Abstract Johan Galtung was an unusually productive scholar over a period of more than 60 years. His work changed over time, and it is tempting to distinguish between a Galtung Phase I and Phase II. In Phase I, he was an ambitious and competent academic with a double education in mathematics and sociology, with an empirical orientation, writing for academic journals and book publishers. In Phase II, his work became more partisan. He wrote for more peripheral publications, cited himself more and other scholars less, and became more interested in subverting invariances than establishing them. Despite this, I argue that several main themes are found throughout his long publication career. These include a nomothetic perspective, a structural approach extending across levels of social organization, a quest for equality, a search for an improved concept of peace, and an interest in the policy implications of research.
Abstract In this special issue, an international group of scholars takes stock of the contributions made to the study of war and peace by Johan Galtung, a highly cited and controversial scholar, public intellectual, and institution builder. Some of the authors assess his conceptual contributions, while others evaluate the continued empirical validity of his ideas. His articles on international economic sanctions and the structure of imperialism are examples of theoretical and empirical contributions that were received with enthusiasm in the peace research community, while conceptual innovations like “structural violence” and ‘‘cultural violence’’ have found a much wider audience but a declining relevance to the mainstream of peace studies. While the special issue primarily focuses on his intellectual contributions, some articles also discuss Galtung’s arrogance and his flirtation with conspiracy theories, facets of his life that may have harmed his intellectual legacy.
Abstract Questions of equality and justice have long been important in peace and conflict studies, and a consensus has emerged that systematic inequalities between culturally defined groups, or “horizontal inequalities” (HIs), are associated with various forms of violence. In this paper, we show that many of the ideas and assumptions in the conceptual groundwork and theorization that underpin research on this topic can be traced back to the seminal work of Johan Galtung, although they are rarely attributed to him. We summarize Galtung’s arguments regarding structural inequalities, culture, and violence, including his concept of rank disequilibrium, which problematizes the multidimensionality of inequality and its associated conflict potential. To evaluate the empirical validity of some of Galtung’s theoretical contributions, we review the existing quantitative literature on the relationship between inequality—both vertical (VI) and horizontal (HI)—and violent conflict mobilization within states. Based on this review, which shows some (but far from unequivocal) support for his propositions, we revisit Galtung’s arguments, discussing the opportunities and challenges associated with operationalizing his ideas within the context of contemporary peace and conflict research.
Abstract Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2022 has put nuclear security back in the spotlight, especially through Russian nuclear threats intended to undermine and deter European arms delivery to Ukraine, ranging from battle tanks to cruise missiles to fighter jets. While a growing body of literature has examined the conditions under which nuclear weapons use is publicly endorsed, surprisingly little is known about the recipient effects of nuclear threats. We argue and demonstrate that such threats can deter populations in the target state, instill fears of escalation, and induce public preferences for security policies of restraint. To understand the mechanisms of why and how nuclear threats succeed, we devise a large-scale public opinion survey in Germany, centering on the debate on military support to Ukraine—which Russian nuclear threats seek to deter. Our findings demonstrate that (i) large shares of the public deem Russian nuclear threats as credible, and that (ii) perceived credibility exerts a strong negative effect on public support for the delivery of modern weapon systems to Ukraine, suggesting that nuclear coercion can work indirectly, by shaping the domestic constraints within which democratic leaders operate. Finally, we find that nuclear threat capability is remarkably resistant to experimental manipulation.
Audience costs theory suggests that leaders face "costs" in terms of a loss public support when failing to follow through on publicly made threats. These "costs" then lock leaders in a war path. On the other hand, awareness of these costs may prevent states from further escalation. Often, questions arise whether audience costs can signal effectively to nondemocracies who may be less capable of generating these costs themselves. This paper explores the secondary effects of audience costs signaling on another category of actors-rebel groups. We explore rebel group decision-making during civil war to establish how audience costs dynamics further impact civil war outcomes. We argue that the observation of audience costs signaling by state actors encourages rebel groups in civil wars by creating expectations that the target state will be preoccupied with outward-facing conflict, implying a weakening in both its resolve and capabilities. However, the absence of audience costs occurring when leaders "back down" from conflict should signal a reversal of the target state's relative position, giving rebel groups pause on their campaign tactics. We analyze these dynamics via patterns of rebel attacks during the Syrian Civil War following Obama's "red line" speech and the American response following Assad's use of chemical weapons in August 2013. La teor & iacute;a de los costes de audiencia sugiere que los l & iacute;deres se enfrentan a "costes" en t & eacute;rminos de p & eacute;rdidas a nivel de apoyo p & uacute;blico cuando no cumplen con las amenazas que hicieron p & uacute;blicamente. Estos "costes", entonces, bloquean a los l & iacute;deres en un camino hacia la guerra. Por otro lado, ser conscientes de estos costes puede evitar que los Estados lleven a cabo una mayor escalada. Es frecuente que surjan preguntas con respecto a si los costes de audiencia pueden se & ntilde;alar, de manera efectiva, a las no democracias que pueden ser menos capaces de generar estos costes por s & iacute; mismas. Este art & iacute;culo estudia los efectos secundarios que tiene la se & ntilde;alizaci & oacute;n de los costes de audiencia en otra categor & iacute;a de actores: los grupos rebeldes. Analizamos la toma de decisiones por parte de los grupos rebeldes durante la guerra civil con el fin de establecer c & oacute;mo la din & aacute;mica de los costes de audiencia ejerce un impacto a & uacute;n mayor sobre los resultados de la guerra civil. Argumentamos que la observaci & oacute;n de la se & ntilde;alizaci & oacute;n de costes de audiencia por parte de los actores estatales incentiva a los grupos rebeldes durante las guerras civiles dado que crea expectativas de que el Estado objetivo estar & aacute; ocupado con conflictos hacia el exterior, lo que implica un debilitamiento tanto con relaci & oacute;n a su determinaci & oacute;n como en lo relativo a sus capacidades. Sin embargo, la ausencia de costes de audiencia que tiene lugar cuando los l & iacute;deres "se retractan" en el marco de un conflicto deber & iacute;a poner de manifiesto una reversi & oacute;n de la posici & oacute;n relativa del Estado objetivo y otorgar a los grupos rebeldes una pausa en sus t & aacute;cticas de campa & ntilde;a. Analizamos estas din & aacute;micas a trav & eacute;s de los patrones observados en los ataques rebeldes durante la Guerra Civil Siria tras el discurso de Obama sobre la "l & iacute;nea roja" y la respuesta estadounidense tras el uso de armas qu & iacute;micas por parte de Assad en agosto de 2013. La th & eacute;orie des co & ucirc;ts d'audience sugg & egrave;re que les dirigeants risquent des "co & ucirc;ts", c'est-& agrave;-dire une perte de soutien public s'ils ne mettent pas & agrave; ex & eacute;cution les menaces prof & eacute;r & eacute;es publiquement. Ces "co & ucirc;ts" coincent ensuite les dirigeants sur le sentier de la guerre. D'un autre c & ocirc;t & eacute;, s'ils & eacute;taient conscients de ces co & ucirc;ts, les & Eacute;tats pourraient renoncer & agrave; toute escalade suppl & eacute;mentaire. Souvent, l'on se demande si les co & ucirc;ts d'audience peuvent constituer un signal efficace pour les non-d & eacute;mocraties qui pourraient & ecirc;tre moins capables de g & eacute;n & eacute;rer elles-m & ecirc;mes ces co & ucirc;ts. Cet article explore les effets secondaires du signalement de co & ucirc;ts d'audience sur une autre cat & eacute;gorie d'acteurs: les groupes rebelles. Nous explorons la prise de d & eacute;cisions de groupes rebelles lors de guerres civiles afin de d & eacute;terminer si les dynamiques de co & ucirc;ts d'audience ont d'autres effets sur les issues d'une guerre civile. Nous affirmons que le respect du signalement de co & ucirc;ts d'audience par les acteurs & eacute;tatiques encourage les groupes rebelles dans les guerres civiles parce qu'ils s'attendent & agrave; ce que l'& Eacute;tat cible se pr & eacute;occupe d'un conflit tourn & eacute; vers l'ext & eacute;rieur, et donc pr & eacute;voient un affaiblissement de sa d & eacute;termination et de ses capacit & eacute;s. Cependant, l'absence de co & ucirc;ts d'audience quand des dirigeants reculent devant un conflit devrait signaler une inversion de la position relative de l'& Eacute;tat cible, et donc faire r & eacute;fl & eacute;chir les groupes rebelles & agrave; leurs tactiques de campagnes. Nous analysons ces dynamiques par le biais de sch & eacute;mas d'attaques rebelles lors de la guerre civile en Syrie apr & egrave;s le discours de la "ligne rouge" de Barack Obama et la r & eacute;ponse & eacute;tats-unienne apr & egrave;s le recours aux armes chimiques de Bachar al-Assad en ao & ucirc;t 2013.
