It can seem that the point of the finitude argument put forward by the meaning sceptic in Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is merely that of undermining a particular approach to meaning, the dispositionalist approach. I argue that Kripke's remarks about finitude have a more universal purport than has been recognized. They supply the materials for a better understanding of the kind of creatures we are and of the kind of phenomenon meaning is.
By analogy with Kripke's claim that no fact of the matter can determine the meaning of a word, the sceptical paradox of implementation is an argument to the conclusion that no fact of the matter can determine the function of a computational artefact. The paradox targets the prevailing view within the philosophy of computer science, according to which the function of a computational artefact is to be identified with the content of its functional specification, a mathematical object that formalises the intentions of the artefact's designer. In existing formulations, such a view requires the existence of certain semantic intentions in the head of the designer. However, if we accept Kripke's claim that there is no such thing as a mental state of semantic intention, this leaves ultimately indeterminate what is the function implemented by a computational artefact. Just as Kripke's solution to the paradox requires replacing the received conception of language with a very different one, so the sceptical paradox for computational artefacts forces us to explore a new perspective on computational artefacts that, this time, does without semantic intentions.
This paper proposes an account of extended personhood and identity, and argues that personhood ought to be understood in forensic terms. The proposed account utilizes the extended mind thesis in conjunction with a substantially modified version of Robert Nozick's Closest Continuer Theory (CCT). In addition to offering an account of extended identity, the ensuing externalist reading of Nozick's CCT solves a longstand-ing problem with Nozick's account. Nozick argues that temporal identification of persons depends, in large part, on the person's own subjective metric. While this is an innovative approach to diachronic personal identity, the potential for excessive subjectivity is also one of the problematic features of Nozick's CCT. This paper argues, however, that even though Nozick is not an externalist with regard to personal identity or cognition, nevertheless, given Nozick's broader philosophical contemplations, an extended or externalist reading remains logically consistent with Nozick's general conclusions. Moreover, the proposed reframing of the CCT in externalist terms buttresses Nozick's argument as the amended neo-Nozickean account helps to properly curb the subjectivity inherent in the CCT enough to avoid absurd identifications while retaining the focus on subjective self-formation, which is integral to Nozick's innovative proposal.
What is it for an agent to follow a rule, rather than merely act in accordance with it? An intuitive and plausible answer to this question is that to follow a rule is to perform an intentional act such that S follows a rule R iff S intends to act in accordance with R and subsequently acts on that intention. This intentional account of rule-following faces essentially two problems, widely seen as fatal: (1) Kripkean sceptical arguments, originally derived from Wittgenstein, suggesting that the requirements of a rule outstrip the possible content of our intention, and (2) a regress argument due to Boghossian, namely that the intentional view requires the agent to represent the conditional content of the rule in such a way that an inferential step is needed for the agent to move from the antecedent to the consequent, which, given some plausible assumptions about inference, leads to a regress. In this paper, I will defend the intentional view of rule-following, using a game-theoretic account of semantic content outlined in Berg (2022) and Berg (forthcoming). I will argue that by placing the agent in the basic constitutive practice of using the terms that figure in an expression of the rule, we can give an answer to (1). Likewise, by positing that the agents have an in-built mental mechanism which is such that it responds to the constitutive structure of the content being represented (see Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum 2018) and by placing the resulting movement of thought in a basic constitutive practice of inferring, we can avoid Boghossian's regress.
Over the past decade, the internet has witnessed a proliferation of AI companies claiming to enable bereaved individuals to create griefbots of their deceased loved ones. Griefbots are generative AI conversational systems fine-tuned on the digital remains of the deceased to imitate their linguistic and behavioural patterns. Scholars have examined various advantages and drawbacks associated with incorporating griefbots into the mourning process. Krueger and Osler (2022) have discussed griefbots as potential transitional objects that assist bereaved individuals in readjusting to daily life following their loss and in reformulating their relationship with the deceased as a continuing bond. Stokes (2021) has focused on the ethical concerns surrounding these technologies, particularly regarding the potential violation of the deceased's rights and dignity. Lindemann (2022) has analysed the risk factors associated with griefbot use, advocating for their regulated implementation as a possible aid for individuals experiencing prolonged grief disorder. The present analysis focuses on the implications of griefbot use for the bereaved's wellbeing and autonomy. Section 1 provides a definition and comparison of the Freudian relinquishment theory and the continuing bonds perspective. Section 2 outlines Krueger and Osler's (2022) and Stokes's (2021) positions concerning griefbots. Section 3 examines potential risks associated with these technologies in the grieving process. First, it considers whether griefbots can be classified as transitional objects in comparison with other affective artifacts. Secondly, it explores the possibility of self-deception among grieving users when interacting with griefbots. Thirdly, it analyses the potential risk of isolation and detachment from reality resulting from such interactions. Finally, Section 4 proposes how the representational model of griefbots could mitigate the aforementioned risks.
