This paper examines the problem of demarcation in contemporary philosophy of science, with particular emphasis on the transition from essentialist to constructivist approaches. Traditional accounts aimed to establish universal and necessary criteria distinguishing science from non-science; however, such efforts have proven unsuccessful and have been widely criticized. The paper argues that this failure does not justify abandoning the demarcation project, but rather calls for its reconceptualization. Drawing on insights from science and technology studies and feminist epistemology, demarcation is approached as a context-sensitive and practice-based process. It is conceptualized as a form of boundary-work enacted within scientific institutions and communities. The analysis highlights the procedural, socially negotiated, and normatively significant character of demarcation, thereby contributing to a broader understanding of scientificity.
The thesis of universal causal determinism implies we are but conscious automata whose every interaction with the world follows a tight script that cannot be deviated from. This is a disconcerting implication as it undermines the image of ourselves as agents in charge of our lives. Is any committed determinist to put up with this deflated image of herself? In this paper, I open a new conceptual perspective on this disconcerting implication that will reinflate the image. I will show in what sense we can be seen as metaphysically free despite the truth of the thesis of universal causal determinism. The new perspective is compatibilist in essence and meant to be therapeutically attractive.
In this paper, I discuss John Taurek’s (1977) famous attempt to undermine the moral significance of numbers in situations in which one is expected to choose whom to save from harm. Taurek famously argued that the number of people affected by one’s choice should not be a morally relevant factor in determining how one should act in conflict cases. While Taurek’s approach has obvious counterintuitive implications, I suggest that one way to avoid them while still preserving the spirit of his argument is to focus on the number of years a person is expected to live.
