ABSTRACT This article discusses three interpretations of cosmic significance, all of which reveal something important about the notion of significance. Along the way, it proposes a unified view of significance by combining elements of each of the views. It then moves on to analyse space endeavours, considering these views to investigate whether there are any grounds for thinking that grandiose space projects could be significant on the cosmic scale. Of the three space endeavours examined, planetary seeding fares best for cosmic significance. Nonetheless, this does not mean that we ought to seed planets, since the value of such activity remains uncertain, and in general significance is not something that we should have pro‐attitudes towards, as also malign things can be important.
ABSTRACT Descartes' cogito argument is perhaps the most well‐known philosophical argument, the conclusion of which is supposed to be a form of rationalism that allows for contingent a priori knowledge of the world. In this short note, I argue that, in fact, the all important statement, ‘I am, I exist’, should be analysed through the lens of (classical) two‐dimensional semantics (a la Kaplan and Evans). Once we do this, I argue, we find that even though the thought is always true when thought, it does not express a deep contingency (as per Evans). That is, it does not result in substantive knowledge of the world. I note that it might also not be superficially contingent, but something more nuanced in between due to the performative nature of the thought.
ABSTRACT According to the deprivation account of the badness of death, death is bad for the one who dies because it deprives her of goods she would otherwise have enjoyed. This view faces the so‐called symmetry problem when one considers prenatal nonexistence. Scholars have proposed various solutions to this problem, but all of them encounter their own difficulties. In this paper, I propose a new solution to the symmetry problem. The symmetry problem focuses on the rationality of regretting death and prenatal nonexistence. However, the meaning of rationality in the symmetry problem is ambiguous as it stands and can be further clarified. I argue that, once the meaning of rationality has been clarified, then it becomes apparent that the symmetry problem fails. Consequently, the apparent force of the symmetry problem stems from an obscurity in the meaning of rationality. I also argue that my solution avoids difficulties with the most prominent solutions to the symmetry problem.
Metaethical quietists propose views that share all the features of robust non-naturalist realism, such as a commitment to cognitivism and irreducibly normative truths, except robust realist non-naturalists' commitment to non-natural properties. In this paper I propose a version of quietism which holds that true first-order claims about practical reasons are made true by being the conclusion of the best reasoning process about what practical reasons there are but true claims about what is the best reasoning process about normative practical reasons are not made true by either non-natural properties or natural properties. I call this view Quietist Constructivism (QC). I first argue that QC gives quietists the resources to explain why there are no non-natural properties but there are non-natural truths. I then explain how QC may give non-naturalists the resources to solve two of the most significant problems that non-naturalists face. I argue that QC has important resources that seem to enable it to solve the reliability and supervenience problems for non-naturalism in ways that robust realist non-naturalism and non-constructivist quietism cannot. Finally, I discuss some challenges that QC faces and argue that it seems that they can be overcome.
