This article explains how the cyber domain today largely replicates the patterns of devolution and fragmentation observed in the electromagnetic spectrum (EM) and aviation domains more than a century ago. Both remained fragmented under duress of heightened Great Power rivalries and tensions coinciding with World War I and World War II. Relevant history demonstrates that once fragmented under Great Power duress, global domains with obvious incentives for pursuing mutual gains remain fragmented—often until after a severe clash of Great Power militaries. The ongoing cyber domain fragmentation under the pressure of increasing Great Power stress is destined to persist and will render moot legal and diplomatic efforts to constrain risky strategic cyber competition between them. Successful American strategic competition in cyberspace below the threshold of armed conflict requires all national instruments of cyber power—including military ones—be utilized in persistent and assertive strategic cyber-campaigning against Russian and Chinese cyber campaigns that aim for strategically significant erosion of western relative power and cohesion.
In an era defined by intense competition with China and Russia, Washington faces a crucial challenge: how to reconcile its ideological commitments with the pragmatic needs of global geopolitics. This article argues for forming pragmatic coalitions that include illiberal regimes, noting that key geopolitical partners in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East are often less than ideal from a liberal democratic perspective. However, deterring revisionist challenges will remain an utmost priority for the United States, and achieving it would likely require diplomatic flexibility.
For the last thirty years, US grand strategy has been predicated on an expansive definition of US interests and optimistic assessments of US capabilities. In the changed global conditions of the 2020s, a fresh look at American global engagement needs to determine where, when, and under what conditions the United States ought to intervene. Thinking in terms of a national security “butterfly effect” and balancing that risk assessment against the realities of the “Lippmann Gap” (where strategic aspirations cannot exceed actual capabilities) produces a series of grand strategic options for policymakers.
This article reviews prominent definitions of global competency, explores the available (though limited) current evidence for its potential benefits, and offers recommendations for framing an understanding of the salience of global affairs education within theories of national security and related practice. The article identifies three potential pathways through which global competency benefits security. First, global competency—especially through phased primary, secondary and tertiary educational models—may contribute to a stronger and more competitive workforce in direct and indirect ways, in turn enhancing a country’s innovative capacities and economic and military power and resilience to shocks. Second, global competency can serve as a form of public diplomacy, in turn supporting a country’s soft power and global influence. Third, global competency can strengthen domestic institutions, combatting dis/misinformation about global issues and reducing vulnerability to malign actors who aim to leverage inaccurate and fear-based messages about the world to influence and destabilize foreign electorates.
