This paper examines how President Prabowo Subianto's evolving China policy is reshaping Indonesia's informal relations with Taiwan amid intensifying U.S.-China rivalry. Drawing on neoclassical realism, it argues that Indonesia's foreign policy is not determined solely by systemic pressures but is filtered through domestic variables such as elite perceptions, historical memory, and institutional constraints. This study shows that Prabowo's pragmatic strategy of deepening economic and strategic cooperation with Beijing has gradually narrowed Indonesia's diplomatic space for managing its unofficial ties with Taiwan. While Jakarta continues to uphold the one-China policy, its simultaneous dependence on Chinese investment and functional cooperation with Taiwan reveals a pattern of strategic ambiguity that is characteristic of middle-power diplomacy. By analyzing economic and strategic considerations, geopolitical balancing, regional security dynamics, and historical and domestic factors, this paper demonstrates that Indonesia's Taiwan policy reflects a complex negotiation between external great-power rivalry and internal legitimacy concerns. The findings suggest that Indonesia's ability to sustain its long-standing free and active foreign policy is increasingly constrained by asymmetric interdependence with China and the gradual erosion of ASEAN cohesion. Ultimately, this paper contends that Indonesia's future posture toward Taiwan will depend not only on shifts in regional power configurations but also on Prabowo's capacity to reconcile domestic political legitimacy with international strategic autonomy. By highlighting the role of domestic filters in shaping foreign policy under conditions of great-power competition, this study contributes to broader debates on middle-power diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific.
With President Tsai Ing-Wen’s adoption of the New Southbound Policy in order to enhance Taiwan’s relations with Indonesia and its other southern neighbors, students from Indonesia studying in Taiwan have doubled as of 2024, and Indonesian workers have also significantly increased. As people-to-people relations have been one of the policy’s main goals, these figures indicate some degree of success. At the same time, relations between the two countries remain limited due to Indonesia’s adherence to the one-China policy, which prohibits official diplomatic relations. This paper examines how Indonesia manages its relations with Taiwan, particularly in relation to citizen protection during the New Southbound Policy. This paper employs qualitative research through an analysis of in-depth interviews with government officials and researchers. It argues that the protection of Indonesia’s citizens has become the country’s focus in its relations with Taiwan and that the mainstreaming of this issue has provided a means to escape the constraints of the one-China policy. However, this paper also finds that rising inter-bureaucratic tensions may be a hindrance to closer and deeper relations.
This paper explores Indonesia-Taiwan relations under the populist government of President Prabowo within the broader rise of populism in Indonesia. Indonesia and Taiwan have maintained pragmatic ties in economic cooperation, labor migration, and education throughout the past decade. At the same time, the future trajectory of this relationship has been challenged by the growing influence of populist nationalism under the leadership of Prabowo Subianto. This study examines key developments, major challenges, and possible shifts in Indonesia's approach toward Taiwan and proposes that a populism characterized by a strong nationalist rhetoric may lead Indonesia to reinforce its adherence to the one-China policy. While this may not directly undermine ties, it could invite greater pressure from China for Indonesia to remain disengaged from cross-Strait affairs. Additionally, Indonesia's foreign policy is expected to become more transactional and prioritize economic interests. While Taiwan remains an important economic and investment partner, Indonesia's increasing alignment with Beijing's strategic and economic interests may limit deeper engagement beyond trade and labor relations. The findings suggest that Indonesia-Taiwan relations could indeed become more constrained under a populist regime that is defined primarily by economic rather than political considerations.
This paper examines the symbiotic relationship between philanthropy and entrepreneurship, two powerful symbols of migrant social engagement among Indonesians in Taiwan. Economic adaptation among immigrants is positively associated with social activity and influenced by religion as a source of encouragement. Based on ethnographic research, this paper reflects on the constructive intersection of work ethics and spirituality among entrepreneurs in addition to the living conditions of Indonesian workers in Taiwan. Entrepreneurs in this community actively participate in religious organizations and social activities as expressions of solidarity with fellow migrants. The research findings indicate that this intersection of religious engagement and entrepreneurial activity has shaped immigrant self-identity, internal solidarity, leadership, and collective action.
This paper examines Taiwan's strategic shift from a classic developmental state model toward a post-developmental form of economic statecraft aimed at achieving strategic autonomy under growing cross-strait asymmetry. Drawing on developmental state theory, small-state diplomacy, and geoeconomic analysis, this paper argues that rather than disengagement from globalization, Taiwan's economic policy since the late 2010s reflects a selective realignment that leverages its technological centrality to resist external coercion. This is particularly evident in the field of semiconductors. This study analyzes Taiwan's transformation in three phases. These include state-led industrialization, deep economic entanglement with China under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), and a diversification strategy shaped by engagement through the New Southbound Policy and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). This paper finds that Taiwan has increasingly deployed trade, innovation policy, and multilateral economic instruments not merely for economic gain but as tools of sovereignty-preserving statecraft. Rather than pursue isolation or hard decoupling, Taiwan is constructing a form of strategic openness by insulating itself where necessary while reinforcing international embeddedness. This approach offers a critical case of how small states with advanced industries can navigate asymmetric interdependence through calibrated economic agency rather than confrontation. The findings underscore the rising salience of geoeconomic strategy in Taiwan's external policy in a contested Indo-Pacific order.
