The year 2025 marked the collapse of the major net-zero financial alliances. Since their creation, these forms of cooperation in capital markets have been subject to antitrust scrutiny, which varies significantly across jurisdictions. In the US, such alliances have been assessed as potential anticompetitive boycotts of the fossil-fuel industry, triggering investigations and litigation that has generated substantial legal uncertainty. Although the EU and the UK have adopted more accommodating approaches, divergences persist even from an intra-European perspective, both regarding the classification of net-zero coalitions and the assessment of out-of-market efficiencies. Through a comparative analysis of US, EU and UK, the paper argues that divergent antitrust approaches can significantly undermine sustainable finance initiatives, producing a serious chilling effect. To reduce this antitrust fragmentation, the paper underscores the importance of recognising broad out-of-market efficiencies and proposes a graduated assessment calibrated to the global benefits of sustainability agreements in capital markets. Against this backdrop, the use of soft law and greater international convergence between competition authorities may offer a viable path forward, although competition law must ultimately grapple with the varieties of capitalism.
Efficiencies are a component of the overall appraisal of a merger under EU merger control. They may be balanced against the anti-competitive effects and convince the Commission that a merger would not harm consumers. While efficiencies are expected to play a central role in the renewed merger control framework of the EU, key questions remain unresolved. The article first zooms in on the challenge of balancing between different types of efficiencies and between different consumers. Particular attention is paid to the notion of consumer groups and its implications for more accurate and inclusive enforcement. Next, the article discusses the balance of evidentiary burdens and clarifies some misconceptions regarding the distinction between the standard of proof and the quality of the evidence. By reviewing the draft text of the new Merger Guidelines in light of existing case-law, the article identifies critical inconsistencies and proposes a more coherent approach for the balancing of efficiencies.
The aim of the research was to identify the challenges in the development of economic competition in Armenia and to formulate proposals for improving antitrust policy in line with international standards. The study employed a combination of comparative statistical analysis (specifically, the calculation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to assess the levelof market concentration) and institutional analysis based on the examination of the activities of the Competition Protection Commission of Armenia. A normative legal approach and case studies were additionally utilized, enabling the alignment of national antitrust policy with international standards and practices. It was established that small and medium-sized businesses in Armenia are a key factor in the competitive environment. The development dynamics of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from 2018 to 2024 revealed a steady increase in the number of entities from 64.3 thousand to 109.4 thousand, indicating a doubling of entrepreneurial activity over six years. The analysis of the HHI confirmed pronounced sectoral polarization: the banking sector has a low level of concentration (HHI – 908), power generation – a moderate level (HHI – 2,034), while the mobile telecommunications segment is characterized by high concentration (HHI – 4,784). An assessment of the effectiveness of Armenia’s antitrust policy was conducted based on the analysis of the legislative framework and the activities of the Competition Protection Commission. It was established that between 2020 and 2024, the regulator significantly intensified its supervisory measures: notably, in the case of Alex Holding LLC, a fine of AMD 24.7 million was imposed for abuse of a dominant position, and in 2024, fines totalling over AMD one billion were levied for collusion in the fuel market. It was determined that enhancing the effectiveness of Armenia’s antitrust policy necessitates the harmonization of national legislation with European standards. It is demonstrated that the implementation of leniency programmes, which have an effectiveness of 60–70% in detecting cartel agreements in Germany and France, and the reform of the fining system in accordance with the principles of the European Commission, will significantly improve the outcomes of antitrust investigations in Armenia.
The rise of the gig economy has intensified the tensions between labour law and EU competition law. As platform workers are typically classified as self-employed, they slip through the meshes of labour law while they are simultaneously considered ‘undertakings’ under competition law. This article maps the different ways in which competition law intersects with platform labour markets and explores the role that competition law can play in addressing the gig economy’s excesses, with a dual approach. First, it assesses the offensive use of competition law as a sword to discipline gig platform conduct under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. While recent enforcement against wagefixing and no-poach agreements demonstrates a renewed focus on labour markets, the article shows that structural and evidentiary barriers continue to limit effective intervention. Second, the article explores the defensive function of competition law as a shield to protect platform workers from competition enforcement. It analyses Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) caselaw, the Commission’s 2022 Guidelines and the Platform Work Directive, situating them within a broader normative shift toward a socially attuned application of competition law. The article concludes that while competition law cannot substitute labour law, a labour-sensitive recalibration can meaningfully contribute to rebalancing power in platform labour markets.
This article examines the extent to which designated “gatekeepers” implement the provisions of the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) outside its territorial scope (“Brussels Effect”). Drawing on transparency reports, contractual documents, and informal communications, we reveal significant disparities in compliance strategies: Apple, Alphabet, and Booking predominantly restrict their implementation to the EU or European Economic Area (EEA), whereas Microsoft, Meta, and ByteDance extend certain measures to non-EU jurisdictions, notably Switzerland. Crucially, obligations subject to non-compliance proceedings by the European Commission are rarely extended beyond the EU, suggesting a strategic approach to territorial extensions of the DMA’s implementation. The article also uncovers a pattern of complex and sometimes contradictory communication by gatekeepers, raising questions about the transparency of the DMA’s implementation. These inconsistencies, coupled with selective extensions of specific data-related DMA provisions, point to a fragmented Brussels Effect of the law. The findings also imply that gatekeepers weigh the economic and strategic costs of compliance when deciding on territorial scope, and that the DMA’s global impact may depend on further coordination between regulators as well as more stringent enforcement.
