ABSTRACT Descartes' cogito argument is perhaps the most well‐known philosophical argument, the conclusion of which is supposed to be a form of rationalism that allows for contingent a priori knowledge of the world. In this short note, I argue that, in fact, the all important statement, ‘I am, I exist’, should be analysed through the lens of (classical) two‐dimensional semantics (a la Kaplan and Evans). Once we do this, I argue, we find that even though the thought is always true when thought, it does not express a deep contingency (as per Evans). That is, it does not result in substantive knowledge of the world. I note that it might also not be superficially contingent, but something more nuanced in between due to the performative nature of the thought.
ABSTRACT According to the deprivation account of the badness of death, death is bad for the one who dies because it deprives her of goods she would otherwise have enjoyed. This view faces the so‐called symmetry problem when one considers prenatal nonexistence. Scholars have proposed various solutions to this problem, but all of them encounter their own difficulties. In this paper, I propose a new solution to the symmetry problem. The symmetry problem focuses on the rationality of regretting death and prenatal nonexistence. However, the meaning of rationality in the symmetry problem is ambiguous as it stands and can be further clarified. I argue that, once the meaning of rationality has been clarified, then it becomes apparent that the symmetry problem fails. Consequently, the apparent force of the symmetry problem stems from an obscurity in the meaning of rationality. I also argue that my solution avoids difficulties with the most prominent solutions to the symmetry problem.
Metaethical quietists propose views that share all the features of robust non-naturalist realism, such as a commitment to cognitivism and irreducibly normative truths, except robust realist non-naturalists' commitment to non-natural properties. In this paper I propose a version of quietism which holds that true first-order claims about practical reasons are made true by being the conclusion of the best reasoning process about what practical reasons there are but true claims about what is the best reasoning process about normative practical reasons are not made true by either non-natural properties or natural properties. I call this view Quietist Constructivism (QC). I first argue that QC gives quietists the resources to explain why there are no non-natural properties but there are non-natural truths. I then explain how QC may give non-naturalists the resources to solve two of the most significant problems that non-naturalists face. I argue that QC has important resources that seem to enable it to solve the reliability and supervenience problems for non-naturalism in ways that robust realist non-naturalism and non-constructivist quietism cannot. Finally, I discuss some challenges that QC faces and argue that it seems that they can be overcome.
Intuitions are sometimes conceived as intellectual perceptions. They share with physical perceptions being direct and, in that way, non-inferential. Contemporary epistemologists tend to consider all knowledge dependent in some way on perception but not as requiring countenancing abstract objects. We do, however, speak of seeing truths of logic and mathematics, even if we do not view the abstracta they apparently concern as in the causal order. How, then, is knowing them possible if, as is quite plausible, knowledge depends on a causal connection between objects known and beliefs constituting knowledge of them? Much language concerning abstracta-using "seeing", "grasping", "perceiving", and the like-invites comparing the apprehension of abstract entities with the perception of concrete entities. How much like perception of the physical is apprehension of the abstract? And can an account of perception encompass both? Might intuition, taken as apprehension in the way W. D. Ross did, be a kind of intellectual perception and, if so, must there be a causal element in it after all? This paper draws on an overall account of perception to frame a theory that provides for an ontology applicable to perception of the physical, apprehension of the abstract, and knowledge of the normative.
The world appears to be in a constant state of flux, with objects changing and events unfolding over time. I refer to this characterisation as the Manifest Dynamic World. I have argued elsewhere that the Manifest Dynamic World involves two fundamentally distinct kinds of dynamism that cannot be reduced to one another: the dynamic character of change and the dynamic character of time. The former concerns the dynamic aspect of objects changing and moving, while the latter concerns the sense of events changing their temporal position. If I am correct, we should adopt what I call the Independence Approach, according to which each distinct kind of dynamism presented in the Manifest Dynamic World must be explained on its own terms, thereby avoiding the conflation of two fundamentally different phenomena. I argue that the block universe contains genuinely dynamic processes, which in turn account for the dynamic character of change. By contrast, I suggest that the dynamic character of time is a false belief generated by our cognitive system. Thus, the Manifest Dynamic World consists of veridical dynamic experiences of objects changing and moving, jointly with a false belief, generated by our cognitive system, that events change their temporal position.
Some beliefs, positive and negative attitudes, and desires fit their objects. Others do not. This paper considers whether consequentialist ethics can plausibly be reconciled with the fittingness of beliefs, positive and negative attitudes, and desires. Then the paper turns to what consequentialist ethics can consistently say about the fittingness of acts.
One classic objection to Objectivism about ought is that it recommends unconscionably risky actions in so-called Three-Option-Cases, the most famous of which is Jackson's case featuring a doctor called Jill. Some philosophers deny this orthodoxy and claim that Objectivism can yet account for our intuitions in such cases. In this paper, I critically evaluate such attempts and draw some more general lessons about Objectivism's ability to deal with risk and recklessness. I argue that an adequate form of Objectivism must make room for a distinctly moral relevance of recklessness. To assess Objectivism's chances of doing so, I make an important distinction between two ways in which risks can matter morally. As I argue, the kind of relevance which is required for extensionally adequate verdicts in all Three-Option-Cases is inevitably incompatible with all plausible forms of Objectivism.
In bioethics, two sorts of normative categories are commonly used. These can be split into two families: the deontic categories, such as 'right', 'ought to' and 'requirement', and the evaluative categories, including 'good', 'bad', 'better than' and 'the best'. While other normative concepts such as 'virtue' and 'vice' have also been discussed, the aptic categories, including 'fitting', 'appropriate' and 'merited' have received little to no attention from bioethicists. Drawing on Philip Stratton-Lake's important contributions to the metaethical literature on the aptic categories, this paper investigates the role of fittingness in bioethics. To this end, we first establish four characteristic features of the aptic categories. We then show how fittingness can be applied in four areas of bioethical research, before considering some objections. We conclude that there is much to be gained by expanding the dialogue between recent metaethical work on the aptic categories and practical ethics.
Most na & iuml;ve realists do not distinguish between perception and consciousness; to say that I perceive the table is akin to saying that I am conscious of the table. Doing so leads many to maintain that if the character of experience is constituted by anything other than the table, I do not perceive it, and so na & iuml;ve realism fails. I argue that although most attempts to account for the character in terms of what I perceive fail, na & iuml;ve realism is not affected, and an account of the character of experience can still be offered. I do so by proposing a version of na & iuml;ve realism-called Neo-Reidian Na & iuml;ve Realism-suggested by a study of Thomas Reid's work. Reid distinguishes between perception and consciousness, and based on this distinction, I propose that in perception I stand in a relation to the world, and the character is constituted by qualia.
How to understand metaphysical disputes is a disputed matter. Within this broader dispute, deflationist approaches read some of the traditional metaphysical debates as having metalinguistic negotiations at their roots. That is, some metaphysical disagreements are read as speakers commending each other to use some concepts over others. Thomasson's Easy Ontology exemplifies this view. In this paper, I introduce the Second-Order Moral Twin-Earth [SOMTE], a thought experiment designed to test whether such a deflationist strategy can account for disputes about metanormative realism. I argue that [SOMTE] shows two patently disagreeing positions within this debate whose incompatibility can't be properly characterised by this deflationist treatment. Given the commitments of the metanormative positions in dispute, I show that the strategy of translating the metaphysical disagreement into metalinguistic disputes proves unavailable. I conclude that [SOMTE] poses a challenge to the adequacy of this deflationist treatment in the metanormative domain.
In the social world, our lives are informed, impacted, and controlled by time. Behind this grand saying there is the phenomenon of making time. More precisely, there are acts and processes, largely conventional and oftentimes institutional, that create temporal fiat objects (TFOs for short). A TFO is an abstract entity set with temporal boundaries, much like a national park is a creatable spatial fiat object with spatial boundaries. In this paper, I construct an ontology of TFOs and argue that it is explanatorily useful for understanding how TFOs are created and maintained (often at the hands of those in power) and for solving justice issues that arise from TFOs generated in morally problematic ways. The explanatory utility of the theory provides one reason to believe that the theory is true. A comprehensive social metaphysics should make room for such temporal entities in the social world.
This paper examines whether grounding can be naturalized. We adopt a tripartite framework-Ocat (scientific catalogue of existents), Otyp (ontological types), and metaphysics (natures/modal profiles)-and show that classifying as such the relata of putative grounding claims forces a dilemma. When the relata belong to Ocat, 'ground' merely paraphrases logical or scientific explanatory relations already available and adds no explanatory value. When they belong to Otyp or to metaphysics, the relation floats free of scientific warrant and cannot be naturalized. Surveying canonical cases (Fine; Schaffer) and general programs (monism; ontic structural realism), we conclude that naturalistic grounds of grounding are unavailable: the notion is either otiose to the scientific discourse, adding nothing to it, or detrimental if competing with it.
Saul Kripke introduced the notion of rigid designation for singular terms to disprove the description theory of meaning for names, and to argue that true identity statements with rigid designators are necessarily true, although a posteriori. He proceeded to apply the notion to general terms for natural kinds, stuffs and phenomena, and claimed that true theoretical identifications with rigid general terms are also necessary a posteriori truths. Michael Devitt pointed out that, regardless of whether general terms are taken to designate their extensions or abstract entities, rigid designation cannot single out the terms Kripke considered rigid. Devitt suggested that, in the case of general terms, rigid designation should be replaced with a notion of rigid application, where rigid appliers stand for essential properties. He showed that rigid application allows for creating 'lost rigidity arguments' against description theories of meaning for natural kind terms, but that it cannot ensure the necessity of true theoretical identifications with rigid appliers. In this paper, I will argue that necessitism, that is, the claim that anything which exists in any possible world exists in every possible world, is both necessary and sufficient to bridge the gap between rigid application and metaphysical necessity.
If life is absurd in that we cannot help but desire the unattainable, then there is prima facie reason to lament the absurd whenever we are confronted with it. This is an intuitive idea: it is fitting to be disappointed by what is essentially disappointing. But if there is nothing we can do about the absurdity of life, we may have reason to minimize awareness of it. My paper explores this hyporeflective response. I present an initial case for hyporeflectivism-what I call the argument from irremediability. I proceed to argue that the hyporeflectivist can overcome three difficulties (the unavoidability objection, the involuntarist objection, and the truthfulness objection). They are hard-pressed, however, to overcome the pyrrhic objection: in avoiding the negatively evaluative feelings associated with a desire for the unattainable, we may lose more than we gain.
I examine five principles about the metaphysics of properties, each of which has been defended in the literature: (1) the sum of properties is their corresponding conjunctive property, (2) the mereology of properties is classical, (3) properties are individuated by necessary co-instantiation, (4) sums of objects belonging to different categories do not belong to the category of any of their parts, and (5) there is at least a property necessarily instantiated by every individual. I prove that this package of views entails that there is exactly one property. Since this conclusion is highly implausible, I will discuss some ways of modifying the package in order to avoid it.
Political compromises are common. Parties that seek to influence society must inevitably make them. Populists often criticize such compromises, as compromising implies that an ideal outcome will not be achieved. In general, political compromises evoke strong emotions, particularly when they are perceived as problematic-morally or otherwise. In this paper, I will examine whether the moral norms that govern compromise are specific to it. I evaluate Fabian Wendt's view that "deontic restrictions"-limits on what we are morally permitted to do-are not specific to the morality of compromise. I offer critical remarks on Wendt's argument, though I do not claim that his position fails. However, I argue that there is a sense in which the rules of compromise are specific. When compromises are regarded as morally bad, certain moral norms play a particularly prominent role. These norms are more frequently invoked than others and, in this respect, function as specific rules that mark the limits of compromise.
The revelation thesis, namely the claim that introspection or phenomenal concepts reveal the full essence of conscious states, has recently become a central topic in the philosophy of mind. On the one hand, many argue that the plausibility of anti-physicalist arguments (such as conceivability arguments) depends on it. On the other hand, the revival of panpsychism has also invoked the revelation thesis against physicalism. However, physicalists have pointed out that if the revelation thesis is true, panpsychism faces a parallel difficulty. David Chalmers has proposed a strategy, which I call the distinction strategy (DS) that seeks to defend panpsychism by distinguishing between the essence of phenomenal properties and their grounds. However, this proposal faces a dilemma: either it fails to genuinely rescue panpsychism, or it can equally be used to rescue physicalism. Consequently, Chalmers's proposal does not render panpsychism superior to physicalism, and the revelation thesis cannot serve as a reliable weapon for panpsychists against physicalism. Finally, this paper will offer further reflections on this debate.
As AI grows ever more complex and ubiquitous, its moral status becomes increasingly pressing. But knowing whether an AI has moral status is only part of the ethical puzzle. To determine how we ought to treat such entities, we must know not only whether AIs have moral status, but also about the content of their interests-what contributes to their wellbeing. This paper will survey different accounts of wellbeing, arguing that regardless of which theory one accepts, our epistemic position regarding AI interests is radically impoverished. The central difficulty is that it cannot be taken for granted that the behavioral and linguistic outputs of artificial systems correspond to inner experiences and mental contents in the same way as they do for evolved organisms. This argument does not entail an absolute prohibition on creating such AIs, but it does reveal significant, underappreciated, risks involved in doing so.
