Dennett's theory of the self as a center of narrative gravity (cNG) stands out as a rare instance of human exceptionalism within a philosophy otherwise characterized by a deep commitment to the notion of evolutionary continuity. According to cNG, though all living organisms possess a minimal or biological self, only human beings -through their use of language- create the kind of self-representations necessary for the possession of a richer, socially constructed, narrative self. Dennett points to this uniquely human trait of narrative self-representation as the means by which we generate a self that is different in kind from the selves of all other animals. In this paper I suggest that we can resolve this tension between cNG and evolutionary continuity by (1) reconsidering the notion of narrative as it plays a role in Dennett's theory of self, and (2) acknowledging that the same social pressures Dennett cites as the impetus for our development of a self-concept are present for many other animal species as well. If other animals can also think in narrative terms, then cNG need not be understood as an endorsement of human exceptionalism. I conclude that expanding cNG in such a way that it can include the selves of both human and some non-human animals is appropriate in light of both the evidence of highly complex social worlds of several non-human animal species and the central role that evolutionary continuity plays in Dennett's overall
Daniel Dennett conceives language as an adaptive strategy of "Gregorian systems", creatures designed by evolution to accumulate and transmit knowledge and tools. In this context, words are "mental tools" that can be manipulated and used to generate intelligent behavior. On the other hand, a body of research has identified effects of written language on different cognitive domains. This paper explores, based on Dennett's evolutionary approach to mind and language, what might be the distinctive features of the literate mind, and in what sense these might justify considering it a subtype of the "Gregorian mind".
I argue that Daniel Dennett makes two important contributions to thinking philosophically about the notion of self. First, his narrative conception of the self (self as the "center of narrative gravity"). Second, his concept of 'real patterns' which, when applied to the self, forces us to rethink the idea of self as a center of narrative gravity. If we understand the self as a self-pattern, then it is more than a center of narrative gravity. Self-narrative is only one factor in the self-pattern although it plays two important roles: (a) as one among other elements of the self-pattern it contributes to self-constitution; (b) self-narrative reflects all the other significant factors that make up the self-pattern. Accordingly, as Dennett himself suggested, self-narrative "is a much more complicated concept" than an abstract center of gravity.
This note examines four recent translations of Spinoza's Ethics, which constitute a significant editorial milestone in Spinozist studies and merit careful reflection. The discussion is organized into two sections. The first highlights the noteworthy 'editorial' features of these editions, including introductions, notes, and commentaries that enhance their scholarly value. The second focuses on the translation work itself, with particular attention to one aspect of the translation of the first part of the Ethics: the vocabulary of difference. This analysis seeks to illuminate a certain vulgate concerning the text's very wording.
Since Dennett (Content and Consciousness) introduced the personal-subpersonal distinction, it is used in various disciplines. Although there is a relative consensus on the idea that the distinction is fundamentally located at the explanatory level, there are philosophers who have used it as an ontological distinction to refer to states and processes. Some consider this to be an "abuse" of the distinction and that it leads to confusion between different uses of it, and even to assimilate it to another very close distinction such as the doxastic-subdoxastic one. In this paper, I will first clarify the distinction and show that Dennett has always defended a similar conception of it. Secondly, I will defend that some attempts to clarify the distinction not only fail to shed light on it but do nothing but obscure its usefulness by dictating correct and incorrect uses, and leaving aside the plurality of phenomena for which it was postulated. Finally, I will offer certain generalizations under which I consider the typical phenomena for which the distinction was formulated fall, and will give an example showing how useful it is in exposing the weakness of a philosophical argument.
