The article focuses on a source previously unknown and unclaimed by Russian Japanologists: the “Shinobi Method” section from the 1940 “Chekist work manual” Japanese Intelligence, printed by Special Bureau of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD USSR), which provides brief but, precisely from the point of view of a Japanologist, insightful coverage of the main points in the history of the development and content of ninjutsu, the Japanese art of intelligence and espionage. The article proves that the unnamed author of the section was Roman Nikolaevich Kim (189?—1967), a postwar Soviet writer and author of popular detective stories, who was earlier a counterintelligence officer working for the OGPU-NKVD of the USSR and who, at the time of writing and publishing the manual, was under investigation and trial due to false charges of spying for Japan. Based on the results of the conducted study of the source material, the authors of the article come to the conclusion that R. N. Kim, born in Russia but educated in Japan and interested in ninjutsu from his youth, was not only the author of the “Shinobi Method” section of the 1940 Japanese Intelligence manual, but also the first researcher of ninjutsu in the Soviet Union and, probably, in the entire world (the study of this issue is only at an early stage) who achieved significant, for his time, results; that, while studying ninjutsu, Kim used a wide range of publicly available sources: encyclopedias and reference materials, historical literature, and the works of ninjutsu popularizers available to him, all of which he thoroughly analyzed and creatively processed; and that the results of his research in the 1930s and 1940s found application in the training of Soviet intelligence officers. At the same time, the authorship of these materials and their primary sources have remained unknown until today. Therefore, a contemporary analysis of the now-available publication will allow us to reconstruct and more clearly understand the study of little-known aspects of Japanese history and martial culture.
This article examines how the events of the winter and spring of 1920 known historically as the Nikolaevsk Incident are reflected in the correspondence of Japanese intelligence and diplomatic agencies. The documentary evidence consists of reports from the naval intelligence station in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur (filed after Japanese expeditionary forces entered the city following the departure of the partisan units) and materials from a joint investigation by the Army and Navy Ministries; these documents are currently held in Japanese departmental archives and have recently been digitized and made publicly accessible by the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR) of the National Archives of Japan. By the beginning of 1920, a Japanese colony of about 350 people lived in Nikolaevsk-onAmur. To protect it and ensure the actions of the naval forces in the Far Eastern naval theater, the command of the Japanese Armed Forces deployed a small garrison in the city. In early 1920, a partisan detachment of anarchist Ya. I. Tryapitsyn approached the city, entering Nikolaevsk on February 29 after a clash with Japanese soldiers in the Chnyrrakh fortress. By agreement with the command of the local Japanese garrison, the partisans guaranteed the lives and safe stay of the colonists in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur, and also allowed the Japanese soldiers to keep their weapons and ammunition. However, almost immediately, Tryapitsyn’s troops started terrorizing the city, attacking all segments of its population. Having nothing to do with communist ideology, but guided only by his own selfish motives, Tryapitsyn organized a campaign of looting and violence under the pretext of fighting the bourgeoisie. On March 11, he demanded that the Japanese garrison disarm. Realizing that the lives of the colonists would be in danger if this demand were met, the Japanese military made a desperate attempt to destroy the partisans but failed. The surviving Japanese colonists and military personnel were killed by Tryapitsyn’s troops in May 1920, and the Nikolaevsk Incident became the reason for Japan's occupation of Northern Sakhalin until May 1925.
The aim of this study is to identify the specific features of interpreting the Japanese colonial period (1910—1945) in South Korean school history textbooks and to analyze the influence of political and ideological factors on the content of educational materials. The relevance of the study is determined by the fact that the interpretation of the colonial past remains a subject of political struggle, affecting the formation of national identity and the development of Korean—Japanese relations. The article examines the evolution of assessments of the colonial period from the 1950s to the present day. The source base of the study consists of South Korean history textbooks for middle and high schools. Through comparative analysis, the structure of the narrative and the evaluation of the economic, social, and cultural consequences of Japanese rule are compared. The author analyzes how different political regimes from the authoritarian governments of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-hee to democratic administrations shaped the narrative of the occupation and shows that, despite changes in educational policy, the fundamentally negative assessment of Japanese rule has persisted. The stability of this narrative is due to the predominant focus on the national liberation movement, the repressive nature of the colonial administration, the forced mobilization of Koreans, the issue of “comfort women,” territorial disputes over Dokdo, and the phenomenon of pro-Japanese collaborationism. The main findings indicate that South Korean school textbooks remain an arena of ideological struggle over historical memory. Despite reforms and the transition to a pluralistic system for textbook approval, the dominant educational mainstream is close to the colonial exploitation theory. At the same time, after democratization, the coverage of forced mobilization and collaborationism has expanded. In contrast to the dominant narrative, the “New Right” offers an alternative view of the colonial period, emphasizing Japan’s modernization contribution to the development of law, education, infrastructure, and industry, as well as proposing a more lenient assessment of Koreans’ cooperation with the colonial authorities. The politicization of history education continues to have a significant impact on the formation of national identity and public perception of the past.
The aim of this article is to examine the beliefs and value orientations within Japanese society that influence the field of crime-fighting, crime prevention, and correctional measures. It analyses the influence of Japan’s major religions on the formation of societal attitudes towards crime and towards individuals who have committed crimes, as well as the national psychological characteristics of the Japanese people which complicate their reintegration into society. It is noted that, as this problem was identified by private philanthropists as far back as the 19th century, Japan has made significant progress in changing public attitudes towards offenders who have embarked on a path of rehabilitation and resocialization. On the basis of academic works and publications, this study highlights the persistence of the communal worldview and consequently, society’s attitude towards deviant behavior in the country during the post-war years, despite large-scale transformations in various spheres of Japanese society. Attention is paid to the concepts of guilt and shame in Japanese culture, and the reintegrative nature of shame is emphasized, which undoubtedly has a significant influence on the successful social reintegration of former offenders in Japan. It is concluded that a distinctive feature of Japanese society in the context of the resocialization of offenders is the fact that responsibility for returning offenders to a lawabiding life is assumed not only by their families, who traditionally constitute the key social unit in this regard, but also community voluntary organizations, of which there are a considerable number in Japan, which shoulder a significant burden of responsibility. Japan’s modern probation and rehabilitation services owe their early emergence to the efforts of private philanthropists, whose legacy also lives on in the numerous private organizations of today, which selflessly assist society in reintegrating offenders into social life. The article examines the activities of non-governmental organizations in the field of the reintegration of convicted offenders, including the Nationwide Organization of Offenders Employment Support Providers and the Movement Towards a Brighter Society, the Women’s Association for Rehabilitation Aid and the Japan Federation for Big Brothers and Sisters. Considerable attention is paid to the country’s established probation service, which is based on a corps of voluntary probation officers known as hogoshi. The conclusion is drawn that, within Japan’s penitentiary culture, particular emphasis is placed on the social rehabilitation of offenders, encompassing reform, resocialization, and reintegration.
The article analyzes the content, dynamics, and prospects of security cooperation between Japan and ASEAN countries against the backdrop of intensifying strategic competition with China. The relevance of the study is determined by the revitalization of comprehensive cooperation between Tokyo and the states of Southeast Asia, which gained additional momentum after 2022 due to the growth of regional tensions and the reassessment of Japan's role in the region, reflected in the revision of its key conceptual documents in the field of security and defense. The paper examines the key parameters of Tokyo's regional strategy, including the concept of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), and its instrumental implementation within the framework of defense cooperation policies with Southeast Asian countries. The normative and institutional framework of this cooperation is analyzed, from the conclusion of the “Vientiane Vision" to the launch of the JASMINE initiative in 2023, as well as the mechanisms for its implementation, in particular the launch of the “Official Security Assistance" (OSA) program. It is revealed that the issue of territorial disputes in the South China Sea serves as the primary driver for the intensification of Japan’s ASEAN-oriented defense diplomacy. The case of deepening military and political interaction with the Philippines and its engagement in minilateral frameworks (JAPHUS, SQUAD) is examined in detail. The article concludes that Japan seeks, through the introduction of new foreign policy tools and the promotion of minilateral cooperation frameworks, to secure its status as a significant regional power capable of contributing to the construction of a regional security architecture by providing “public goods" and projecting its normative power. Acting as a secondary power and guided by the logic of leadership contestation, Japan strives to prevent China from reshaping the regional order in its favor. Simultaneously, the article outlines the main internal (constitutional constraints, public sentiment) and external challenges (China's counterstrategy, which combines both economic incentives and inclusive multilateral diplomacy as opposed to exclusive minilateral frameworks) that limit its capabilities in regional rivalry with the PRC.
