
A key question for legal scholars and political scientists is whether women jurists judge differently than men. Some studies have suggested that women judges are more likely to support plaintiffs in sexual harassment, employment, and immigration cases. Other studies conclude that women are more likely to vote liberally in death penalty and obscenity cases, and more likely to convince their male colleagues to join a liberal opinion. Yet other studies have found little evidence that women judge differently from men. This article explores the jurisprudence of the first woman judge, Judge Florence Allen, to test these claims of gender difference in judging. Judge Allen was the first woman judge many times over: the first woman elected to a general trial court (Cuyahoga County Common Pleas in 1920), the first woman elected to a state supreme court (Ohio 1922), the first woman appointed to a federal appellate court (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 1932), and the first woman shortlisted for the U.S. Supreme Court. Her forty years on the bench included cases of constitutional law, administrative power, criminal process, labor rights, and patent cases. Using original archival research, this Article shows that Allen's judicial record supports the conclusion that women judge no differently from men. However, Allen worked hard to cultivate this conclusion, seeking to distance herself from claims of women’s difference and inferiority, and instead seeking to establish that women could “think like a man.” Her deliberate effort was to judge in a moderate, neutral, and objective manner, distancing the work from her feminist activism. Overall the historical record reveals the jurisprudence of the first woman judge as one of moderation, fitted to the male-centric norms of the profession and rejecting any promise of women’s advocacy on the bench.
The hope is that the Court will one day hold that the Thirteenth Amendment has its own equal protection clause or component and that strict scrutiny will not be used for benign racial classifications designed to eradicate current badges and incidents of slavery. This Article critiques the Court’s decision in the Civil Rights Cases regarding the scope of Section 1 of the Amendment and it offers a holistic or structural interpretation of the Amendment to include an equal protection component and a lesser standard of review than strict scrutiny. Essentially, the Thirteenth Amendment, if properly used, could become a public policy of equal protection that influences courts’ interpretation of the Amendment, other constitutional provisions, and statutes.
This Article compares the levels of procedural justice afforded to persons with severe mental illness in the civil and criminal systems, either via involuntary commitment in state psychiatric hospitals in the civil system or via mental health court as an alternative to incarceration in the criminal system. Using Virginia’s mental health courts and civil commitment systems as case studies, this Article compares the procedures by which a person can be involuntary committed in the civil system with those afforded to persons who are funneled into mental health treatment courts in the criminal system, analyzing how levels of procedural justice—both actual and perceived—affect treatment outcomes. The underlying premise of this Article is that the higher the level of perceived procedural fairness, the higher the likelihood that a person with acute mental illness will comply with treatment. This Article ultimately suggests that certain aspects of procedural due process in the mental health court model should be utilized in the civil commitment system in order to effect positive treatment outcomes by increasing perceived levels of procedural fairness and resultant buy-in to treatment. I. REVOLVING DOORS OF HOSPITALIZATION AND INCARCERATION II. MANDATED TREATMENT IN THE CIVIL V. CRIMINAL SYSTEMS A. An Overview of the Civil Commitment Process B. Mental Health Treatment Courts in the Criminal Justice
This article is about necrophilia, in particular how state laws frame the harm associated with the crime. In the long term, I’m interested in theorizing various issues related to the sexual autonomy rights and interests of victims of rape. In the short term—and the limited scope of this article—is an examination of the normative reasons why states seek to punish necrophilic acts. The fifty-state survey contained herein examines statutory texts, legislative history, and case law. After this review, five distinct formulations of the social harms associated with necrophilia emerged. The first of these is “no social harm” and applies to the four states that do not currently have criminal prohibitions against necrophilia. The remaining categories are: crimes against nature, mistreatment of corpses, the rights of surviving family members, and sex crimes.