Abstract The problem of consciousness remains the most intractable question in the philosophy of mind. Scientific approaches to consciousness, in their effort to provide a systematic account, impose determinate structures. This methodological necessity encounters a dilemma: it seeks to define what is never self‐identical. This paper considers Conscious Agent Theory (CAT) within this broader challenge, assessing its attempt to model consciousness while rejecting materialist reductionism. In rendering consciousness as a structured agent, CAT fortifies the problem by generating a fundamental tension between self‐transcendence and reification. Engaging with phenomenology and existentialist thought, the paper explores how being‐for‐itself resists reduction. The challenge from embodiment reveals that CAT risks erasing the transcendence distinguishing consciousness from the world it discloses, or reinstating dualism. CAT's tendency towards reification entails a Cartesian inheritance, placing it in opposition to phenomenological accounts of consciousness as relational, and self‐transcending. This dialectical tension invites further discussion between scientific perspectives and phenomenology.
Abstract What ethical values and principles should guide and govern AI entities? This is just one of many AI‐related questions facing the world today. Another question—perhaps even more important—is Can ethical values and principles be instilled into AI entities to guide and govern them ? The present essay addresses the question of whether Flourishing Ethics is potentially a global ethical framework that prioritizes human flourishing while, at the same time, accommodating cultural diversity. It focuses upon possible use of LLMs to create moral advisers; and it is intended to support current worldwide efforts to keep AI developments within the bounds of universal ethical principles.
Abstract This paper presents the case of Margaret Macdonald's (1903–1956) posthumous treatment of Susan Stebbing (1885–1943). After Stebbing's death, Macdonald—her Ph.D. student and collaborator—wrote an early history of analytic philosophy in which Stebbing's work is credited to Bertrand Russell (specifically, her account of ‘directional analysis’). The paper argues that this case contains two important lessons for practitioners of the history of philosophy engaged in scholarship recovering the work of women in philosophy's history. First, that we should not expect any subject of historical scholarship to be morally infallible. And, second, that cases such as this emphasise the importance of social context when it comes to understanding marginalised figures in philosophy's history.
Abstract In this paper Calkins's work in philosophy is examined through two of her major books, and it is concluded that she was an early naturalizer and proponent of lines of thought that now receive greater attention. In general, Calkins refuses to accept the a priori patterns of theory of the traditional style; her work alludes to empirical lines of thought. One consequence of her work is that nineteenth‐century views on religion and religious practice may be further alembicated. In addition, Calkins's work clearly demonstrates the early ties between psychology and philosophy, now sometimes overlooked. Her thinking is decidedly an advance in terms of her era.
Abstract This paper reconstructs and addresses three major critiques of Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach (CA): (1) the claim that an exclusive focus on capabilities (rather than functioning) is ineffective in protecting people's well‐being; (2) the critique of paternalism; and (3) the objection according to which the CA relies on a vague notion of human nature. It argues that, while Nussbaum's account has the inner resources to partially address the objections, incorporating John Stuart Mill's harm principle offers a more robust defense of the CA. The paper contends that this liberal principle provides a sound criterion for distinguishing the human capabilities that merit political protection from those that do not. Moreover, the principle also allows the CA to better address the critiques of paternalism and laissez‐faire. After presenting this defense, the paper analyzes how the adoption of Mill's principle should shape the CA's treatment of self‐harm.
