Explicating the concept of coherence and establishing a measure for assessing the coherence of an information set are two of the most important tasks of coherentist epistemology. To this end, several principles have been proposed to guide the specification of a measure of coherence. We depart from this prevailing path by challenging two well-established and prima facie plausible principles: Agreement and Dependence. Instead, we propose a new probabilistic measure of coherence that combines basic intuitions of both principles, but without strictly satisfying either of them. It is then shown that the new measure outperforms alternative measures in terms of its truth-tracking properties. We consider this feature to be central and argue that coherence matters because it is likely to be our best available guide to truth, at least when more direct evidence is unavailable.
Neo-logicists have claimed that Hume's Principle (HP) may be taken as a stipulative definition of cardinal number. However, this claim is threatened by the fact that HP is not conservative over pure second-order logic. I argue that the dominant neo-logicist response to the conservativeness objection is not satisfactory. Then I propose a novel version of neo-logicism, based on Heck's Two-sorted Hume's Principle (2HP), which does meet the conservativeness objection—provided that conservativeness is understood semantically and not deductively. I also argue that on my proposal, the Bad Company problem is solved by conservativeness.
In this paper I defend the ancient thesis that agents always act under the guise of the good. I do so by arguing that the role that goodness plays in action is isomorphic to the role that truth plays in belief. In particular, I argue that the guise of the good thesis allows us to: (i) fix the topic of ethical and metaethical disagreement just as the aim of belief allows us to fix the topic of alethiological disagreements, (ii) explain the thinness of thin moral concepts in parallel to the thinness of concepts like truth, (iii) develop an account of moral testimony that parallels the best non-reductive accounts of theoretical testimony, and (iv) explains why we are to our values changing over time in much the same way that we are open to our theoretical premises changing over time.
Bradford (2023) calls attention to the fact that the strength of our reasons to preserve distinctively valuable objects increases as the number of such objects decreases. Bradford develops an account of this phenomenon in terms of ‘irreplaceable value’, and in particular in terms of a notion of the degree of such value, which is distinct from its amount. We present an alternative explanation of this pattern in our reasons, which appeals to the value of diversity: the world is better, other things equal, insofar as it contains more kinds of value. We develop this view in two connected ways: one appeals to evidential probability under conditions of uncertainty, and the other appeals to the value of diversity. We conclude by discussing some explanatory advantages of our view over Bradford’s.
The consequence argument aims to show that if determinism is true, such that all our actions are the necessary consequences of the remote past and the laws of nature, then no one could have done anything other than what she has in fact done. However, a recent challenge invokes a formal framework of ‘levels’ to argue that this argument actually commits a category mistake, since it is not legitimate to claim that determinism at the physical level precludes alternative possibilities at the agential level. Nevertheless, in this paper, I argue that the consequence argument can still be validly constructed even within a formal framework of levels, provided that we accept the plausible principle that anything is possible at the agential level only if it is physically realizable.
The paper demonstrates that the phenomenology of logical experience, or Husserlian phenomenology, and the computational theory of mind, in the form of a Fodorian language of thought, necessarily constitute a single theoretical science. We first show that Husserl, like Fodor, argues that symbolic mental representations themselves must have syntactic (language-like) form as part of an unconscious causal mechanism of symbolic transformation, thereby anticipating Fodor’s application of Turing to cognitive psychology for a language of thought. We then argue, based on these facts, for a theoretically necessary transformation of the pure description of phenomenology into a complete nomological-explanatory theory with a computational (not necessarily biological or neurological) implementation as its causal basis.
Joe.Cunningham@nottingham.ac.ukIn a recent article, Nathan Howard argues that normative reasons for action are to be identified not with facts, but with fact/goal pairs. For example, on Howard’s view, the reason in favor of me cooking the meal is not the fact that I promised—rather, it is that fact PLUS the goal to honor my promises. Howard supplies three arguments for his preferred view. In this reply I aim to do two things. The first is to undermine Howard’s three arguments. The second is to establish a dilemma for Howard’s preferred view. The upshot is a defense and development of the view that normative reasons for action are facts.
Many accept David Lewis's (1983) claim that, among the candidate meanings for our predicates, some are more natural than others—they do better or worse at “carving nature at its joints.” Call this claim predicate naturalism. Disagreement remains over whether the notion of naturalness extends “beyond the predicate'” (à la Sider, 2011). Are the candidate meanings of logical vocabulary also more or less natural? Call this claim logical naturalism. One motivation for predicate naturalism comes from its supposed ability to help rebut various radical indeterminacy arguments associated with Hilary Putnam (1977, 1980, 1981). It does so in combination with a popular meta-semantic theory called reference magnetism. I argue that the same threats of Putnam-style radical indeterminacy rearise for proponents of predicate naturalism—threats that logical naturalism helps rebut. So, if we accept predicate naturalism because it helps fend off threats of indeterminacy, we should also accept logical naturalism.
One motivation for preferring the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics over realist rivals, such as collapse and hidden variables theories, is that the interpretation is able to preserve locality (in the sense of no action at a distance) in a way these other theories cannot. The primary goal of this paper is to make this argument for the many worlds interpretation precise, in a way that does not rely on controversial assumptions about the metaphysics of many worlds.
Humean accounts of chance have a problem with undermining futures: they have to accept that some series of events are physically possible and have a nonzero chance but are inconsistent with the chances being what they are. This contradicts basic platitudes about chances and is inconsistent with plausible constraints on credences. We show how Humeans can avoid these contradictions by drawing on metaphysically impossible worlds that are, nevertheless, scientifically possible. The guiding idea is that chance “doesn't know” at least some of the metaphysical facts. Unlike previous approaches to undermining (e.g., Lewis (1994), Thau (1994), and Hall (1994)), our account is part of a unified solution to a variety of challenges that the Humean faces. And it connects more closely with the way we employ stochastic theories in scientific practice. But perhaps most importantly, the idea that chance doesn’t know metaphysical facts flows from the Humean conception of chance.
In this paper I explore how we can conceive of communication without recourse to the notion of meaning. The first step is to decouple linguistic understanding from its usual characterization as knowledge of meaning. Instead, I argue that we should think about understanding as a kind of skill or knowledge-how with both a practical and cognitive component. Further, we need to account for the different roles which an expression can play. Essentially, one expression can be understood in different ways with respect to different communicational functions it can fulfill. With the notion of understanding of expressions—competence—in hand, I explain how it relates to the understanding of utterances—comprehension. Since the former is a skill, the latter can be explained as the deployment of that skill to a particular conversational context. Finally, I give an account of communication and discuss the advantages which come from adopting this perspective.
This paper introduces a novel theory of vagueness. Its main aim is to show how naïve judgments about tolerance and indeterminacy can be preserved while departing from classical logic only in ways which are independently motivated. The theory makes use of a bilateral approach to acceptance and rejection. Combined with a standard account of validity, this approach gives rise to an entailment relation which is non-transitive. I argue that this is desirable: it is both pre-theoretically plausible and provides a compelling solution to a number of longstanding puzzles. The theory aims to preserve the naïve picture of vagueness. It combines tools from expressivist and dynamic treatments of information in conversation to show how principles which are generally assumed to be in tension are compatible. The resulting logic departs from classical logic in precisely those places we should expect it to.
Throughout science and mathematics, expert inquirers often reformulate existing problem-solving procedures and theories. But what value is there to reformulating, particularly when one already knows how to solve a given problem? Is reformulating merely instrumentally valuable for other practical or epistemic aims, or does it constitute a distinctive kind of epistemic achievement? I argue that by changing what we need to know to solve a problem, significant reformulations constitute a kind of intellectual value. Whereas some reformulations are trivial notational variants, a significant reformulation provides an inferentially distinct problem-solving plan. I situate my preferred position as a middle ground between deflationary and metaphysically substantial alternatives.
