Abstract More than 20 years since the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in the UN General Assembly, the principle has not been fully embraced by states in Southeast Asia, a region that continues to face high risks for atrocities. Using the three pillars of the principle and the framework of norm cascade and implementation, this article finds three important lessons on the challenges and constraints in implementing R2P in the region using Myanmar and the Philippines as case studies. Specifically, it examines the continuing problem of democratic transitions in Myanmar (still dominated by the military) and in the Philippines (where political dynasties continue to rule), which accounts for resistance to the R2P norm particularly in holding state actors accountable for atrocity crimes. It also analyses the normative and structural limitations of ASEAN in responding to the Myanmar crisis after the February 2021 coup, and how geopolitics has undermined the role of both the United Nations and ASEAN in responding to atrocities in Myanmar. While many scholars have raised the question of whether ASEAN, in asserting its centrality, is still fit for purpose in managing regional peace and security, the more important question to raise is whether Myanmar is fit to continue as a member of the organisation as it unapologetically violates the group’s Charter principles. Meanwhile, despite the Philippines withdrawal from the Rome Treaty in 2019, the government in Manila opted to surrender former President Rodrigo Duterte to the International Criminal Court for atrocity crimes committed during his drug war campaign. This proves that the state’s resistance to R2P’s norm core is short-lived as the political dynamics in the country significantly changed following the political rift in the Marcos-Duterte alliance in 2022.
Abstract The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) never expected to get involved in international peacekeeping operations so soon after its establishment on 27 April 1994. However, the outbreak of the two Congo Wars in the late 1990s led the United Nations to urgently request the country to deploy its armed forces into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Beginning with the deployment of a single liaison officer in 1999, this commitment to the DRC, known in the SANDF as Operation Mistral, would evolve during MONUC’s 11 years of existence. By 2010 when MONUC would transform into a new MONUSCO, thousands of SANDF personnel would have seen service in the country in both supporting and combat roles, with 19 members of the SANDF having paid the ultimate sacrifice to ensure peace and stability within the country.
Abstract The armed conflict between Cambodia and Thailand over their unresolved border dispute reemerged in 2025 after nearly a decade of hiatus. The recurrence of military conflict demonstrated the vulnerability of lasting peace along the Khmer–Thai frontier. Despite the ceasefire agreement, the ruling by the International Court of Justice, and diplomatic engagement, the conflict appeared to pause each time, rather than leading to a resolution to the dispute. Focusing on the 2008–2011 and the 2025 border skirmishes, this article argues that despite the truce in place and other international and bilateral mechanisms, the two states have serious disagreements on achieving peace. This generates an interpretation gap which, compounded with domestic politics and the collapse of personalized diplomacy, led to the revival of armed conflict between Cambodia and Thailand.
Abstract Korean faith-based organisations (FBOs) have long been involved in aid provision, yet their relationship to South Korea’s donor identity and development cooperation norms remains underexplored. This article examines how Korean FBOs engaged in humanitarian assistance to North Korea function as invisible norm entrepreneurs within Korea’s aid system. Drawing on a constructivist and norm diffusion framework, and based on semi-structured interviews with leaders of major FBOs, government officials, and NGO platform representatives, as well as analysis of policy documents and FBO reports, the study shows that FBOs shape key humanitarian norms such as needs-based assistance, transparency, and localization through their agenda-setting, funding practices, and coalition-building. Despite their limited formal visibility in core ODA laws and strategies, Korean FBOs operate as knowledge providers, catalysts for humanitarian initiatives, and quiet standard-setters in the politically sensitive field of aid to North Korea. The article argues that understanding Korea’s evolving donor identity and aid practices requires recognising the normative agency of FBOs and their ambivalent position between state policy, religious communities, and global humanitarian regimes.
Abstract How do Indo-Pacific middle powers adapt their security strategies under conditions of fragmented regional order and intensifying strategic rivalry that increase conflict risk? Debates on the Indo-Pacific have often focused on great-power competition, particularly the strategic implications of US-China rivalry, while paying comparatively less attention to how middle powers respond to growing geopolitical, institutional, and technological fragmentation within the regional order. This article argues that the evolving peace and security role of middle powers in the Indo-Pacific can be understood through the concept of strategic vulnerability. Under conditions of fragmentation, middle powers increasingly pursue adaptive strategies aimed at mitigating vulnerability and preserving strategic flexibility. The article develops a theoretical framework linking fragmentation to middle-power adaptation as focused by strategic vulnerability, and introduces the concept of networked security cooperation to explain emerging patterns of regional governance and conflict prevention. Drawing on the cases of South Korea, Australia, India, and Indonesia, it argues that middle powers increasingly rely on minilateral buffering, multi-alignment, and strategic diversification through overlapping and functionally differentiated forms of cooperation across security, economic, and technological domains. The article concludes that Indo-Pacific middle powers increasingly function as adaptive stabilizers within a fragmented regional order, contributing to regional resilience while simultaneously reinforcing decentralized patterns of order-building.
