Trade among major powers is never purely economic; it is also a site of political conflict over blame, threat, and national interest. Why, then, do legislators facing similar trade shocks respond in such different ways? Focusing on US Senate rhetoric on trade with China between 2009 and 2023, this paper examines how partisanship conditions the translation of economic disruption into elite political speech. Drawing on sentiment analysis of Senate floor speeches and state-level measures of Chinese import exposure across two periods, it develops a partisan-conditioning argument: trade disruption acquires political meaning as parties interpret it. Democratic senators grew markedly more critical as local import exposure increased, especially under the earlier China Shock window. Republicans showed a much flatter response to early-period exposure and even a slightly positive association with later-period penetration. The China Shock left a durable mark on Senate discourse, but one structured by party, not geography alone.
Should all European Union (EU) citizens enjoy the same welfare benefits as nationals when they migrate within Europe? Which categories of EU migrants (workers, job-seekers and non-economically active ones) should be entitled to full equal treatment? I discuss reciprocity as a moral basis of EU law, extending White's account of fair reciprocity to the supranational context of the EU. I suggest that the concept of workers in EU law should be reformed to account for a plurality of valuable contributions. I also discuss the implications of reciprocity in non-ideal conditions, arguing that EU migrants have a reduced contributive obligation when they face injustice in the host member state. The seriousness of such injustice may even imply lifting the contributive obligation entirely. The contributive obligation of non-economically active individuals is a duty to seek work, and I suggest it entitles them to limited equal treatment.
Research on the participation effects of deliberative mini-publics has often focused on political opinions and knowledge, but less is known about the effects on confidence in deliberation and political talk. Given widespread concerns about eroding tolerance and trust in democracy, deliberation should ideally contribute to citizens’ ability to engage in political talk, as well as the confidence that such talk is possible and worthwhile. Following Dahl’s strong principle of equality, we argue that it is important that citizens believe that other people are capable of contributing. Thus, this study asks whether participation in mini-publics fosters confidence in political talk, measured by internal political efficacy, confidence in others’ democratic abilities and tolerance for opposing views. Using before–after surveys from three Swedish mini-publics in 2024, we find significant increases in participants’ confidence in their own abilities and those of co-participants, despite high baseline values. Effects on perceptions of people in general and tolerance for disagreement were mixed. When comparing cases, we find stronger effects when participants had more deliberation time and when the issue of the assembly was more politicised. The findings suggest that mini-publics can enhance confidence in political talk, depending on their design, duration and context.
Drawing on an inductive analysis of 21 interviews with women candidates at the 2024 elections in Belgium, our article questions how the perpetuation of sexism in politics is facilitated by its invisibilization, even among its victims. First, we show that despite an awareness of the prevalence of sexism in politics, women candidates often struggle to clearly identify its expressions. We show how the type of target (candidates' profile), the type of sexism (benevolent vs hostile), and the context of its expression (online vs offline) affect the type of mechanisms women candidates turn to, but that it ultimately all leads to the same outcome: the invisibilization of sexism and its disconnect from candidates' experience. We argue that the mechanisms uncovered can serve as an analytical grid in other contexts. Our findings call for a reconsideration of how sexism in politics is defined, understood, measured, and addressed by actors and institutions.
How does political humour influence affective polarisation? In today’s media landscape, humour is increasingly used to ridicule political opponents, potentially deepening partisan divides. At the same time, humour may mitigate polarisation by evoking positive emotions and softening reactions to political critique. To date, it remains unclear whether intergroup political humour affects polarisation differently from equivalent non-humorous content. We address this question using a survey experiment in Great Britain ( n = 2011 ) with a 2×3 factorial design varying in message tone (humorous or non-humorous) and target (in-group, out-group or non-political). We find that serious in-group criticism increases affective polarisation, as measured by trait-based evaluations. Notably, this effect is significantly attenuated when the same messages are delivered humorously. Humour, therefore, reduces polarisation in situations that would otherwise provoke defensive reactions among group members. Mediation analyses provide suggestive evidence that this effect operates through increased message discounting and reduced negative emotional responses.
