Questionaremos a tese de que as novas tecnologias de coleta e processamento de dados tornam anacrônicas as metaciências propostas desde Bacon. A pretensão de estender a aplicação dessas tecnologias às ciências sociais esbarra em dificuldades suscitadas pela peculiaridade de os fatos sociais se apresentarem pré-interpretados à observação. A constante atribuição de sentido por parte do senso comum a fatos e eventos sociais gera desafios metodológicos resistentes a tentativas de superá-los fazendo a pesquisa gravitar em torno da coleta piramidal de dados submetida a processamento computacional. A atividade de descrever e a de explicar permanecem em aberto nos casos em que são estudados fatos, a exemplo dos sociais, passíveis de sofrer alterações por serem afetados pelas opiniões que se formam sobre eles. O que é pensado - tanto pelo senso comum quanto pela ciência - agrega informações sobre os fatos que despontam, em muitos casos, capazes de mudar sua configuração a ponto de tornar-se necessário modificar ou substituir a explicação antes elaborada. O aspecto de os fatos sociais serem afetados pelas opiniões dos que os vivenciam e pelas teorias dos que os estudam dificulta a estabilização das descrições e a consolidação das explicações.
In the first section, this editorial introduces the special issue containing articles from the 14th Principia International Symposium: Formal Approaches to Philosophy of Science. The second section invites submissions for the 15th symposium, which will take place in Florianópolis from July 19 to 22, 2027 with the main topic being “Metaphysics of Science”. The third section acknowledges the journal’s 30th anniversary and announces editorial changes to take place next year. The fourth section is dedicated to the memory of colleagues who have passed away.
In this paper I put forward the notion of research program lattice, an extension of Imre Lakatos's methodology of research programs, in order to account for scientific progress in interdisciplinary research contexts. My starting point is twofold: the conception of science as a problem-solving activity as well as full recognition of (methodological) pluralism. From this perspective, scientific progress is viewed as a dynamic evolution of several research programs running in parallel, instead of a mere replacement of isolated theories. A research program lattice is characterized by the existence of a leading idea—analogous to the Lakatosian hard core—, a shared problem domain, a set of relevant questions, compatible methodological assumptions, and a common language enabling communication between diverse approaches. This model is particularly suitable for questions such as: What is consciousness? What is an artificial intelligence? where several research programs coming from disciplines as diverse as neurology, philosophy, computer science, and literature, contribute with a partial, irreducible, yet a complementary perspective for understanding a complex problem. I conclude that the philosophy of science can play a reconstructive and a normative role for the advancement of interdisciplinary research.
This paper examines the role of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) in the metaphysics of science, a field concerned with understanding the fundamental nature of re ality through engagement with scientific theories and models. While IBE is commonly used to justify belief in scientific theories, its application in metaphysics is debated. Some philosophers, like Armstrong, Ellis, and Swoyer, argue that IBE can also legitimize metaphysical commitments due to their explanatory power. However, critics like Saatsi challenge this par allel, questioning the reliability of IBE even within science, given its mixed historical record. To address this debate, the paper draws on a distinction proposed by Azar and Sardi between two senses of IBE. The first, creative sense—akin to abduction—involves generating novel ex planatory hypotheses and is considered valuable for metaphysical inquiry when understood as an exploration of possibilities informed by science. The second, selective sense—choosing the best explanation among known alternatives—faces significant challenges in metaphysi cal contexts, as its truth-conduciveness has been questioned by several authors (Saatsi 2017, Allzén 2023, Ritchie 2022) due to the absence of the empirical feedback mechanisms that support its reliability in science. We argue that, regardless of how the debate over the epis temic status of selective IBE in metaphysics is ultimately resolved, a moderately naturalized metaphysics of science can benefit from abduction while retaining its explanationist commitment.
The purpose of this talk is to briefly recall the main principles of quantum mechanics in order to understand the ontological challenges introduced by the theory. In particular, I will argue that quantum mechanics defies the category of individual for three different reasons: contextuality, non-separability, and indistinguishability. Each one of these three features of the theory violates a traditional ontological principle: the Principle of Omnimode Determination, the Principle of Separability, and the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, respectively. Therefore, any interpretation of quantum mechanics should formulate a “global” solution, according to which the three ontological challenges could be adequately tackled in terms of a single ontology.
