Abstract This paper examines whether data collection by dominant digital platforms can constitute an abuse of dominance under Article 102(a) TFEU. Drawing on the Facebook Germany case, culminating in the CJEU’s ruling in Meta Platforms v Bundeskartellamt, and the Commission’s findings against Meta under Article 5(2) of the Digital Markets Act, it argues that unfair trading conditions offers a more suitable framework than unfair pricing. The paper proposes a three-step methodology of joint application. In this methodology, the GDPR’s data minimisation and purpose limitation principles and the economic value concept from unfair pricing jurisprudence serve as sequential inputs into a single proportionality inquiry, rather than as separate or cumulative theories of harm. This enables holistic enforcement alongside the GDPR and consumer protection law. The paper further argues that ex ante regulation under the DMA and ex post enforcement under Article 102(a) TFEU are complementary rather than substitutable. Article 5(2) DMA, as interpreted in the Commission’s April 2025 decision fining Meta EUR 200 million, is the appropriate forward-looking framework for preventing excessive data collection by designated gatekeepers. Article 102(a) TFEU nonetheless remains an indispensable safety net for conduct outside the DMA’s targeted scope, conduct pre-dating designation, and undertakings below the gatekeeper threshold.
Abstract The global diffusion of competition policy has created risks of regulatory fragmentation. These risks have been addressed primarily through legislative and institutional convergence, neglecting whether alignment remains on the books or seeps into enforcement-level learning. This paper examines that question in merger control, using the European Union–Türkiye relationship as an empirical setting in which alignment pressures coexist with enforcement autonomy. Drawing on a hand-coded dataset of all Turkish merger decisions between 1997 and 2025 that cite the European Commission, the study moves beyond counting citations to analyse their substantive depth. Citations are classified as formal, interpretive, or operative based on how heavily Commission practice structures domestic enforcement reasoning. Using regression analysis, the paper explores the institutional and case-level factors associated with deeper engagement. The results reveal a pattern of selective learning. Citation depth is significantly higher when the Turkish Competition Authority (TCA) relies on Commission decisions, particularly in core analytical stages like market definition and competitive assessment. Deeper engagement also correlates with industries the TCA independently classifies as technologically complex. These findings suggest that enforcement learning operates through problem-driven analytical borrowing rather than mechanical emulation, highlighting the limits of formal alignment as a proxy for global competition policy convergence.
The European Commission’s revised Market Definition Notice, published in 2024, extends the original 1997 Notice in a number of ways, including by explaining how markets may be defined in the presence of multi-sided platforms. This article builds on the principles in the Notice to provide a practical guide to market definition for multi-sided platforms. We consider the latest European Union and UK case law, including the Commission’s Appstore and eTraveli/Booking decisions and the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal’s judgment in BGL/Comparethemarket, and discuss the merits of the various approaches. In particular, we consider when it is appropriate to define one market or multiple ones, how the SSNIP test can be applied to incorporate network effects across the sides, and how this test can be adjusted if there is a zero price on one side, including through the use of an SSNDQ.
