climate responses in one country will affect others, the transmission pathways and channels to respond, has major implications for the current fragile consensus on addressing the climate emergency. New conceptual frameworks to enhance understanding of the channels of impact will better equip policymakers and researchers to anticipate the full spectrum of cross-border spillovers, manage risks governance, and identify opportunities.
