For the Netherlands as a small state under the US nuclear umbrella, the formation of its position on nuclear disarmament is conditioned by the necessity of fulfilling alliance obligations. At the same time, the country actively participates in all multilateral negotiation processes related to this issue. The aim of this study is to identify the factors that determine Amsterdam's choice in favor of its commitments to NATO at the expense of its traditional adherence to the idea of nuclear disarmament. The theoretical framework of the study is based on interpreting Dutch foreign policy as that of a small state compelled to compensate for a lack of power resources to ensure its own security. Subordinating its foreign policy strategy to alliance obligations means that the Dutch leadership perceives NATO as a "shelter," allowing the country's leadership to resolve the issue of national security through stronger allies. Concurrently, the political discourse maintains the perception of the Netherlands as a driving force in the process of nuclear disarmament, which requires corresponding reinforcement through specific diplomatic initiatives. Reliance on stable and shared perceptions of their roles and models of behavior among actors is characteristic of the concept of ontological security. The author concludes that the Netherlands' policy in the sphere of nuclear weapons is predominantly determined by the necessity of complying with alliance obligations, which corresponds to shelter theory, against the backdrop of heightened security problems in Europe. The concept of ontological security can only play a complementary role in explaining Amsterdam's steps in the nuclear weapons sphere. Approaches to nuclear disarmament according to which the Netherlands should become a locomotive of this global process are characteristic only of non-governmental organizations, a majority of the population, and certain left-wing political forces, and they exert a certain influence on the country's official position. Their potential is significantly limited by the high degree of tension in international relations and the marginal position of left-wing forces in the political system. Given the persistent nature of these factors, radical changes in the Netherlands' foreign policy course on the issue of nuclear weapons appear unlikely in the foreseeable future.
This study verifies the concept of informational sanctions pressure as an autonomous “financial weapon” through an empirical analysis of the European Union’s sanctions policy toward Russia. The author demonstrates that mechanisms of anticipatory risk repricing by market participants are capable of generating real valuation losses comparable to, or even exceeding, the effects of the material implementation of restrictions. The paper substantiates the status of informational signals as an independent instrument of coercion, capable of provoking volatility in financial markets - including exchange rates, equity indices, and sovereign bond yields – regardless of the subsequent physical enforcement of announced measures. Empirical evidence shows that the short-term impact of officially non-implemented measures may reach trillion-scale valuation effects, functioning as a trigger for systemic financial stress. The study also identifies a qualitative transformation in market reactions under the conditions of the post2022 “sanctions tsunami”: while the amplitude of responses to formally adopted EU sanctions packages has declined, indicating systemic adaptation, financial markets remain highly sensitive to the informational environment. The findings expand the theoretical understanding of sanctions as a multi-channel instrument of pressure and confirm the universality of a transmission model operating through financial market channels.
This paper examines the Chinese energy policy in the post-bipolar era by means of three conceptual categories – reactivity, adaptivity, and proactivity. The article focuses on China's fundamental energy challenges related to its critical dependence on oil and gas imports, its heavy reliance on environmentally harmful coal, as well as the need for a fundamental overhaul of the Chinese energy industry and economy in a carbon-neutral way in compliance with the global trend. The author concludes that no simple reactivity exists in China's energy policy. Regarding the entire triad of challenges, the Chinese energy policy deals mainly with adaptivity, suggesting a set of solutions that are exceptional in their scale and variety. The clear intention of the Chinese leadership to make an ‘energy revolution’ implying the creation of a clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient energy system in the country points distinctly to adaptivity. There are also manifestations of proactivity in the Chinese energy policy. First, Beijing has decided to prioritize international mechanisms for trading and pricing hydrocarbons, where China calls the shots. Second, it has not only devalued the leadership of the West in the field of ‘green’ energy transition, but also has become a trendsetter in this global process, with real leverage on other countries, including Western ones. The very ‘energy revolution’ that Beijing seeks to make can be seen as proactive. It cannot be ruled out that in the future this Chinese example will be generalized and multiplied globally, with other states following suit. China's energy policy is a combination of adaptivity and proactivity. Given the dynamics of recent decades, proactivity is likely to increase in the Chinese energy policy.
An analysis of Geopolitica’s publications devoted to borders and frontiers makes it possible to assess the current state of geopolitical research in Italy, its relationship to classical geopolitics and other national schools, as well as the development of new concepts. The issue under consideration shows that contemporary Italian geopolitics builds on updated readings of classical ideas while actively drawing on the methodological toolbox of the social sciences and humanities. The theoretical and methodological repertoire mobilized in these studies spans classical and critical geopolitics, geostrategic analysis, neogeography and exogeography, quantitative and digital methods, politico-legal institutionalism, historical sociology, and normative political theory. The material also highlights the applied dimension of the field: geopolitical analysis remains in demand in debates over national political and military strategy. The traditional geopolitical problematique of borders and frontiers is reinterpreted in light of shifting spatial practices and governance regimes; in particular, digitalization reshapes spatial imaginaries and contributes to the emergence of neogeography as a distinct area of inquiry.
This article examines the work of the United Nations Working Group on Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activities in the context of the emerging special international legal regime governing the use of natural resources in outer space. It analyzes the positions of states and the European Space Agency on key issues, including the definition of “space resources”; the scope of space resource activities; the permissibility of recognizing private property rights over natural substances extracted from celestial bodies; attitudes toward the 1979 Moon Agreement and the Artemis Accords; possible restrictions and quotas on resource extraction; protection of the space environment; the establishment of “safety zones” at resource development sites; the creation of a special international body; and the equitable sharing of benefits derived from space resource activities. The article shows that an increasingly clear differentiation of state approaches to the legal regulation of space resource activities is taking shape within the United Nations, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, its specialized subcommittees and working groups. It argues that the preliminary draft Principles on Space Resource Activities, prepared under the auspices of the Working Group, is a compromise instrument of a recommendatory nature, which may facilitate its broad support at the universal level but does not eliminate fundamental disagreements among states on key issues. The article raises the question whether the current political and legal differentiation of state positions amounts to a fragmentation of universal international space law, whose core remains the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, elaborated through a difficult Soviet-American compromise. Against the background of growing economic interest in the natural resources of celestial bodies, this question is examined as one of the central challenges for the future development of international space law.
