Major powers often form military alliances with much weaker partners. Scholars generally believe that these relationships allow major powers to advance their global policy priorities by securing policy alignment from their partners. However, we know little about how successful major powers are in achieving this goal, largely because measuring foreign policy alignment in asymmetric alliances has proven challenging. Major powers pursue alignment on a wide range of policy dimensions, and the degree of alignment provided by allies varies over time. To address these challenges, we develop a measurement model to estimate the policy alignment of US allies in the post-WWII period. Our approach produces a continuous measure of alignment with US foreign policy priorities for all states from 1950 to 2010. The resulting estimates indicate that allies tend to be more closely aligned with the US than non-allies, while also exhibiting substantial variation across alliances and allies over time. We also use the measure to examine the effect of US alliance commitments on alignment relative to other forms of US support, finding that the US alliance network plays a central role in shaping alignment. These findings provide new insights into the US alliance system and highlight the ability of major powers to advance their global policy priorities through alliance commitments to weaker states. Es frecuente que las grandes potencias formen alianzas militares con socios mucho m & aacute;s d & eacute;biles. Por lo general, los acad & eacute;micos creen que estas relaciones permiten a las grandes potencias obtener avances con respecto a sus prioridades pol & iacute;ticas globales dado que aseguran la alineaci & oacute;n en materia de pol & iacute;ticas por parte de sus socios. Sin embargo, existe poca informaci & oacute;n con respecto al grado de & eacute;xito que consiguen las grandes potencias con relaci & oacute;n a lograr este objetivo. Esto se debe, en gran parte, a que medir la alineaci & oacute;n de la pol & iacute;tica exterior en alianzas asim & eacute;tricas ha demostrado ser un desaf & iacute;o. Las grandes potencias buscan la alineaci & oacute;n en una amplia gama de dimensiones pol & iacute;ticas, y el grado de alineaci & oacute;n proporcionado por los aliados var & iacute;a con el tiempo. Con el fin de abordar estos desaf & iacute;os, desarrollamos un modelo de medici & oacute;n que busca estimar la alineaci & oacute;n de pol & iacute;ticas de los aliados de los EE. UU. en el per & iacute;odo posterior a la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Nuestro enfoque produce una medida continua en materia de alineaci & oacute;n con las prioridades de la pol & iacute;tica exterior de EE. UU. para todos los Estados, desde 1950 hasta 2010. Las estimaciones resultantes indican que los aliados tienden a estar m & aacute;s alineados con EE. UU. que los no aliados y, tambi & eacute;n, muestran una variaci & oacute;n sustancial entre las alianzas y los aliados a lo largo del tiempo. Tambi & eacute;n usamos esta medida con el fin de analizar el efecto que ejercen los compromisos relativos a alianzas por parte de Estados Unidos sobre la alineaci & oacute;n en comparaci & oacute;n con otras formas de apoyo por parte de Estados Unidos, lo que nos permite concluir que la red de alianzas de EE. UU. desempe & ntilde;a un papel central en la configuraci & oacute;n de la alineaci & oacute;n. Estas conclusiones proporcionan nuevas perspectivas con respecto al sistema de alianzas de EE. UU. y destacan la capacidad de las principales potencias para lograr avances relativos a sus prioridades en materia de pol & iacute;tica global a trav & eacute;s de compromisos de alianza con Estados m & aacute;s d & eacute;biles. Palabras clave: alianza, pol & iacute;tica exterior, jerarqu & iacute;a, medici & oacute;n Les grandes puissances forment souvent des alliances militaires avec des partenaires bien plus faibles. G & eacute;n & eacute;ralement, les chercheurs pensent que ces relations permettent aux grandes puissances d'avancer sur leurs priorit & eacute;s politiques mondiales en s'assurant l'alignement politique de leurs partenaires. N & eacute;anmoins, nous en savons peu sur le taux d'atteinte de cet objectif par les grandes puissances, en grande partie parce qu'il s'av & egrave;re difficile de mesurer l'alignement des politiques & eacute;trang & egrave;res dans les alliances asym & eacute;triques. Les grandes puissances poursuivent un alignement dans un large & eacute;ventail de dimensions politiques, et le degr & eacute; d'alignement fourni par les alli & eacute;s n'est pas toujours le m & ecirc;me. Pour r & eacute;pondre & agrave; ces d & eacute;fis, nous mettons au point un mod & egrave;le de mesure afin d'estimer l'alignement politique des alli & eacute;s des & Eacute;tats-Unis apr & egrave;s la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Notre approche produit une mesure continue de l'alignement sur les priorit & eacute;s de politique & eacute;trang & egrave;re & eacute;tats-uniennes pour tous les & Eacute;tats entre 1950 et 2010. Les estimations qui en r & eacute;sultent indiquent que les alli & eacute;s ont tendance & agrave; s'aligner plus & eacute;troitement sur les & Eacute;tats-Unis que les non-alli & eacute;s, bien qu'il existe une grande variation d'une alliance et d'un alli & eacute; & agrave; l'autre dans le temps. Nous utilisons par ailleurs la mesure pour examiner l'effet des engagements de l'alliance avec les & Eacute;tats-Unis sur l'alignement par rapport & agrave; d'autres formes de soutien & eacute;tats-unien. Nous observons ainsi que le r & eacute;seau d'alliances & eacute;tats-unien joue un r & ocirc;le central quand il s'agit de fa & ccedil;onner l'alignement. Ces conclusions nous fournissent un nouvel & eacute;clairage sur le syst & egrave;me d'alliances & eacute;tats-unien et mettent en lumi & egrave;re la capacit & eacute; des grandes puissances & agrave; progresser sur leurs priorit & eacute;s politiques mondiales par le biais d'engagements d'alliances avec des & Eacute;tats plus faibles.
Elite-level social capital facilitates both the mobilization and retention of participants in social movements and insurgencies. Well-connected rebel leaders perceived as credible have advantages in building a functioning organization and ensuring loyalty among followers. We argue that leaders from reputable and elite families have several advantages when it comes to organizing an insurgency. They can build on the social capital amassed by previous generations and therefore have greater visibility, credibility, and access to key networks that facilitate more viable rebel organizations. Consequently, we expect these organizations to establish a dominant position as the opposition to the regime and deter rival attempts of rebel group formation. Following an analysis of all civil conflicts 1946-2018, we find robust support for our argument that inter-generational social capital creates more cohesive insurgencies. We also identify a substitution effect as social capital serves similar purposes as previous political involvement but that the most cohesive insurgencies are formed by leaders that have either of these two features in combination with military skills. El capital social a nivel de & eacute;lites facilita tanto la movilizaci & oacute;n como la retenci & oacute;n de participantes en movimientos sociales e insurgencias. Aquellos l & iacute;deres rebeldes que cuentan con buenos contactos y que son percibidos como cre & iacute;bles tienen ventajas para poder construir una organizaci & oacute;n funcional y para asegurar la lealtad entre sus seguidores. Argumentamos que los l & iacute;deres procedentes de familias reputadas y de & eacute;lite cuentan con diversas ventajas a la hora de organizar una insurgencia. Esto se debe a que pueden valerse del capital social acumulado por las generaciones anteriores, lo que les permite tener mayor visibilidad y un mayor nivel de credibilidad, as & iacute; como acceso a aquellas redes fundamentales que facilitan la existencia de organizaciones rebeldes m & aacute;s viables. En consecuencia, se espera que estas organizaciones lleguen a establecer una posici & oacute;n dominante como oposici & oacute;n al r & eacute;gimen y a disuadir los intentos de formaci & oacute;n de grupos rebeldes rivales. Realizamos un an & aacute;lisis de todos los conflictos civiles que tuvieron lugar entre 1946 y 2018. Este nos permite encontrar un apoyo s & oacute;lido a nuestra hip & oacute;tesis de que el capital social intergeneracional crea insurgencias m & aacute;s cohesionadas. Tambi & eacute;n identificamos un efecto de sustituci & oacute;n ya que el capital social cumple prop & oacute;sitos similares a la participaci & oacute;n pol & iacute;tica previa. Por otro lado, concluimos que las insurgencias m & aacute;s cohesionadas son aquellas que est & aacute;n formadas por l & iacute;deres que tienen cualquiera de estas dos caracter & iacute;sticas en combinaci & oacute;n con habilidades militares. Le capital social au niveau des & eacute;lites facilite tant la mobilization que la fid & eacute;lisation des participants aux mouvements sociaux et r & eacute;bellions. Les dirigeants rebelles qui entretiennent un bon r & eacute;seau et qui sont per & ccedil;us comme & eacute;tant cr & eacute;dibles poss & egrave;dent un avantage dans la cr & eacute;ation d'une organization fonctionnelle et la garantie de la fid & eacute;lit & eacute; chez les adeptes. Nous affirmons que les dirigeants issus de familles r & eacute;put & eacute;es des & eacute;lites poss & egrave;dent plusieurs avantages quand il s'agit d'organiser une r & eacute;bellion. Ils peuvent exploiter le capital social engrang & eacute; par les g & eacute;n & eacute;rations pr & eacute;c & eacute;dentes et donc, b & eacute;n & eacute;ficier de davantage de visibilit & eacute;, de cr & eacute;dibilit & eacute; et d'acc & egrave;s aux r & eacute;seaux cl & eacute;s qui facilitent la viabilit & eacute; d'une organization rebelle. Par cons & eacute;quent, nous nous attendons & agrave; ce que ces organizations & eacute;tablissent une position dominante en tant qu'opposition au r & eacute;gime et dissuadent les tentatives de formation de groupes rebelles rivaux. En analysant tous les conflits civils entre 1946 et 2018, nous trouvons nombre d'& eacute;l & eacute;ments pour venir & eacute;tayer notre argument selon lequel le capital social interg & eacute;n & eacute;rationnel cr & eacute;e des r & eacute;bellions plus robustes. Nous identifions par ailleurs un effet de substitution, car le capital social sert des objectifs similaires en tant qu'engagement politique ant & eacute;rieur, mais que les r & eacute;bellions les plus robustes sont form & eacute;es par des dirigeants qui poss & egrave;dent l'une ou l'autre de ces caract & eacute;ristiques ainsi que des comp & eacute;tences militaires.
The determinants of foreign interventions, be they military interventions or other forms of foreign involvement, are important for modern international relations and conflict studies. Nevertheless, major methodological problems with the analysis are often overlooked. This paper proposes modeling interventions as a two-stage decision-making process. The first stage determines whether a specific target state is intervenable from the perspective of a potential intervener, while the actual intervention target is selected among intervenable targets at the second stage. On this basis, we propose two solutions that allow obtaining estimates for predictors of an intervention: a statistical model that explicitly accounts for the two-stage nature of the data-generating process, and near-misses sampling. The two approaches are similar in that they treat intervention as a two-stage decision-making process. The authors utilize the second approach to create a sample of non-case observations. Two methods of data collection are used: matching and extracting information from open sources (media articles, reports, official documents). The authors conduct correlation analysis for several sample construction techniques to evaluate differences in empirical significance. The implications of the application of different sampling methods for the study of interventions are discussed. Los determinantes de la intervenci & oacute;n militar son importantes para las relaciones internacionales modernas, as & iacute; como para los estudios en materia de conflictos. Sin embargo, hay una tendencia a pasar por alto los principales problemas metodol & oacute;gicos relativos al an & aacute;lisis. Este art & iacute;culo propone modelar las intervenciones como un proceso de toma de decisiones en dos etapas. La primera etapa determina si es posible intervenir en un conflicto espec & iacute;fico desde la perspectiva de un posible interventor, mientras que el objetivo real de la intervenci & oacute;n se selecciona en la segunda etapa de entre los conflictos susceptibles de intervenci & oacute;n. Sobre esta base, proponemos dos soluciones que permiten obtener estimaciones para los predictores de la intervenci & oacute;n militar: un modelo estad & iacute;stico que considera expl & iacute;citamente la naturaleza de las dos etapas del proceso generador de datos y un muestreo relativo a casos pr & oacute;ximos a la intervenci & oacute;n. Los dos enfoques son similares en el sentido de que tratan la intervenci & oacute;n como un proceso de toma de decisiones en dos etapas. Los autores utilizan el segundo enfoque para crear una muestra de observaciones de no casos. Se utilizan dos m & eacute;todos de recopilaci & oacute;n de datos: la coincidencia y la extracci & oacute;n de informaci & oacute;n de fuentes abiertas (art & iacute;culos de medios, informes, documentos oficiales). Los autores realizan un an & aacute;lisis de correlaci & oacute;n de varias t & eacute;cnicas de construcci & oacute;n de muestras con el fin de evaluar las diferencias en la significancia emp & iacute;rica. Por & uacute;ltimo, se debaten las implicaciones de la aplicaci & oacute;n de diferentes m & eacute;todos de muestreo para el estudio de las intervenciones militares. Les d & eacute;terminants de l'intervention militaire sont importants pour les relations internationales modernes et la pol & eacute;mologie. N & eacute;anmoins, l'on n & eacute;glige souvent de gros probl & egrave;mes m & eacute;thodologiques concernant l'analyse. Cet article envisage la mod & eacute;lisation des interventions comme un processus de prise de d & eacute;cisions en deux & eacute;tapes. La premi & egrave;re phase permet de d & eacute;finir s'il est possible d'intervenir dans un conflit donn & eacute; du point de vue d'un acteur, tandis que l'on s & eacute;lectionne la cible de l'intervention r & eacute;elle parmi les conflits o & ugrave; il est possible d'intervenir dans la seconde phase. D & egrave;s lors, nous proposons deux solutions qui permettent d'obtenir des estimations pour les variables de l'intervention militaire : un mod & egrave;le statistique qui rend explicitement compte des deux & eacute;tapes intrins & egrave;ques du processus de g & eacute;n & eacute;ration des donn & eacute;es et un & eacute;chantillonnage des presque accidents. Les deux approches traitent l'intervention comme un processus de prise de d & eacute;cisions en deux & eacute;tapes. Les auteurs emploient la seconde approche pour cr & eacute;er un & eacute;chantillon d'observations hors cas. L'on utilise deux m & eacute;thodes de recueil de donn & eacute;es : la correspondance et l'extraction d'informations & agrave; partir de donn & eacute;es ouvertes (articles de presse, rapports, documents officiels). Les auteurs proc & egrave;dent & agrave; une analyse des corr & eacute;lations pour plusieurs techniques de construction d'& eacute;chantillons afin d'& eacute;valuer les diff & eacute;rences d'importance empirique. L'on aborde enfin les implications de l'application de diff & eacute;rentes m & eacute;thodes d'& eacute;chantillonnage pour l'& eacute;tude des interventions militaires.
Naval power remains central to international politics, particularly with the rise of new maritime powers in the twenty-first century. Scholars require data to analyze these dynamics. We update, extend, and add to the Crisher and Souva naval data. We add 14 years of naval data, extending it through 2025, introduce new data on amphibious warship capability for 1955 through 2025, and add 20 new variables to the Crisher and Souva data. With these additions, researchers can examine multiple measures of naval power and fleet composition at the country-year, regional, and system level. We demonstrate the utility of these data by examining twenty-first-century naval buildups in Asia.
States actively seek to expand their representation in international organizations (IOs). This paper uncovers an informal mechanism enabling states to increase their staff representation. Drawing on an original dataset covering 25 United Nations system agencies from 1996 to 2022, we characterize how voluntary contributions are associated with increases in a state's staff representation in IOs. By fostering closer interactions between states and IOs, voluntary contributions enable donor states to create more opportunities that favor the recruitment of their own nationals. However, as countries gain a stronger foothold in IOs, further expanding their influence through voluntary contributions becomes increasingly difficult. Further analysis suggests contributions from high-income countries often generate spillover effects that enhance the representation of countries closely connected to them. These findings shed light on the complexities of power dynamics in global governance. Los Estados buscan, de forma activa, ampliar su representaci & oacute;n en las organizaciones internacionales (OOII). Este art & iacute;culo pone el foco sobre un mecanismo informal que permite a los Estados aumentar la representaci & oacute;n de su personal. Utilizamos un conjunto de datos original que abarca 25 organismos del sistema de las Naciones Unidas desde 1996 hasta 2022, que nos permite caracterizar c & oacute;mo las contribuciones voluntarias se asocian con aumentos en la representaci & oacute;n del personal de un Estado en las OOII. Las contribuciones voluntarias, debido a que fomentan una interacci & oacute;n m & aacute;s estrecha entre los Estados y las OOII, permiten a los Estados donantes crear m & aacute;s oportunidades que favorezcan la contrataci & oacute;n de sus ciudadanos. Sin embargo, a medida que los pa & iacute;ses afianzan su presencia en las OOII, resulta cada vez m & aacute;s dif & iacute;cil ampliar su influencia mediante contribuciones voluntarias. Llevamos a cabo un an & aacute;lisis m & aacute;s detallado que nos permite sugerir que aquellas contribuciones realizadas por los pa & iacute;ses de mayores ingresos generan, con frecuencia, efectos indirectos que mejoran la representaci & oacute;n de los pa & iacute;ses estrechamente vinculados a ellos. Estas conclusiones nos permiten arrojar luz sobre las complejidades de la din & aacute;mica de poder en la gobernanza global. Les & Eacute;tats cherchent activement & agrave; & eacute;largir leur repr & eacute;sentation au sein des organisations internationales (OI). Cet article met au jour un m & eacute;canisme informel permettant aux & Eacute;tats d'accro & icirc;tre la repr & eacute;sentation de leur personnel. Nous fondant sur un ensemble de donn & eacute;es in & eacute;dit couvrant 25 agences du syst & egrave;me onusien entre 1996 et 2022, nous caract & eacute;risons l'association des contributions volontaires aux augmentations de la repr & eacute;sentation du personnel d'un & Eacute;tat au sein des OI. En favorisant des interactions plus & eacute;troites entre les & Eacute;tats et les OI, les contributions volontaires permettent aux & Eacute;tats donateurs de cr & eacute;er davantage d'opportunit & eacute;s qui avantagent le recrutement de leurs propres ressortissants. Cependant, alors que les pays s'ancrent davantage dans les OI, il devient de plus en plus difficile d'& eacute;tendre encore leur influence par le biais de contributions volontaires. D'autres analyses sugg & egrave;rent que les contributions de pays aux revenus & eacute;lev & eacute;s g & eacute;n & egrave;rent souvent des effets d'entra & icirc;nement qui renforcent la repr & eacute;sentation des pays avec lesquels ils entretiennent des liens & eacute;troits. Ces conclusions mettent en lumi & egrave;re les complexit & eacute;s des dynamiques de pouvoir dans la gouvernance mondiale.
Public opinion polls in South Korea consistently report strong majority support for independent nuclear acquisition, seemingly contradicting global nonproliferation norms and the nuclear taboo. However, these results may be distorted by social desirability bias. If respondents perceive support for nuclear weapons as socially unacceptable, they may underreport their true preferences. Conversely, if they believe that most people support nuclear acquisition-an impression reinforced by media narratives-they may feel pressured to align with that view, leading to overreporting. To estimate unbiased levels of support, we implement a list experiment and compare the results to direct survey responses. Our findings indicate substantial overreporting rather than underreporting, suggesting that the commonly cited majority support in direct surveys is inflated. We propose conformity bias-the tendency to adopt perceived majority views-as a likely explanation for this pattern. The list experiment places actual support below 50%, challenging the prevailing perception of widespread pro-nuclear sentiment in South Korea.
As the world becomes increasingly reliant on interconnected digital infrastructure, the urgency to understand and manage cyber conflict increases. Policy-makers have long sought to translate concepts used in the nuclear and conventional domains to state competition in the cyber domain-not least whether the concept of deterrence that underpins the nuclear realm travels. Unfortunately, analysts face two difficult challenges associated with analyzing cyber deterrence. First, using the historical record for empirical data, scholars are only able to observe deterrence failure-with no guarantee that the observed instances of deterrence failure represent a complete set. Second, the "cyber" domain is interminably difficult to both analyze and model-with similar selection effects associated with which types of cyber attacks are detected. As evidenced by our study leveraging a new experimental wargame, TANTALUS, wargaming methods can solve some of these challenges. The piece contributes to a burning and policy-relevant research question, finding that while cyber threats are just as likely to be used as their nuclear counterparts, they are less likely to induce deterrence effects.
With growing interest in and attention to cybersecurity, pundits, media outlets, and policymakers are interested in meaningful insights about the nature of cyber conflict. However, the challenges to rigorous inference in cybersecurity research remain daunting. Perhaps the most serious concern is the inability of researchers to observe the full universe of cases and behaviors under study. This paper addresses the critical problem of missing data in cyber incident data collection efforts. We begin with an overview of missingness as it relates to cyber conflict research. We pay particular attention to selection bias resulting from missing data. We apply a Heckman selection model to assess missingness in cyber data and recommend that scholars working with cyber incident datasets consider similar methodologies or strategies to address missingness-induced bias and enhance confidence in the identified relationships.
From Eastern Europe to the Middle East and South-East Asia, the post-WWII world order has been characterized by the presence of separatist entities that possess many attributes of states yet fail to attain full international legitimacy. The disputes between these de facto states and their parent states often result in "no peace, no war" arrangements that some scholars describe as frozen conflicts. The literature on the subject seems to be "frozen" itself, still unresolved in defining the concept, or limited to studying the issue with either single case studies or small-N comparisons. This article seeks to provide a wide-ranging examination of the dynamics underlying the development of non-international frozen conflicts, with a particular focus on the fluctuations between stalemates and violent thawings. To do so, a quantitative analysis is conducted on an original dataset encompassing 651 dyad-years. The research argues that disruptive events such as leadership changes and alliance shifts reduce the duration of a stalemate. On the other hand, stabilizing factors such as power parity, support from a major power, the presence of a peacekeeping operation, and autonomy arrangements make the stalemate more durable.
In crisis, technological threats often present as unfamiliar to non-specialists. Today, however, emerging AI capabilities introduce distinct uncertainties for the decision-maker that extend beyond mere unfamiliarity, including about the fundamental capability of tools, underlying command structures, and moral accountability. This paper investigates how technological novelty, which I operationalize as multi-dimensional uncertainty beyond a baseline of simple decision-maker experience with a known system, influences decision-makers' reaction to crisis conditions. To capture this spectrum, two large-N experimental simulations were run with military and policy professionals, embedding AI as a tactical aid, an autonomous strategic actor, or not at all. I then measured participants' escalation choices, self-reported uncertainty, and requests for additional intelligence. Under conditions of most significant novelty in which AI assumed decision-making authority across several dimensions, participants showed marked hesitation and elevated uncertainty. By contrast, where AI presented as a support, tool decision-makers behaved similarly to those with AI systems exposure. Both AI scenarios, however, led to more intensive information-seeking than control. These findings suggest that crisis behavior is sensitive to the cumulative uncertainties of novel technologies as distinct from mere unfamiliarity. Accounting for this nuance offers a more precise framework for understanding foreign policy decision-making under technological disruption.
While text-as-data has gained prominence in the study of International Organizations (IOs) over the past decade, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has remained absent from this research wave. We present the NATO Secretary General Documents (NATO-SGD) corpus. It features over 3,000 speeches and statements for the 1996-2024 period, covering the tenures of six NATO Secretaries General. The corpus offers a comparable body of texts that captures the Alliance's discourse and evolving priorities across three decades of geopolitical transformation. Focusing on the Secretary General-who is NATO's primary administrative officer, spokesperson, and authoritative voice-we present a valuable resource for scholars interested in international security, IO leadership, and public diplomacy. Beyond outlining future applications, this article showcases the analytical value of the data through temporal and cross-sectional descriptives.
What is the impact of prominent violations of international norms on support for those norms around the world? Recent studies have shown that American human rights violations may strengthen those norms in authoritarian states, but we know little about the impacts in democratic contexts, especially in cases where the norm and its violations are highly salient. Using a survey experiment in India, I find that exposure to news about American discrimination against minorities significantly reduces Indian public support for minority rights norms and concerns about the state of minority rights at home. Paired survey experiments in the United Kingdom show that when minority rights are less salient, exposure to American discrimination increases concerns around minority rights, but has no impact when they are more salient. The study demonstrates that high-profile violations of international norms may have polarizing impacts on support for those norms around the world.
Post-conflict societies often experience high levels of violence after demobilizing armed groups. Is this violence driven by resettling former combatants within civilian communities? And how can states prevent this form of violence? We answer the first question affirmatively but argue that the rise in violence is chiefly the result of targeted attacks against ex-combatants. These revenge killings may spill over, creating more insecurity for host communities. The state can prevent this kind of violence by providing protection for ex-combatants. We theorize that credible state security guarantees reduce violence through two mechanisms: first, by deterring attacks through physical protection, and second, by encouraging ex-combatants to rely on the state for security provision. Drawing on geo-located data from 12,000 fighters of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), we show that the presence of ex-combatants increased targeted assassinations and general homicide rates after the 2016 Peace Agreement. These effects were compounded when ex-combatants became more visible and identifiable through participation in collective economic projects or collaboration with civilians - two hallmarks of community-based peacebuilding. However, state protection moderated these effects. FARC members who received state protection were more likely to trust state agents and report security threats to them. Unlike previous studies that focus on reconciliation between civilians and ex-combatants, this paper theorizes the role of the state in rebuilding state-rebel bonds during Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). Las sociedades en situaci & oacute;n de posconflicto tienden a registrar altos niveles de violencia despu & eacute;s de la desmovilizaci & oacute;n de grupos armados. & iquest;Est & aacute; motivada esta violencia por la reubicaci & oacute;n de excombatientes en comunidades civiles? & iquest;De qu & eacute; maneras pueden los Estados prevenir esta forma de violencia? Respondemos afirmativamente a la primera pregunta, pero argumentamos que el aumento de la violencia se debe principalmente a ataques dirigidos contra excombatientes. Estos asesinatos por venganza pueden desbordarse, generando m & aacute;s inseguridad en las comunidades que los padecen. El Estado puede prevenir este tipo de violencia proporcionando protecci & oacute;n a los excombatientes. Teorizamos que las garant & iacute;as cre & iacute;bles a nivel de seguridad por parte del Estado reducen la violencia a trav & eacute;s de dos mecanismos: en primer lugar, disuadiendo los ataques mediante la protecci & oacute;n f & iacute;sica, y, en segundo lugar, alentando a los excombatientes a que recurran al Estado en lo referente a la provisi & oacute;n de seguridad. Demostramos, utilizando para ello datos geolocalizados procedentes de 12 000 combatientes de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), que la presencia de excombatientes aument & oacute; los asesinatos selectivos y las tasas generales de homicidios despu & eacute;s del Acuerdo de Paz de 2016. Estos efectos se vieron agravados cuando los excombatientes estaban m & aacute;s visibles e identificables, ya fuera a trav & eacute;s de su participaci & oacute;n en proyectos econ & oacute;micos colectivos o por su colaboraci & oacute;n con los civiles, dos rasgos caracter & iacute;sticos de la construcci & oacute;n de paz basada en la comunidad. Sin embargo, la protecci & oacute;n por parte del Estado moder & oacute; estos efectos. Los miembros de las FARC que recibieron protecci & oacute;n por parte del Estado eran m & aacute;s propensos a confiar en los agentes del Estado y a informarles sobre amenazas a la seguridad. A diferencia de estudios previos que se centran en la reconciliaci & oacute;n entre civiles y excombatientes, este art & iacute;culo teoriza sobre el papel que ejerce el Estado en la reconstrucci & oacute;n de los lazos entre el Estado y los rebeldes durante el desarme, la desmovilizaci & oacute;n y la reintegraci & oacute;n. Apr & egrave;s un conflit, les soci & eacute;t & eacute;s connaissent souvent des niveaux & eacute;lev & eacute;s de violence quand les groupes arm & eacute;s sont d & eacute;mobilis & eacute;s. Cette violence proc & egrave;de-t-elle de la r & eacute;installation d'anciens combattants au sein de communaut & eacute;s civiles ? Comment les & Eacute;tats peuvent-ils pr & eacute;venir cette forme de violence ? Nous r & eacute;pondons & agrave; la premi & egrave;re question par l'affirmative, mais affirmons que l'essor de la violence d & eacute;coule principalement d'attaques cibl & eacute;es & agrave; l'encontre d'anciens combattants. Ces meurtres par vengeance peuvent d & eacute;border, ce qui renforce l'ins & eacute;curit & eacute; pour les communaut & eacute;s h & ocirc;tes. L'& Eacute;tat peut pr & eacute;venir ce genre de violence en fournissant une protection aux anciens combattants. Nous th & eacute;orisons qu'une s & eacute;curit & eacute; & eacute;tatique cr & eacute;dible garantit une r & eacute;duction de la violence par le biais de deux m & eacute;canismes : d'abord, en dissuadant les attaques par la protection physique, et ensuite, en encourageant les anciens combattants & agrave; s'appuyer sur l'& Eacute;tat pour assurer leur s & eacute;curit & eacute;. Nous fondant sur des donn & eacute;es g & eacute;olocalis & eacute;es issues de 12 000 combattants des Forces arm & eacute;es r & eacute;volutionnaires de Colombie (FARC), nous montrons que la pr & eacute;sence d'anciens combattants a accru les assassinats cibl & eacute;s et les taux d'homicide g & eacute;n & eacute;raux apr & egrave;s l'accord de paix de 2016. Ces effets se sont renforc & eacute;s quand les anciens combattants sont devenus plus visibles et identifiables par la participation & agrave; des projets & eacute;conomiques collectifs ou la collaboration avec des civils, deux composantes essentielles de la consolidation de la paix bas & eacute;e sur la communaut & eacute;. N & eacute;anmoins, la protection & eacute;tatique a mod & eacute;r & eacute; ces effets. Les membres des FARC qui ont re & ccedil;u une protection & eacute;tatique avaient plus de chances de faire confiance aux agents de l'& Eacute;tat et de leur signaler des menaces de s & eacute;curit & eacute;. Au contraire d'& eacute;tudes ant & eacute;rieures qui se focalisent sur la r & eacute;conciliation entre civils et anciens combattants, cet article se concenter sur le r & ocirc;le de l'& Eacute;tat dans la reconstruction de liens entre l'& Eacute;tat et les rebelles lors du d & eacute;sarmement, de la d & eacute;mobilisation et de la r & eacute;insertion (DDR).
The length of international negotiations varies widely. One important factor that influences negotiations' duration has to do with the parties' "best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA)." The concept of the BATNA refers to the costs associated with not reaching an agreement that a state faces, and is widespread in the study of negotiations. Looking at the relational nature of negotiating states' BATNAs, I argue that when one party faces a significantly more costly outcome if an agreement is not reached than their negotiating opponent - i.e., their BATNAs are more asymmetric - the negotiation is likely to be shorter. I test this argument examining the duration of trade negotiations between the European Union and a wide variety of negotiating partners. Using a Cox proportional hazards analysis allowing for time-varying covariates as well as time-varying coefficients, I show that the risk that a negotiation will end in a trade agreement is greater when the EU and its negotiating partner have more asymmetric BATNAs. In other words, those negotiations tend to be shorter. La duraci & oacute;n de las negociaciones internacionales var & iacute;a en gran medida. Uno de los factores importantes que influyen en la duraci & oacute;n de las negociaciones tiene que ver con la << mejor alternativa a un acuerdo negociado (BATNA, por sus siglas en ingl & eacute;s)>> que tengan las partes. El concepto de BATNA se refiere a los costes asociados con el hecho de no alcanzar un acuerdo a los que se enfrenta un Estado. Este concepto se encuentra ampliamente difundido en el estudio de las negociaciones. Argumentamos, despu & eacute;s de estudiar la naturaleza relacional de las BATNA de los Estados negociadores, que cuando una de las partes se enfrenta a un resultado significativamente m & aacute;s costoso si no se alcanza un acuerdo que el que obtendr & iacute;a su oponente en la negociaci & oacute;n, es decir, cuando sus BATNA son m & aacute;s asim & eacute;tricas, es probable que la negociaci & oacute;n sea m & aacute;s corta. Ponemos a prueba esta hip & oacute;tesis a trav & eacute;s del an & aacute;lisis de la duraci & oacute;n de las negociaciones comerciales entre la Uni & oacute;n Europea y una gran variedad de socios negociadores. Utilizamos un an & aacute;lisis de riesgos proporcionales de Cox que permite utilizar covariables variables en el tiempo, as & iacute; como coeficientes variables en el tiempo, y demostramos que el riesgo de que una negociaci & oacute;n concluya con un acuerdo comercial es mayor cuando la UE y su socio negociador tienen BATNA m & aacute;s asim & eacute;tricas. En otras palabras, este tipo de negociaciones tienden a ser m & aacute;s cortas. La dur & eacute;e des n & eacute;gociations internationales varie grandement. Un facteur qui a une grande incidence sur la dur & eacute;e des n & eacute;gociations concerne la << meilleure alternative & agrave; un accord n & eacute;goci & eacute; >> (MAAAN). Tr & egrave;s r & eacute;pandu dans l'& eacute;tude des n & eacute;gociations, le concept de MAAAN fait r & eacute;f & eacute;rence aux co & ucirc;ts que risque un & Eacute;tat s'il ne trouve pas d'accord. M'int & eacute;ressant & agrave; la nature relationnelle des MAAAN des & Eacute;tats n & eacute;gociateurs, j'affirme que lorsqu'une partie risque une issue bien plus co & ucirc;teuse en cas de non-conclusion d'un accord que la partie oppos & eacute;e (c.-& agrave;-d. que leur MAAAN sont plus asym & eacute;triques), la n & eacute;gociation sera probablement plus courte. Je teste cet argument en examinant la dur & eacute;e des n & eacute;gociations commerciales entre l'Union europ & eacute;enne et un large & eacute;ventail de partenaires n & eacute;gociateurs. & Agrave; l'aide d'une analyze des risques proportionnels de Cox admettant les covariables et les coefficients qui varient dans le temps, je montre que le risque qu'une n & eacute;gociation se conclue sur un accord commercial est plus important quand l'UE et ses partenaires n & eacute;gociateurs ont des MAAAN plus asym & eacute;triques. Autrement dit, ces n & eacute;gociations tendent & agrave; & ecirc;tre plus courtes.
How do transitions to democracy affect international conflict? I argue that democratic transitions are likely to reduce conflict, on average. Prior to transitions occurring, autocratic regimes face incentives to develop constraining institutions to credibly commit to providing concessions as dictators get weaker. After transitioning, these institutions are likely to grow stronger and more visible, further enhancing effective costly signaling. At the same time, democratic transitions can rapidly incorporate women's preferences for more cooperative foreign policy into the policymaking process. Time-series cross-sectional matching and difference-in-differences estimation allow me to test a variety of implications of my argument with credible causal inference. Pooling across three- and five-year periods after transition, democratic transitions reduce conflict, including fatal conflicts. In addition, I find similar patterns with respect to constraining institutions, women's suffrage, and women's political influence, which are consistent with the broader theoretical argument. & iquest;De qu & eacute; forma afectan las transiciones hacia la democracia al conflicto internacional? Argumentamos que, en general, las transiciones democr & aacute;ticas tienden a reducir las probabilidades de que se produzcan conflictos. Antes de que ocurran estas transiciones, los reg & iacute;menes autocr & aacute;ticos se enfrentan a incentivos para desarrollar instituciones limitantes que les permitan comprometerse de manera cre & iacute;ble a otorgar concesiones a medida que los dictadores van perdiendo fuerza. Despu & eacute;s de la transici & oacute;n, es probable que estas instituciones se fortalezcan y que sean m & aacute;s visibles, lo que mejorar & aacute; a & uacute;n m & aacute;s la efectividad de la se & ntilde;alizaci & oacute;n costosa. Al mismo tiempo, las transiciones democr & aacute;ticas pueden incorporar r & aacute;pidamente las preferencias de las mujeres con relaci & oacute;n a una pol & iacute;tica exterior m & aacute;s cooperativa dentro del proceso de elaboraci & oacute;n de pol & iacute;ticas. Utilizamos el emparejamiento transversal de series temporales y la estimaci & oacute;n de diferencias en diferencias, los cuales nos permiten probar una variedad de implicaciones de esta hip & oacute;tesis con una inferencia causal cre & iacute;ble. Observamos que, al analizar per & iacute;odos de tres y cinco a & ntilde;os despu & eacute;s de la transici & oacute;n, las transiciones democr & aacute;ticas reducen los conflictos, incluyendo los conflictos con v & iacute;ctimas mortales. Adem & aacute;s, encontramos patrones similares con respecto a las instituciones restrictivas, al sufragio femenino y a la influencia pol & iacute;tica de las mujeres, los cuales son consistentes con el argumento te & oacute;rico m & aacute;s amplio. Quel est l'effet des transitions d & eacute;mocratiques sur les conflits internationaux ? J'affirme qu'en moyenne, les transitions d & eacute;mocratiques ont des chances de r & eacute;duire les conflits. Avant l'intervention de ces transitions, les regimes autocratiques re & ccedil;oivent des incitations & agrave; la mise en place d'institutions contraignantes pour s'engager de fa & ccedil;on cr & eacute;dible & agrave; l'accord de concessions, quand les dictateurs s'affaiblissent. Apr & egrave;s la transition, ces institutions ont des chances de gagner en puissance et visibilit & eacute;, ce qui accentue un envoi de signaux co & ucirc;teux et efficaces. Dans le m & ecirc;me temps, les transitions d & eacute;mocratiques peuvent rapidement int & eacute;grer les pr & eacute;f & eacute;rences f & eacute;minines pour une politique & eacute;trang & egrave;re plus coop & eacute;rative dans le processus d'& eacute;laboration de politiques. Une estimation des doubles diff & eacute;rences et des correspondances chronologiques transversales me permet de tester diverses implications de mon argument gr & acirc;ce & agrave; une inf & eacute;rence causale cr & eacute;dible. Quand on combine les p & eacute;riodes de trois et cinq ans apr & egrave;s une transition, les transitions d & eacute;mocratiques r & eacute;duisent les conflits, notamment les conflits mortels. En outre, je constate des sch & eacute;mas similaires par rapport aux institutions contraignantes, au suffrage f & eacute;minin et & agrave; l'influence politique des femmes, qui viennent confirmer l'argument th & eacute;orique plus large.
