Abstract This paper presents a unified theory of the truth conditions and probability of indicative conditionals and their compounds in a trivalent framework. The semantics validates a Reduction Theorem: any compound of conditionals is semantically equivalent to a simple conditional. We obtain Stalnaker’s Thesis in full generality and generalize Adams’s p-validity into a criterion for valid uncertain inference. Finally, we show that Bayesian updating on an indicative conditional is tantamount to updating on the corresponding material conditional.
Abstract Leora Sung argues that the phenomenon of near-future bias strengthens our duties of charitable giving and puts moral pressure on our decisions regarding savings and investment. I raise two objections to Sung’s argument. First, Sung’s argument relies on a crucial rational-choice-theoretic result which she erroneously claims is derivable from very thin facts about near-future bias, but which in fact holds only under atypical circumstances. Second, I argue that Sung’s account assigns an implausible morally determinative role to subjective preferences. I conclude by noting that the most natural responses to my two objections push in inconsistent directions, making the two objections collectively decisive against Sung’s argument.
Abstract It’s plausible that you cannot know, or be justified in believing that your lottery ticket is a loser solely on the basis of the odds involved. I argue that extant views which deliver this result fall prey to a revenge problem. They entail that if you believe that your ticket is a winner on the basis of the extremely low odds of it being a winner, your belief would be just as justified as in the case where you believe that it is a loser. This seems absurd. I examine two ways of escaping the revenge problem. The first solution aims to vindicate the intuition that one is more justified in believing that one’s ticket is a loser than that it is a winner. I argue that the axiological assumptions required for this solution are unmotivated and implausible. The second solution is error-theoretic in nature. It concedes that one would be equally justified in believing that one’s ticket is a loser or a winner, but maintains that the former belief manifests greater epistemic value. The fact that it is epistemically better to believe that one’s ticket is a loser rather than a winner explains the relevant intuitions.
