This paper examines the structure, dynamics, and effects of hybrid threats, focusing on Montenegro's experience and positioning with respect to NATO and the European Union. Using a comparative and empirical framework, itanalyses institutional vulnerabilities, the role of proxy actors, cyber-attacks, and regional resilience practices. The study draws on policy documents and reports from NATO, the EU, the UK FCDO, and local research centres, the Digital Forensic Centre (DFC) and the Centre for Democratic Transition (CDT), as well as comparative data from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Albania. Through a case study of Montenegro, the paper maps key vectors of hybrid action: cyber-attacks targeting electoral processes and critical infrastructure, media-narrative campaigns aimed at delegitimising Euro-Atlantic integration, the operation of proxy actors linking domestic political and religious structures to external centres of influence, and economic and energy penetration that constrains institutional autonomy. A comparative regional analysis reveals shared patterns of sequential attack, whereby initial cyber incidents are amplified by subsequent disinformation campaigns, while highlighting differences in institutional resilience across the Western Balkans. The findings indicate that Montenegro's primary weaknesses lie in the fragmentation of its security sector, insufficient inter-institutional coordination, limited digital literacy, and a reactive rather than preventive approach to hybrid threats. The paper concludes with policy recommendations centred on the establishment of a national hybrid-threat monitoring centre, the introduction of digital and media literacy programmes, greater transparency in financing flows, and enhanced regional and international cooperation.
Western-centric and Russian-centric views of Truth exist in fundamentally different epistemological universes: a cognitive division that stems from the rationalism of the Enlightenment, compared to the Byzantine Orthodox concept of “Sophia”. The article examines how a clash between the Western concept of Truth as an objective, empirically verifiable search for knowledge through reason (Kant, 1784/1996) and Russian epistemology, which places a strong focus on holistic wisdom, spiritual insight, and ideological coherence (Florensky, 1914/1997), causes conflict. The epistemic gap itself creates structurally open conditions for disinformation tactics and information operations. While rational discourse in the West assumes a commitment to truth-seeking, Russian strategic communication thrives in a paradigm, where Truth is instrumental, subordinated to power, and ultimately pluralistic in Nietzschean terms (Nietzsche, 1873/1979). In part inspired by philosophy (Kant, Heidegger, Foucault), theology (Florensky, Lossky), and security studies (Giles, 2016; Pomerantsev, 2014), the article details the friction between Enlightenment rationality and Slavophile Eurasianist holism and its impact forn the current information threats. In particular, the analysis illustrates how this bifurcation facilitates the adoption of both disinformation tactics and reflexive control techniques (Thomas, 2004) that exploit Western epistemological presuppositions. And familiarity with this gap is crucial for constructing effective response models and enhancing democratic resilience in the face of hybrid threats and interferences.
Local dynamics are crucial for uncovering Russian influence operations and understanding how Russia operates. In Serbia, pairing memory politics with state capture strategies proves to be a powerful tool for both local elites and Russian activities. Memory politics enables Serbian elites and nationalists to exploit historical grievances, garnering support and legitimizing their narratives, which often hinders democratic progress and social cohesion in both Serbia and its neighbouring countries. State capture facilitates this by enabling media, judiciary, and security institutions to propagate the regime’s ideological agenda. This troubling dynamic extends beyond the ruling party, as large parts of the Serbian opposition also embrace nationalist narratives, thereby limiting democratic pluralism and prolonging the influence of nationalism, even in the event of potential regime changes. Serbia uses its ethnic minorities in Bosnia and Kosovo as proxies to stall state-building and exacerbate divisions, perpetuating identity-based conflicts that impede institutional stability in the region. The vulnerabilities of the Serbian nation across its borders create opportunities for exploitation by Russia, especially in the context of recent events in the Balkans and the Ukraine War. Moreover, Serbia's situation highlights similar risks in divided countries like Georgia, Moldova, and Montenegro. To effectively counter Russian foreign policy, it is crucial to understand the local causes, drivers, and potential triggers of instability.
Today, national security services of EU member states are faced with a situation in which they must preserve their own integrity but at the same time elevate intelligence cooperation in response to increasingly global threats and an increasingly global array of accessible data. The main obstacle to the development of intelligence cooperation at the Union level is the lack of trust—both of member states towards the Union, and among the member states themselves. On the other hand, external threats have always exerted a cohesive influence on this aspect of member state cooperation. In order to successfully balance these two tendencies, such cooperation should be based on common interests. Furthermore, this cooperation should not be too formal, and it should be regulated either by national laws or bilateral/multilateral agreements. The intelligence cooperation of the Union member states within the Union should not be formed by taking over the rights of member states as guaranteed by Union law, but rather within existing forms of cooperation.
The article traces the main lessons of Russian-Ukrainian war as of 2025. Recognizing the conflict in its continuity since 2014 as transformative for contemporary international relations, it offers a structured periodization and names the important stages. Five key lessons are identified: the return of industrial-scale warfare, the importance of strategic communication, fragmentation of the existing global order, the crisis in strategic imagination as well as the risks of conflict spillover. The study concludes that international relations are in the era of great-power competition with no clear vision of a sustainable security order.
