Abstract The most common approach to reflecting on racial injustice in moral and political thought has become thinking of the problem in terms of institutional or systemic failures. These approaches address significant problems yet leave untouched a more fundamental question: what kind of people abide by racial injustice despite our modern claims to liberal equality? In this paper I rely upon Sophocles, Bernard Williams and James Baldwin in addressing this more fundamental question by describing ongoing racial injustice as a tragedy in the making begotten by shamelessness among Americans who cleave to bad white identity politics.
Abstract I argue against the claim that, in so far as you regard some aspect of the future as certain, it is impossible, irrational, unreasonable, or at least somehow problematic to make a decision about it, at least from within the same ‘standpoint’. I argue by appeal to ‘happy cases’, in which you are certain you will decide to do what you would also have yourself do. In such cases, certainty does not render decision-making problematic. Throughout, I challenge the metaphor of distinct ‘standpoints’ and suggest we replace it with a distinction between questions.
Abstract In the philosophy of logic, the Adoption Problem is a challenge to the claim that the logic one uses is always under one’s rational control. According to its proponents, some fundamental logical principles, such as modus ponens, cannot begin to be used by a reasoner who does not already use them. The standard explanation is that these principles are ‘self-governing’ and hence unadoptable; this serves as an argument for the exceptional epistemic and cognitive status of fundamental logical principles. I argue, however, that this interpretation is flawed. The account of adoption proposed by Birman (2024) relies on an incorrect assumption about the relationship between logical adoption and logical inference, and this assumption makes the adoption of all logical principles impossible, even if they are not self-governing. The Adoption Problem is therefore not convincing, at least not in its original form.
Abstract This paper argues that a key part of the harm of death is connected to ignorance. I propose that certain cases of ignorance are tied to harm and suffering, and that the ignorance connected to death normally brings with it this epistemic harm. Furthermore, I suggest that this epistemic harm is a significant, although not the only, part of the harm of death. This more intellectualist picture of the harm of death is contrasted with a more hedonist picture which focuses on missed pleasures. An explanation of why there is such an epistemic harm in dying and why this harm is not easily escapable is outlined by connecting certain kinds of knowledge to the constitution of the self.
Abstract The Stoics are notorious for their claim that apatheia, or the complete elimination of passion, is a consequence of possessing virtue. Are they committed to the even stronger position that passion must always be avoided by the moral learner who is seeking to become virtuous? No, I argue here. By grieving his own state of vice, regretting his past vicious actions, and feeling shame at the prospect of acting badly, the moral trainee is not made worse in his progress toward virtue. To defend this interpretation I do not propose that the vice-directed passions consist in fully veridical beliefs. Rather, I suggest they are analogous to cases of morally improving deception.
