
A postphenomenological analysis of Facebook, revealing the four ways that users can interact with Facebook, and the dangers this represents.
Copyright 2006. All rights reserved. See www.TheNewAtlantis.com for more information. In the debate about the moral standing of human embryos, some defenders of embryo-destructive research have claimed that human embryos are not human beings until implantation (i.e., when the embryo attaches to the uterus, approximately six days after fertilization), and others have claimed that they are not human beings until gastrulation (i.e., when the possibility of twinning no longer exists and the primitive neural streak first appears, approximately 14 days after fertilization). These claims have been repeated by policymakers, scientists, and bioethicists alike, yet they fly in the face of the embryological evidence. Seeing why will put the embryo research debate on a more solid biological footing.
In many realms of life there are questions that never really go away. We address them more or less satisfactorily, and, for a time, they recede from the center of our attention. Yet, because they are important, they are likely to reappear and again demand our consideration. In the realm of bioethics one such question is whether it could be right to increase the supply of organs for transplant by providing financial incentives for those who supply their organs or, even, by establishing some kind of market for the sale of organs. (Whether the market should work only for sellers or for buyers also is, of course, one aspect of this recurring issue.) Such questions have received attention in the past, but in recent years—fueled by longer waiting lists for transplantation—they have returned to the center of bioethical concern. In May, 2006, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) released a report (titled, Organ Donation: Opportunities for Action) that recommended against using financial incentives to boost organ supply. The report did, however, propose some other means aimed at achieving the same goal—in particular, increasing the rate of organ procurement from those who die suddenly of cardiac arrest. On May 15, 2006, responses to this report appeared on the op-ed pages of both the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. Sally Satel (in the Times) and Richard Epstein (in the Journal) attacked the IOM report for its “timid,” “narrowminded,” and “unimaginative” thinking. “The key lesson in all this,” wrote Epstein, “is that we should look with deep suspicion on any blanket objection to market incentives—especially from high-minded moralists who have convinced themselves that their aesthetic sensibilities and instinctive revulsion should trump any humane efforts to save lives.” Although this is a serious challenge, it is, I think, a forgetful and a misleading one. Forgetful, because it has lost contact with the reasons that moved our society to turn to an organ procurement system based on giving (even if for a variety of motives, not all of which need be altruistic). Misleading, because in its animus against moralism it adopts a too simple moral position for which saving of lives always has trump. The questions that need asking are not aesthetic but anthropological, and it would be a shame if we were to become tone deaf to such questions, however difficult to articulate they may be. So, for instance, we must ask: Even Gifts of the Body Gilbert Meilaender