China's advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), particularly large language models (LLMs), are reshaping global power dynamics through technology. The emergence of a sophisticated Chinese AI ecosystem has challenged the dominance of Western models. This article examines how these developments disrupt technological hierarchies, economic markets, and geopolitical influence through what Beijing terms “AI democratization.” Drawing on theories of technological hegemony, soft power, and digital authoritarianism, this study analyses interconnected dimensions of China's LLM strategy. These include a state–industry model enabling rapid commercialisation, the economic disruption of Western tech markets, and the geopolitical instrumentalisation of AI capabilities through the Digital Silk Road. Using qualitative content analysis of policy documents, technical reports, and international agreements, the study reveals a persistent tension between China's rhetoric of “AI democratization” and concerns regarding digital authoritarianism. The findings contribute to international relations theory by demonstrating how Chinese LLMs function as tools of attraction and control alike.
China's rapid nuclear modernisation is reshaping crisis dynamics in East Asia in ways that reflect a contemporary form of the stability–instability paradox. As Beijing moves toward a more diverse and survivable second-strike capability, strategic nuclear stability with the United States may become firmer in relative terms, even as coercive pressure and grey-zone activity around Taiwan intensify. This paper situates China within competing interpretations of the paradox, contrasting the classic Snyder–Jervis model with arguments that some states deliberately manipulate nuclear risk, as seen in Pakistan and in Russia's conduct during the Ukraine war. The analysis does not claim that nuclear modernisation initiates coercion, which has older roots, but that improving retaliatory survivability can condition how coercion is sustained, calibrated, and risk-managed under heightened escalation stakes. China is pursuing neither open brinkmanship nor a static form of minimal deterrence. Instead, it is building a nuclear backstop that supports prolonged competition below the threshold of major war. Evidence from China's missile expansion, silo construction, sea-based forces, and regional military behaviour shows how a firmer nuclear ceiling can coexist with recurrent lower level instability. The paper concludes with implications for U.S. crisis management and regional deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.
This article analyses the speeches of legislators and the interventions of interest groups during the ratification procedures of the Free Trade Agreements signed by Chile, Costa Rica, and Ecuador with China. Our descriptive results suggest a focus on economic issues at the expense of human rights and democracy. Additionally, the rhetorical strategies employed by both lobbies and politicians reinforce the idea of non-alignment or strategic autonomy in the context of bilateral relations with China. Finally, legislators in the three countries are slightly more likely to adopt protectionist stances than lobbies. Overall, it appears that politicians and lobbies in Latin America adopt a pragmatic approach to fostering economic cooperation with China.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has had far-reaching consequences and, as has already been observed by several authors, it had important geopolitical, economic, and also ideational implications in Central Asia. This article focuses on the case of Kazakhstan and explores what those consequences mean for relations between Kazakhstan and China. Some scholars expressed the view that Kazakhstan had already departed from Russia's influence and become China's closest ally. The article discusses to what extent that can be considered true. To better analyse this case, an eclectic approach is employed which considers both economic and ideational factors. The research demonstrates that the Russian invasion of Ukraine did catalyse both an intensification of China-–Kazakhstan cooperation on the high-political and economic levels and an improvement in public perceptions of China. Despite these significant developments, however, the research findings undermine exaggerated or alarmist interpretations that have been circulating among some scholars.
While some literature examines populism in Taiwan, current Taiwan-specific literature offers limited insight into the extent of populist messaging on social media election campaigns, its communication mechanisms and internal structure, inter-party differences in its application, and its relationship with election topics. To address these significant gaps, this paper analyses Facebook campaign messages of seven candidates/leaders from different Taiwanese political parties during the 2020 election using quantitative content analysis. This paper contributes by: (a) establishing a reliable framework for measuring populist content and style in Taiwan; (b) identifying negative and confrontational inclinations in minor parties’ populist communication; (c) uncovering a moderate correlation between populist content and style in Taiwan, with systematic engagements of negativity and emotionality; and (d) revealing significant associations between populist content and style and election topics, as well as different tendencies across parties in leveraging these elements to frame the electoral agenda.
