This study investigates the health status of defectors from North Korea and their process of assimilating into the economy of South Korea. Utilizing data from the National Health Insurance database spanning 2003 to 2022, we constructed a comprehensive dataset covering nearly all North Korean defectors in South Korea, alongside a 2 percent control sample that was randomly selected from the national population. Our findings indicate a higher incidence of medical treatment for mental illnesses and infectious diseases among North Korean defectors than native South Koreans. Through a panel analysis, we observed a significant initial income disparity between North Korean defectors and South Koreans, which narrows as the defectors' length of residence in South Korea increases. However, the income gap remains large even decades after their arrival, thus suggesting potential challenges in achieving economic convergence considering the working period of North Korean defectors in South Korea. Furthermore, defectors arriving with infectious diseases or mental health issues tend to earn less than those without such health concerns. The economic disparity associated with mental health issues tends to decrease over longer periods of residence, while the gap related to infectious diseases does not diminish over time.
While China's coal-based electricity generation has attracted much interest, less attention has been paid to coal used in its chemical industry, including ammonia used for fertilizer production, an important but often overlooked source of emissions and an important contributor to climate change. The rapid growth of ammonia produced on the basis of coal since the early 1980s is a contributing factor to the growth in CO2 emissions. China's growing production of coal-based ammonia and nitrogen fertilizer has been an important driver in this rise, with important global climate consequences. What drives China's use of coal as a basis feedstock for fertilizer production, and why does it matter for understanding China's participation in global efforts to combat climate change? This article tackles these questions by bringing to the foreground the domestic underpinnings of this situation, highlighting domestic-level considerations essential for understanding China's ability to live up to its global climate commitments.
This article examines Japan's institutionalization of Maritime Domain Awareness as a non-military response to China's gray zone tactics in the Indo-Pacific. Drawing on neoclassical realism, this analysis demonstrates how systemic threats, mediated by domestic variables-such as elite perceptions, media framing, and bureaucratic reforms-prompt information-centric adaptations rather than militarized responses. Constructivist insights highlight Japan's shift toward proactive maritime engagement through its evolving sovereignty and identity narratives. Employing process tracing, this article analyzes key cases-the 2004 Chunxiao dispute, 2012 Senkaku crisis, and 2019 Umishiru launch-to examine how non-military pressures reshaped Japan's maritime strategy from resource utilization to comprehensive governance. This study extends neoclassical realism to the study of hybrid threats and derives policy lessons for regional initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA).
Abstract: How do different types of military dictators behave when managing elites? In this study, we argue that much of this has to do with the initial formation of the regime. In collegial military regimes, where there are plural elites, dictators must devise strategies to redistribute power between the existing coalition and officers who are excluded, in order to consolidate power. Conversely, when there is no unified and cooperative power base, dictators struggle to consolidate power initially. However, once they overcome this initial hurdle, they can swiftly concentrate power without having to negotiate with other elites. This research focuses on the patterns of elite reshuffling and purges in South Korean military regimes from 1962 to 1988, revealing significant differences in the management of elites between the two types of military rule.
This study forms part of a project that examines the question of how China practises its increased activity in global environmental governance (GEG). To shed light on this, we explore biodiversity and China's role as host for the 15th Conference of the Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity in 2022 (Kunming/Montreal). We ask how we can describe and assess China's changing role in global biodiversity governance, an issue that has so far received scant academic attention. We develop and apply a set of indicators to classify various roles states can perform in global environmental governance: types of leadership, the intermediary, the bystander, and the laggard. Based on the indicators, we investigate how China's activities fit with the various roles. We conclude that although, as host, China proclaimed ambitions for global biodiversity governance, its behavior cannot be described in terms of any leadership role, but rather displays traits of the laggard and the bystander. Our methods for data collection are key actor interviews and document analysis.
