Anthrax, a disease of public health as well as bio-warfare potential is caused by Gram positive, non-motile and spore forming Bacillus Anthracis. Bacteraemia and toxaemia of B. anthracis is responsible to cause lethality in anthrax-infected host. In this study, GroEL (HSP60) gene was cloned in pET28a+ vector and expressed in heterologous system E. coli. Over expressed recombinant GroEL was purified by IMAC chromatography and analysed on 10% SDS-PAGE. In western blot analysis, the rGroEL reacted with mouse anti-his antibody and anti-B. anthracis Sterne mouse serum. The immunogenicity of GroEL with aluminium hydroxide was evaluated in BALB/c mouse model. The endpoint titer of anti-rGroEL circulating antibodies in mouse serum was found high by indirect ELISA after first and second booster doses. IgG1 and IgG2b isotypes were found dominating in comparison to other isotypes. Humoral immune response generated by rGroEL indicated that it is immuno-dominant antigen of B. anthracis, which could be further evaluated as a subunit vaccine candidate against anthrax.
The tools of synthetic biology and the life sciences are rapidly advancing, as the ability to apply classical engineering to biological systems creates increasing possibilities for innovations in health and medicine, materials science, energy and agriculture. Intrinsic to these capabilities is the mounting ‘digitization of biology’, as the genetic code and its related metadata (including translated proteins, associated functions, herein referred to as “biodata”) are amassed in order to engineer biology for specific purposes. The full spectrum of risks associated with the compilation and use of a wide range of biodata has not been fully identified or comprehensively understood. Further, divergences in traditional attitudes about security among disciplines, namely, biological sciences, engineering, information technology, and data science, complicate discussions on approaches to risk mitigation. To provide a more unified perspective and clarity, we propose that there are unique risks associated with the digitization of biology, represented by overlapping concerns of biosecurity and privacy. We discuss these in three categories of risk: 1) pathogen risks; 2) manufacturing risks, and 3) risks to individual privacy that can allow human harms. Further, we note that there is insufficient address or treatment of these risks in the formulation of ethics, policy and governance. Mitigation of risks will require characterization of all three spheres of risk, acknowledgement that they may require different solutions, and engagement of divergent disciplines and stakeholders to design solutions.
