This paper examines how President Prabowo Subianto's evolving China policy is reshaping Indonesia's informal relations with Taiwan amid intensifying U.S.-China rivalry. Drawing on neoclassical realism, it argues that Indonesia's foreign policy is not determined solely by systemic pressures but is filtered through domestic variables such as elite perceptions, historical memory, and institutional constraints. This study shows that Prabowo's pragmatic strategy of deepening economic and strategic cooperation with Beijing has gradually narrowed Indonesia's diplomatic space for managing its unofficial ties with Taiwan. While Jakarta continues to uphold the one-China policy, its simultaneous dependence on Chinese investment and functional cooperation with Taiwan reveals a pattern of strategic ambiguity that is characteristic of middle-power diplomacy. By analyzing economic and strategic considerations, geopolitical balancing, regional security dynamics, and historical and domestic factors, this paper demonstrates that Indonesia's Taiwan policy reflects a complex negotiation between external great-power rivalry and internal legitimacy concerns. The findings suggest that Indonesia's ability to sustain its long-standing free and active foreign policy is increasingly constrained by asymmetric interdependence with China and the gradual erosion of ASEAN cohesion. Ultimately, this paper contends that Indonesia's future posture toward Taiwan will depend not only on shifts in regional power configurations but also on Prabowo's capacity to reconcile domestic political legitimacy with international strategic autonomy. By highlighting the role of domestic filters in shaping foreign policy under conditions of great-power competition, this study contributes to broader debates on middle-power diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific.
With President Tsai Ing-Wen’s adoption of the New Southbound Policy in order to enhance Taiwan’s relations with Indonesia and its other southern neighbors, students from Indonesia studying in Taiwan have doubled as of 2024, and Indonesian workers have also significantly increased. As people-to-people relations have been one of the policy’s main goals, these figures indicate some degree of success. At the same time, relations between the two countries remain limited due to Indonesia’s adherence to the one-China policy, which prohibits official diplomatic relations. This paper examines how Indonesia manages its relations with Taiwan, particularly in relation to citizen protection during the New Southbound Policy. This paper employs qualitative research through an analysis of in-depth interviews with government officials and researchers. It argues that the protection of Indonesia’s citizens has become the country’s focus in its relations with Taiwan and that the mainstreaming of this issue has provided a means to escape the constraints of the one-China policy. However, this paper also finds that rising inter-bureaucratic tensions may be a hindrance to closer and deeper relations.
This paper explores Indonesia-Taiwan relations under the populist government of President Prabowo within the broader rise of populism in Indonesia. Indonesia and Taiwan have maintained pragmatic ties in economic cooperation, labor migration, and education throughout the past decade. At the same time, the future trajectory of this relationship has been challenged by the growing influence of populist nationalism under the leadership of Prabowo Subianto. This study examines key developments, major challenges, and possible shifts in Indonesia's approach toward Taiwan and proposes that a populism characterized by a strong nationalist rhetoric may lead Indonesia to reinforce its adherence to the one-China policy. While this may not directly undermine ties, it could invite greater pressure from China for Indonesia to remain disengaged from cross-Strait affairs. Additionally, Indonesia's foreign policy is expected to become more transactional and prioritize economic interests. While Taiwan remains an important economic and investment partner, Indonesia's increasing alignment with Beijing's strategic and economic interests may limit deeper engagement beyond trade and labor relations. The findings suggest that Indonesia-Taiwan relations could indeed become more constrained under a populist regime that is defined primarily by economic rather than political considerations.
This paper examines the symbiotic relationship between philanthropy and entrepreneurship, two powerful symbols of migrant social engagement among Indonesians in Taiwan. Economic adaptation among immigrants is positively associated with social activity and influenced by religion as a source of encouragement. Based on ethnographic research, this paper reflects on the constructive intersection of work ethics and spirituality among entrepreneurs in addition to the living conditions of Indonesian workers in Taiwan. Entrepreneurs in this community actively participate in religious organizations and social activities as expressions of solidarity with fellow migrants. The research findings indicate that this intersection of religious engagement and entrepreneurial activity has shaped immigrant self-identity, internal solidarity, leadership, and collective action.
This paper examines Taiwan's strategic shift from a classic developmental state model toward a post-developmental form of economic statecraft aimed at achieving strategic autonomy under growing cross-strait asymmetry. Drawing on developmental state theory, small-state diplomacy, and geoeconomic analysis, this paper argues that rather than disengagement from globalization, Taiwan's economic policy since the late 2010s reflects a selective realignment that leverages its technological centrality to resist external coercion. This is particularly evident in the field of semiconductors. This study analyzes Taiwan's transformation in three phases. These include state-led industrialization, deep economic entanglement with China under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), and a diversification strategy shaped by engagement through the New Southbound Policy and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). This paper finds that Taiwan has increasingly deployed trade, innovation policy, and multilateral economic instruments not merely for economic gain but as tools of sovereignty-preserving statecraft. Rather than pursue isolation or hard decoupling, Taiwan is constructing a form of strategic openness by insulating itself where necessary while reinforcing international embeddedness. This approach offers a critical case of how small states with advanced industries can navigate asymmetric interdependence through calibrated economic agency rather than confrontation. The findings underscore the rising salience of geoeconomic strategy in Taiwan's external policy in a contested Indo-Pacific order.
Through a variety of formats, short-form videos evoke emotions in their target audiences to serve specific political objectives. The Communist Party of China (CPC) exemplifies this through its softer propaganda approach that seeks to reach audiences emotionally. At the same time, there is little research on audience interpretations and emotional responses to this emotional propaganda or on their broader attitude toward the propaganda system. This study addresses the existing research gap by conducting semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 32 Chinese citizens and employing folk theories to uncover their emotional responses and associated outcomes. The findings reveal that, other than the conformity exemplified by feeling touched emotionally, two additional emotional stances of neutral indifference and aversion have emerged that represent moderate and strong facets of emotional resistance. Based on these folk theories, this study delineates audience-authority relationships into co-construction, compromised adaptation, and opposition. Finally, this paper integrates individual, political, cultural, and technological factors to explain the reasons behind each type of emotional response. By offering theoretical and practical insights, this research illuminates the tensions and challenges associated with emotional manipulation and the management of audience emotions within an authoritarian context.
This study investigates the dynamic interplay between agricultural productivity and technological progress in China, explicitly distinguishing between indigenous innovation and foreign technology transfer - a gap largely unaddressed in prior research. Employing a Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) model, the analysis integrates time-series data beginning in the year 1995, when patent registration by Chinese residents began. It focuses on the three core variables of agricultural productivity, domestic technological innovation, and foreign technology inflows. The findings reveal a causal and statistically significant link between agricultural productivity and indigenous technological progress. While foreign technology contributes to the innovation process, its impact appears to be comparatively limited and often mediated through compulsory transfer mechanisms rather than voluntary diffusion. The evidence suggests that China's initial productivity gains were largely fueled by economic liberalization, which subsequently laid the foundation for local sustained innovation. These results have notable policy implications for emerging economies and underscore the importance of first investing in economic reforms to foster an agricultural transformation that is both enduring and information-driven.
The study of the involvement and agency of nonstate actors in cultural diplomacy as an element of public diplomacy has gained relevance through the development of new technologies. With an approach based on the practice of language promotion as a part of the larger field of cultural diplomacy, this paper uncovers and analyzes challenges and opportunities in cooperation with nonstate actors using Taiwan as a case study. My analysis relies on theoretical concepts concerning the role of nonstate actors and the support they have received from Taiwanese representatives and authorities, a key element in the consolidation of networks with overlapping interests. Such interests and goals are in tune with a public diplomacy agenda that includes cultural promotion and understanding and the creation and management of long-term relationships. My research is based on data collection from interviews with the Taiwanese managers and staff of private Mandarin schools in the largest economies of Latin America, in addition to a review of the existing literature and official documents. My findings underscore the relevance of cooperation on issues such as the formation of human capital, scholarships, standardized tests, and the adoption of new technologies to reach new audiences. By identifying the connections between public diplomacy and foreign policy, this study focuses on Latin American countries that maintain unofficial ties with Taiwan to highlight the role of nonstate actors in a landscape shaped by an intricate foreign policy agenda. This outlook offers a more comprehensive understanding of the complex interplay between private and public interests in cultural diplomacy, particularly in how language schools are integrated into public diplomacy networks that connect state actors with diasporas and local communities.
We are now witnessing the end of the post-Cold War era in which the United States had the freedom to prioritize democratic enlargement, global free trade, and international cooperation through global institutions without having to prepare for the use or the threat of force to outcompete geopolitical rivals. How has the return of great power competition and the decline of the post-Cold War peace affected U.S. foreign policy decisions that were embedded in ideas of complex interdependence? Our research explores how notions of complex interdependence have made way for a return to geopolitics in American policy toward China and Russia through three key departures from the post-Cold War framework of engagement and interdependence. First, preparations for war define American policy in its strategic competition with Beijing and Moscow. Second, there is an increasing hierarchy between high and low politics with security alliances, military preparedness, and strategic competition topping the policy agenda. Finally, the United States as an actor on the global political stage has seen its role expanded even more as strategic competition and security confrontation require states to mobilize, organize security alliances, and boost their defense preparedness. Therefore, strategic competition and geopolitical rivalries are now more important determinants of U.S. foreign policy than more benign and cooperative assumptions of complex interdependence.
This paper confronts an extraordinary contradiction: With an ideology built on historical continuity and collectivism, the world's most populous authoritarian state now finds itself enmeshed in the contradictions of postmodern identity politics. With its gleeful pulverizing of truth, identity, and coherence, postmodernism has inadvertently infiltrated the narrative-driven fortress of the People's Republic of China. In its national narrative, however, postmodernism erodes "Chineseness" from within. I explore how this paradox stretches across cultural, political, and diplomatic spheres, complicating China's global image and muddling its efforts to project ideological coherence on the world stage.
In 2020 and 2021, Taiwan and South Korea held mayoral by-elections in their second-largest cities of Kaohsiung and Busan. In both cases, the former regional ruling parties reclaimed control of their stronghold cities. How did voters perceive representative democracy during this unusual political era? An analysis of survey data reveals that while voters in Kaohsiung who supported the winning candidates were more likely to believe that the political process was responsive, this pattern did not hold in Busan. These varying results suggest that winning voters under a vertically divided government like that of Busan may be skeptical of local governance, a phenomenon which mediates the link between electoral success and satisfaction with democracy.
The shockwaves emanating from Russia's invasion of Ukraine have fundamentally unsettled the peace in Europe, exposing vulnerabilities and forcing geopolitical recalibrations. While much scholarly attention has focused on the conflict's European dimensions, this paper examines its underexplored implications for East Asia and the burgeoning Russia-North Korea security partnership. Drawing on the existing scholarship on authoritarian alignment, we analyze the evolution of their relationship to uncover the mechanisms by which the two states have forged strategic partnerships that transcend traditional bilateralism. We argue that this partnership not only redefines Russia-North Korea ties but also signals the emergence of a broader alignment involving China and Iran. We contend that this collaboration poses a major challenge to the architecture of post-war East Asian security.
China's involvement in the Israel-Palestine conflict during the war in Gaza reflects a strategic maneuvering that is aimed at positioning itself as the leader of the Global South while exerting pressure on the United States. In contrast to the staunch support of the United States for Israel, China has adopted a seemingly neutral stance that advocates for a two-state solution. This approach challenges a perceived American hypocrisy and positions China as an alternative to Western powers, particularly in the Arab world, where public opinion has increasingly been against Israel and the United States. China's efforts to influence the conflict have faced limitations, however. Despite recent shifts in its stance that include more direct criticism of Israeli actions and condemnation of U.S. support in the United Nations, there has been no tangible evidence to suggest that Beijing's involvement could de-escalate tensions in Gaza. As such, this paper examines China's diplomatic approach toward the Israel-Palestine conflict by analyzing its historical position, intentions, evolving strategy, efforts at mediation, and implications.
This paper analyzes Vietnam’s evolving policy toward the United States in the context of strategic competition between China and the United States. As a rising and trusted partner within Washington’s broader strategy to manage China’s rise, Vietnam has garnered significant attention from both superpowers. As both the United States and China expect Hanoi to take clear stances on certain issues, Vietnam’s traditional strategy of hedging is becoming increasingly untenable. Instead, the country has gradually adopted a posture of strategic alignment with the United States. In this paper, strategic alignment refers to policy choices made by small and middle powers that are dictated primarily by their national interests. For Vietnam, these choices include diplomatic deference, concessional economic commitments, selective security cooperation, and support for US global governance initiatives. As US–China rivalry continues to intensify under the second Trump administration, Vietnam’s approach and strategic alignment with the United States are unlikely to change drastically. However, this alignment may deepen Hanoi’s “China dilemma” in which its cooperation with the United States risks being perceived as contrary to China’s interests.
This study applies the framework of realist constructivism to analyze the foreign policy responses of China and the United States to the 2021 Myanmar crisis. Our research explores how the rivalry between these two global powers has exacerbated the crisis and hindered efforts toward regional stability. Using qualitative data from diplomatic statements, official documents and media reports, this study identifies key differences in the foreign policy approaches of China and the United States. This comparative analysis demonstrates how realist constructivism offers a comprehensive framework for understanding state behavior in geopolitical crises like the US-China competition in Myanmar—a new Cold War dynamic characterized by strategic divergence and the legitimizing of foreign policy through a shared reliance on identity-driven moral claims, highlighting the co-constitutive interplay of power, norms and identity.
What are the likely implications of Donald Trump’s second term in office? Many of the foundational policies from Trump’s first term– such as tax reductions, deregulation, demands that allies increase their military budgets, and increased tariffs on foreign products — are likely to persist, alongside the establishment of a new Department of Government Efficiency to reduce government staffing and expenditures. Trump will confront a divided Congress, a polarized public, potential divisions within his administration, and the emergence of the Global South, with its grievances against the developed North. In addition, the geopolitical landscape is characterized by increased competition and conflict, reflecting the tensions and uncertainties produced by the imbalanced interdependence of global economies and the rise of new international coalitions with different goals and values, raising concerns about Trump’s capacity to effectively navigate these multifaceted challenges.
As the first Eastern country to undergo modernization, Japan was also the first to possess colonies. The Japanese Empire’s development of its Asian colonies has served as the genesis of Oriental development studies. After acquiring Taiwan in the late 19th century, Japan drew on the experiences of Western countries as it sought to develop its new colony. At the same time, poor sanitation in the initial stages of the island’s development resulted in significant losses for the Japanese personnel. The Japanese government therefore altered its development strategy to prioritize public health over large-scale infrastructure development, and the public health system of Gotō Shinpei was implemented accordingly. Documented in the book Taiwan Colonial Policy, these measures are unique to Oriental development studies and highlight the focus on public health infrastructure during the period. From the perspective of the eco-state, the above approach improved Taiwan’s ecological environment and laid the groundwork for its future growth. This study explores the roots of Oriental development studies in the context of Japan’s colonization of Taiwan, revealing a distinctive emphasis on public health systems that has been crucial in Taiwan’s modernization.
The Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (KSEZ) in Myanmar is part of China’s massive international development strategy known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). To advance the KSEZ, the Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) has asserted its commitment to the principles of corporate social responsibility (CSR). In this paper, we investigate how CITIC’s CSR practices are perceived by two groups of local non-state stakeholders: Myanmar villagers and civil society organizations (CSOs). To this end, we conducted 31 qualitative interviews with non-state stakeholders in Kyaukphyu Township between March 2022 and October 2023. According to our interview results, there is a substantial though not universal local perception that CITIC’s publicly broadcast commitment to CSR has served primarily to advance the KSEZ and left the concerns of local residents largely unaddressed. By examining CITIC’s stated commitment and its actual commitment to CSR as perceived by the local non-state stakeholders, we aim in this study to deepen our understanding of the business practices of Chinese SOEs in overseas investments and to enrich the research on the BRI in Myanmar.
This speech forecasts continued US government resolve to counter multifaceted and often very serious challenges posed by the behavior of the government of the People's Republic of China, and accompanying greater American support for Taiwan. It explains the reasons for US resolve developed over the past six years, highlighting the role of bi-partisan majorities in Congress. It anticipates smooth continuity in the US government resolve if President Biden is reelected and some serious complications if the former President Trump is reelected, though the hardening of US policy against China will endure.
Military modernization is a complicated process of force building by which a nation fulfills its defense requirements. Professionally, it is measured by the sophistication of the combat capabilities of a country's armed forces as defined by the effectiveness of strategies and doctrines, commanding heights, soldier training, organization and structure, and the jointness of services and weapons systems. Technological progress is a primary driver for a military to modernize through transformation. More broadly, military modernization is an integral component of a country's overall modernization, either facilitating or obstructing its socio-political, economic, and technological development. Military modernization is also affected by the nature of a country's political system, as it determines the relations between civilian leaders and the top brass, the status of the military in society, and the internal shape of the organization, i.e., officer corruption and force cohesiveness. Yet, whether the system of state governance decisively impacts the patterns and pace of military modernization is a subject of debate. As discussed in detail in this paper, one-party rule is a specific political structure that can affect military modernization either positively or negatively. Positively as in the case of China, systemic factors such as the undisrupted CPC control of the military, concentrated inputs of resources into force building, and targeted capability acquisition contribute to the modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as a beneficiary of one-party rule. Negatively, one party-rule may disrupt military/society interactions and is prone to structural corruption, undermining the quality of military modernization.
