ABSTRACT In a number of influential works, Kit Fine has developed a novel account of foundational metaphysics. Fine defends the view that the foundational question of ontology is concerned with what is real, and that the aim of foundational metaphysics is to provide a complete description of Reality. This paper examines whether such a metaphysical aim is achievable. I argue that this project faces a trilemma, showing that Fine's conception of totality fails to secure closure and, therefore, that his metaphysical description of Reality cannot be completed.
ABSTRACT Some have argued that talk of the body or one's body in philosophical discussions is conceptually confused. In this paper, I provide an analysis of what “ x 's body” means that I believe overcomes difficulties raised for other suggested definitions. The definition of “ x 's body” provided here serves to vindicate talk of one's body in philosophical discussions, showing that it is not conceptually suspect as some have claimed. Knowing what makes something one's body will presumably also be of some use when trying to answer difficult questions regarding how we relate to our bodies (whether we are identical with our bodies, whether we are constituted by them, whether they are a part of us, etc.).
ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to investigate the justification of what I call policial obligation , a standing pro tanto moral obligation to obey police directives. I examine the philosophical importance of different theories of political obligation for the case of policing and argue that, in the United States, there are strong reasons to doubt that there is such an obligation.
ABSTRACT Discussions of style in contemporary analytic philosophy have been confined almost exclusively to aesthetics, yet many bodily actions seem to exhibit styles as well. We can have an aggressive or a placid style of driving; a sloppy or a meticulous style of washing the dishes; an idiomatic or a weird way of playing jazz. We often use the notion of style not just to catalogue different behavioral patterns, but also to explain, predict, and excuse them. In this paper, I develop and defend a novel and substantive account of style, and I argue that all our habitual and skilled bodily actions are styled in this sense. The phenomenon of style turns out to far outstrip artistic performances and to constitute an important dimension of our agency. No theory of human action, then, can be considered comprehensive if it cannot account for action styles.
Philosophical concepts of sexual orientation understand it in terms of sex/gender-based attraction. I argue that this lacks proper justification by rejecting seven reasons given in its support. I defend the broader "General Concept": One's sexual orientation consists of those sexual attractions that are stable and important to one's psychosexual identity. I explain and defend these two conditions and then provide six reasons in support of the General Concept. I conclude with a possible world in which our concept of sexual orientation is age based so as to clarify how our current concepts of sexual orientation are products of our contingent history.
