Historically the United States uses both bilateral aid and influence over multilateral development finance to further its geopolitical objectives. Past studies explain the choice between these two instruments based on either a divided government effect or whether the recipient government is a traditional US ally (the dirty work hypothesis). We advance a theory explaining the bilateral/multilateral choice in terms of the confluence of these factors and test its predictions using United Nations Security Council voting, US bilateral aid flows, and World Bank lending. Results confirm theoretical expectations: higher bilateral aid goes to allies who support the United States in the Security Council but only when the US government is not divided and higher World Bank lending goes to non-allies who support the United States in the Security Council but only when the US government is divided. This detailed understanding of the link between domestic politics and governance in international organizations has important implications as the international order moves beyond a US-dominated system.
Following pressure from investors, Congress passed the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) to facilitate lawsuits by nonstate commercial actors against sovereign states in US courts. This legislation redefined sovereign debt as a commercial activity, seemingly favoring creditors. Yet case outcomes proved variable. While the FSIA established clear procedural guidelines, judicial discretion remained, raising questions about what factors influence outcomes. How deep is the effect of judges' partisan leanings? To what extent does a left-right divide exist in this issue area? Although sovereign debt of other countries rarely sparks US political debate, I argue that partisan influence persists in these cases, particularly when defendants are democracies. Republican-nominated judges consistently apply the FSIA's pro-creditor framework regardless of defendant characteristics, reflecting their party's historical support for transnational commercial actors and contract enforcement. Democratic-nominated judges, however, exhibit conditional deference: when democracies demonstrate fiscal restraint before defaulting-signaling genuine economic distress-Democratic-nominated judges more readily defer to the sovereign defendant within the FSIA's constraints. When democracies maintain high government consumption while defaulting, suggesting strategic choice rather than necessity, Democratic-nominated judges enforce more strictly. By contrast, both Democratic- and Republican-nominated judges converge on pro-creditor positions when adjudicating autocratic defaults because the absence of credible fiscal signals eliminates conditions for conditional deference. I test this argument with an original data set of sovereign debt litigation cases brought to the United States from 1977 to 2022.
Abstract When civilians flee conflict, concerned donors adopt policies intended to curb both violence and large refugee flows, viewing these objectives as complementary. Can such policies reduce the flow of refugees while safeguarding civilians? Using a model of refugee flight in civil conflict, I find donors who link aid and migration policies may fail to restrain government violence, risking increases in displacement and repression. Specifically, when donors lack leverage or have inconsistent priorities, their goals are undermined by strategic government violence. Policies aimed at reducing migration, like increasing humanitarian aid or reducing access to asylum, can yield more intense fighting because they leave a larger base of support for rebels. Threats to suspend aid similarly do not deter violence when it is clear donors’ primary concern is migration. I find if donors condition assistance on reducing both migration and violence against civilians, but prioritize curbing repression, they can achieve both goals.
