
What we call meat has become a contentious issue in the United States. This article is the first to explore the many dynamics behind meat labeling laws proposed by various state legislatures. It uses food studies methods to places those debates within a larger context of the history of “meat,” plant-based proteins, cell-cultured proteins, and insect-based proteins, as well as other food labeling struggles. The article ultimately argues that expressly recognizing these dynamics can augment sustainable food advocacy efforts in the future.
Congress and federal financial regulators have long prioritized the safety and soundness of banking firms. But at the same time, the directors and officers of banking firms are legally bound to prioritize shareholder wealth maximization, which creates incentives for risk-taking that work against these regulatory goals. This shareholder primacy norm has long been a central feature of corporate governance, but as I describe in this Article its application to banks was not a deliberate policy choice but rather a historical accident. Indeed, banks possess several unique features that make shareholder wealth maximization an inapt governance priority for them. Banks are highly leveraged, which increases the importance of creditor agency costs. Banks also enjoy government guarantees, either explicit or implicit, on their short-term debt, and thus their governance is a matter of public concern. Finally, bank failures result in high negative externalities, and this also creates a strong public interest in bank safety and soundness. This Article argues that a new federal governance regime for banking institutions is appropriate and consistent with the historical purposes of banking regulations and charter oversight in the United States. Furthermore, such a regime would reduce the tensions between the law of state entities and the sprawling federal banking regulatory framework created by Congress, and harmonize the internal governance of banking firms with the broader goals of external banking regulations. Finally, I offer some thoughts on the key principles that should be present in any such federal governance regime for banking. For too long, we have tolerated a “cat-and-mouse” dynamic in banking, one in which regulators have sought to identify and address risky practices while knowing that the directors and officers of banking firms have strong incentives to take on higher risk. By changing this paradigm and realigning the incentives inherent in banking governance, we can take a major step towards ensuring long-term stability in our financial system.
There is an inescapable inconsistency between the general rule that naked (cartelistic) restraints of competition are per se illegal and the treatment of such restraints when engaged in by self-regulatory professional organizations, standard setting organizations, and various private organizations that regulate competition in variety of athletic and other activities. Most observers believe that some of that cartelistic regulation may be not only socially and economically desirable but also necessary to serve the public interest. The judicial effort to explain when cartels or other naked restraints on competition within or between such groups and others are lawful and when they are not has floundered on the lack of specificity of the “rule of reason” which invites linking any justification for a restraint to some ambiguous assertion of “reasonableness.” The inevitable implication is that any cartel could be lawful if it were reasonable and served some “pro- competitive,” “consumer welfare,” or other “public interest” goal. This Article contends that this approach is wrong. Instead, what courts are in fact doing is preempting certain kinds of restraints from antitrust law review, although this is evident only by implication. This Article applies the Carstensen-Roth framework to explain such preemption or exemption. Three elements are necessary: state law, federal law, constitutional law, or some generally accepted public interest goal must authorize the organization to regulate some aspect of the market, the regulation at issue must be within the scope of that authorization, and the process used to adopt and implement the regulation must be appropriate under the circumstances. Naked restraints satisfying these elements are exempt from antitrust law review, and courts applying antitrust law should not undertake to determine the substantive “reasonableness” of such regulations. This framework adheres to the general rule that naked restraints of competition are always per se illegal unless exempt and provides a clearer basis for determining when and whether a restraint can be lawful. The three Supreme Court decisions reviewing FTC challenges to conspiracies among dentists to restrict and regulate competition in dental care provide the basis to illustrate and test this approach.
Since World War II, it has become increasingly common practice for presidents to use non-defensive military force abroad without obtaining congressional pre-approval, thereby leaving Congress with no meaningful role in the decision. This modern practice is clearly at odds with the Constitution’s text and original meaning. A wealth of scholarly commentary concludes that the Constitution grants Congress alone the power to authorize non-defensive military force. Although not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, ample commentary also concludes that a president has inherent constitutional power only to defend the nation from an actual or impending attack. This Essay rejects the notion that a president’s independent constitutional authority to use non-defensive military force is, as a matter of constitutional law, left solely to the routine political give and take of the elected branches. In a republic based upon fundamental individual rights to life, liberty, and property—and of a limited central government constrained by fundamental law—legislative acts and well-accepted principles of necessity must govern a president’s legal authority to invade individual rights through the use of military force. A more complete contextual and structural reading of the Constitution’s text, as well as early government practice and relevant Supreme Court precedent, demonstrate that the Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution believed these basic, rule-of-law and separation-of-powers principles to be etched into the Constitution’s original design. This Essay briefly reviews the current situation and comprehensively surveys the Constitution’s allocation of war- and military-related powers to demonstrate Congress's extensive authority over war and the nation's armed forces. This review strongly confirms the view that the Constitution requires Congress to affirmatively authorize all non-defensive military force and provides Congress with several powers to check a president's use and command of the military. It then briefly posits some of the reasons the relevant constitutional norms have eroded, clarifies why aberrant past practice cannot amend the Constitution's separation of war powers, and explains why Congress must reestablish its authority, briefly suggesting two ways that it may do so.