In light of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and burgeoning tensions between the United States and China, it is understandable why the international community has returned to a keen interest in great power competition and traditional security threats. For countries in the Asia Pacific, however, concerns over the potential for great power conflict must be tempered by the realities of residing in a region known for serious and ongoing non-traditional security threats, including active violent non-state armed groups. At the same time, there have been increasing public acknowledgements that the development of military applications of artificial intelligence, including but not limited to autonomous weapons systems, has progressed past the point where a comprehensive ban is likely to be an effective solution. This article focuses on understanding the capacity of violent non-state groups to adopt, or otherwise capitalise on, the maturation and proliferation of increasingly autonomous weapons systems, with a focus on the Asia Pacific.
What do South Koreans expect that the United States would do if North Korea invaded, and what shapes these views? Existing research addresses US abilities to deter North Korean aggression, as well as South Korean expectations for the US military presence. Rather than just address the credibility of the alliance in the abstract, we assess what specific actions South Koreans expected from the United States if North Korea invaded. Through an original national Web survey of 1,000 South Koreans in 2025, we find that most respondents expect the United States to provide aid, with fewer expecting troop and air support and over one in five expecting the use of tactical nuclear weapons. We find that preexisting views of the United States are a stronger predictor of expecting US action than subjective security threat assessments or views of the North Korean regime. The findings suggest the perceived credibility of American commitment is the strongest factor in South Korean expectations of American defence.
The rise of regional powers can shift historical alliances. This article examines the impact of Chinese power on the U.S.–Japan security alliance. Some have argued that China’s rise will strengthen the U.S.–Japan alliance because external balancing will increase as the threat grows. Others argue that, as the potential cost of fighting against China grows, extended deterrence becomes less credible. This article asks the question: is the growth of Chinese power strengthening or weakening the U.S.–Japan alliance? This study introduces statistical tests that suggest China’s rise negatively impacted the U.S.–Japan alliance from 1999 to 2020. To test this, original monthly-level data were obtained from the Japanese Ministry of Defense, including all military exercises. The findings address the geopolitical implications of how the rise of regional powers can affect security alliances between asymmetric powers by increasing the costs of balancing.
This article addresses the critical question of variation in India’s crisis behaviour towards Pakistan since 1998 by introducing the concept of perception dissonance—the divergence between Indian and Pakistani interpretations of nuclear stability. Existing accounts, particularly the stability–instability paradox, cannot explain why India has alternated among paralysis, restraint and escalation in response to comparable or escalating provocations. This article argues that crisis outcomes hinge not on material capabilities alone but on whether Indian decision-makers acknowledge or discount Pakistan’s nuclear signalling. A 2×2 matrix yields four hypotheses linking signalling and perception to predicted conventional responses. The examination of four cases, Kargil, Parakram, Mumbai and Balakot, reveals that India’s perception of strategic stability varied even as Pakistani signalling continued to project instability. Dissonance cuts both ways: at Kargil and Balakot, India discounted Pakistani instability signals and escalated, whereas during the 2008 Mumbai attacks, India perceived instability despite Pakistan’s restrained signalling, producing strategic paralysis.
