Mourning is often framed as a sequence of emotions that can be described, experienced, 'completed' and then followed by a return to a previous 'normal' state. In the article, I argue that mourning is a substantially more profound existential experience. I propose that the death of a loved one constitutes an existential rupture, and mourning is a transformation: of the subject's structure and ontological self-awareness. The aim of this article is to explore how mourning affects the perception of time and the connection between body and consciousness. Mourning is not a process to be overcome or healed, but rather a plastic transformation without a guarantee of becoming a better or worse subject. The relationship with the deceased also does not simply disappear; rather, it is transformed, simultaneously reshaping the mourner's ontological self-understanding. The research method is phenomenological reconstruction: an analysis of mourning (published recollections and work by the artist Nick Cave following the death of his son), interpreted through classical phenomenological texts and Catherine Malabou's theory of plasticity. The main phenomenological thinkers referenced are Alfred Schutz, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Saulius Geniu & scaron;as.
The article investigates the Chinese concept of death from the perspective of cosmic transformations (hua, bian), which is almost exceptionally explored only in the studies of its understanding in the classical Daoist thought. The article argues that the view of death as transformation is no less important to other Chinese philosophical-religious traditions, namely, Classical and later (neo-)Confucianism, as well as a 'local' religion and Daoist alchemist tradition; thus, it could be considered as revealing the peculiarity and complexity of a general Chinese understanding of death. Such complexity is comprised by the polysemanticity of the very term 'transformation', stemming from Chinese processual ontology and emanative-recreative-generative (sheng sheng ) cosmogony. The article examines the views of death, as well as their development, co-relation and change according to two aspects-or 'paradigms' - of transformation-the one of human 'souls' (hun-po) and of body/forms (zing ), with the extension of a historical perspective from Classical Confucianism and Daoism (the texts Lunyu, Yijing, Liji, Laozi, Zhuangzi) to Neo-Confucian Zhu Xi and the ideas of Daoist alchemists. It also includes the concept of a dual soul (or souls) in Chinese local religion, formed in the pre-imperial period and later incorporated into the teaching of the latter (Daoist alchemy and Zhu Xi's thought). The analysis is concentrated on the co-relation and comparison of insights on death from those various sources, as well as their relation to ontological and cosmological terms yin-yang , dao , qi , and sheng sheng .
Friedrich Nietzsche's political philosophy, permeated by aristocratic radicalism, challenges contemporary values, but is often smoothed out or depoliticised. In this text, I analyse two tactics by which this is accomplished in Nietzsche's research. I analyse the myth of Elisabeth F & ouml;rster - Nietzsche's alleged falsification of texts as a factually unsubstantiated projection, and Walter Kaufmann's apolitical interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy as meaningfully limited. I show that, despite Nietzsche's anti-antisemitism and critique of German culture, his aristocratic radicalism justifies a hierarchical, brutal politics. I argue that both Elisabeth's myth and Kaufmann's interpretation can be understood as a specific form of interpretation, as domestication. I argue that these forms of domestication contradict the pursuit of 'harsh truths' which is essential to Nietzsche's philosophy. Lastly, I claim that domestication is a serious obstacle to a reconstruction of Nietzsche's political thought.
The paper presents the argument that Spaemann's ecological thought is grounded in his attempt to find an alternative to the problems which he sees as originating in the rejection of teleological understanding of human beings and nature. The paper argues that Spaemann's ethical personalism and reflections on ecological problems are not two separate fragments of his philosophy, which have no clearer relation. A personalist perspective is inseparable from Spaemann's efforts to rehabilitate anthropomorphisms, which he sees as a necessary condition for the establishment of ethical relationship with nature. The paper defends the thesis that philosopher's attempt to rehabilitate anthropomorphisms is the link which connects his ecological and personalist ethics. The personalist perspective marks an attempt to find an alternative to the ever-intensifying domination of modern anthropocentrism, which is characterised by an inability to grasp the reality of person and nature.
Anscombe famously argues that ‘I’ is not a referring expression, otherwise, a ‘Cartesian Ego’ would inevitably appear. She thinks the form of self-consciousness expressed in ‘I’ is ‘subjectless’: it is consciousness that does not involve a self-object (or Ego). Sartre’s theory of consciousness offers a strikingly parallel and mutually illuminating framework. He similarly denies the presence of the Ego within consciousness, arguing instead that the Ego is a transcendent object constructed through reflection. For both of them, the fundamental form of self-consciousness is pre-reflective. I argue that Anscombe’s position encounters two difficulties: (1) how the non-referential ‘I’ can express subjectivity, and (2) how self-consciousness is about an embodied subject. I propose that Sartre’s accounts of (1) the ‘fundamental ipseity’ and (2) the ‘lived body’ offer a phenomenological framework that helps to respond to Anscombe’s difficulties.
Žukauskaitė, A., 2025. Į organizmus orientuota ontologija. Vertė Aistis Žekevičius. Vilnius: Hubris. 219 p. ISBN 978-609-8280-92-0
In Resp. 509 b–c, Plato attributes to the Form of the Good an efficient causality, but he does not explain the matter in detail. This has led some scholars to interpret it in reference to the ‘unwritten doctrines’. The aim of this paper is to link this passage to the cosmological myth narrated in the Timaeus and to make sense of it in the light of Tim. 29 d–30 a, where Plato asks why the world of becoming exists in addition to the world of Ideas, and he gives an allegorical answer by appealing to the goodness of the Demiurge.
This paper examines the emancipatory potential of aesthetic experience through a comparative reading of Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schiller, and Jacques Rancière. It argues that Rancière both inherits and transforms the Kantian-Schillerian legacy by shifting the question of freedom from free accord of faculties or moral autonomy to a meaning-disruptive experience of equality. While Kant and Schiller conceptualize the disinterested experience of the spectator in aesthetic or ethical terms, Rancière interprets it as a condition that can trigger a struggle for equality. The article traces this entangled genealogy to demonstrate how Rancière’s notion of aesthetic experience cancels hierarchies and opens a space for dissensus, only within which politics can occur. By clarifying the conceptual transitions from Kant’s sensus communis to Schiller’s play drive and Rancière’s dissensual common sense, the paper demonstrates how, for Rancière, aesthetics is a field of disagreement, revealing aesthetic experience as a political act that disrupts the pre-established sensible orders; and how it generates equality through discord, transforming aesthetic contemplation into a mode of emancipation from the dominant orders of meaning and sense.
Straipsnio tikslas – įrodyti, kad Spaemanno ekologinę mintį grindžia pastanga rasti alternatyvą jo diagnozuotoms problemoms, kylančioms iš teleologinio žmogaus ir gamtos supratimo atsisakymo. Įrodinėjama, kad personalistinė etika ir svarstymai apie ekologines problemas nėra atskiri, aiškesnio ryšio neturintys jo filosofijos fragmentai. Personalistinė perspektyva ir nuo jos neatsiejama pastanga reabilituoti antropomorfizmus Spaemanno suprantamos kaip būtinos etinio santykio su gamtine tikrove sąlygos. Straipsnyje ginama pozicija, kad filosofo siekis reabilituoti antropomorfinį tikrovės supratimą, yra jungtis, vienijanti jo ekologinę ir personalistinę etiką. Personalistinė perspektyva reiškia pastangą rasti alternatyvą modernybės raidoje vis intensyviau dominuojančiam antropocentrizmui, kuriam būdingas asmens ir gamtos tikroviškumo praradimas.
Straipsnyje analizuojama kiniškoji mirties samprata iš kosminių transformacijų arba virsmo (hua化, bian 变) perspektyvos, kuri paprastai pasitelkiama tik tyrinėjant jos suvokimą klasikiniame daoizme. Siekiama pagrįsti teiginį, kad požiūris į mirtį kaip virsmą būdingas ir kitoms kinų filosofinėms-religinėms tradicijoms – klasikiniam bei vėlesniam (neo-) konfucianizmui, daoizmo alchemikams bei „vietinei“ kinų religijai, todėl jis perteikia bendros kiniškos mirties sampratos savitumą ir kompleksiškumą. Šį kompleksiškumą implikuoja paties žodžio „virsmas“ semantikos platumas, užkoduotas procesualioje kinų ontologijoje ir emanacinėje rekreacinėje / generacinėje (sheng sheng 生生) kosmogonijoje. Straipsnyje išskiriami du pagrindiniai kosminių virsmų paradigmos aspektai – žmogaus „sielų“ (hun-po 魂魄) ir kūno-formos (xing 形) transformacijų, pagal kuriuos analizuojama mirties sampratų raida bei kaita platesniame ir ilgesniame kinų filosofinės-religinės minties kontekste. Jų aprašymų ir idėjinių sąsajų ieškoma klasikiniuose konfucianizmo ir daoizmo tekstuose (Lunyu, Yijing, Liji, Laozi, Zhuangzi), taip pat kinų „vietinės“ religijos suformuotoje dvilypės sielos (sielų) sampratoje, kuri atsirado dar priešimperiniu laikotarpiu ir egzistuoja iki šių dienų; ją perėmusio neokonfucianisto Zhu Xi ir daoizmo alchemikų tekstuose. Siejant ir lyginant šių šaltinių idėjas apie mirtį kaip virsmą, ypatingas dėmesys skiriamas jos sampratos ryšiui su kinų ontologijos bei kosmogonijos sąvokomis (yin-yang 阴阳, dao 道, qi 气, sheng sheng 生生).
This paper aims to move from a theoretical towards the practical possibility of grasping how learning with the Milieu emerges from children’s and young people’s perspectives as they live and learn primarily in urbanized places. The potential for learning in urbanized environments as Milieus is revealed by examining specific learning experiences in two different contexts: in Lithuanian educational institutions, where children learn through a phenomenon-based methodology, and in cases where children and young people engage in climate activism outside formal education settings. The children’s and youths’ experiences of being and/or learning in urbanized environments demonstrate that they are directly connected to them as milieus. Learning within these environments potentially becomes an opportunity for active, affective engagement, creativity, and the development of equal relationships with everything that surrounds them (human and nonhuman) within and beyond specific urban places. Furthermore, an urbanized place as a milieu allows children and young people to connect with and expand their awareness of the world beyond their immediate surroundings. The paper also highlights different conditions necessary for urbanized places to become learning environments with the milieu possibility.
Gedulas dažnai įrėminamas kaip emocijų seka, kurią galima aprašyti, išgyventi, „užbaigti“ ir grįžti į ankstesnę „normalią“ būklę. Straipsnyje siekiu atskleisti, kad gedulas yra kur kas gilesnė egzistencinė patirtis. Laikausi požiūrio, kad artimojo mirtis – tai egzistencinis lūžis, o gedulas – tai transformacija: subjekto struktūros ir ontologinės savimonės. Straipsnio tikslas – atskleisti, kaip gedulas veikia laiko suvokimą, kūno ir sąmonės jungtį. Gedulas – tai ne procesas, kurį reikia įveikti ar išgydyti, o plastinė transformacija be garantijos į kokybiškesnį ar blogesnį subjektą. Santykis su mirusiuoju taip pat neišnyksta – jis pakinta kartu keisdamas ir gedinčiojo ontologinę savivoką. Tyrimo metodas – fenomenologinė rekonstrukcija, analizuojant gedulo patirties liudijimą (publikuotus menininko Nicko Caveʼo užrašus ir kūrybą po sūnaus mirties), interpretuojant jį pagal fenomenologinius tekstus bei Catherine Malabou plastiškumo teoriją. Pagrindiniai fenomenologinių teorijų autoriai: Alfredas Schutzas, Mauriceʼas Merleau-Ponty, Saulius Geniušas, Janas Patočka, J. Toddas DuBose.
Random decision-making (RDM) is a method of choice in which an agent delegates the final selection to a random device (e.g., a coin). When faced with multiple options, RDM is often dismissed as an irrational approach. Even in symmetrical cases where RDM is conceded to be rational, it is typically regarded as merely one among many equally effective methods for making an arbitrary choice. I challenge this prevailing view by pinpointing a unique psychological benefit of RDM – specifically, its capacity to mitigate potential regret – and thereby demonstrating that its rational applicability extends well beyond the narrow confines hitherto acknowledged. Once this capacity is recognized, it becomes clear that RDM is the uniquely rational strategy in certain symmetrical dilemmas while remaining rational in some asymmetrical cases. Furthermore, while factors such as affective and sociocultural influences impose limitations on the practice of RDM, I contend that these constraints are not insurmountable and may be mitigated as a deeper understanding of RDM’s unique value emerges.
Friedricho Nietzschės politinė filosofija, persmelkta aristokratinio radikalizmo, kelia iššūkį šiuolaikinėms vertybėms, tačiau dažnai sušvelninama ar depolitizuojama. Šiame tekste analizuoju dvi taktikas, kuriomis tai atliekama Nietzschės tyrinėjimuose. Analizuoju mitą apie Elisabethʼės Förster-Nietzsche tariamą tekstų klastojimą, parodydamas, jog tai faktiškai nepagrįsta projekcija, ir Walterio Kaufmanno apolitinę Nietzschės interpretaciją kaip reikšmingai ribotą. Parodau, kad, nepaisant Nietzschės antiantisemitizmo ir kritikos vokiečių kultūrai, jo aristokratinis radikalizmas pateisina hierarchinę, brutalią politiką. Tvirtinu, jog tiek Elisabeth’ės mitas, tiek Kaufmanno interpretacija gali būti suprasti kaip specifinė interpretacijos forma, kaip domestikacija. Argumentuoju, jog šios domestikacijos formos prieštarauja Nietzschės filosofijai esmiškam „šiurkščių tiesų“ siekiui. Galiausiai, teigiu, jog domestikacija yra reikšmingas trukdis siekiant rekonstruoti Nietzschės politinę mintį.
Attitudes towards the future and the past differ. This difference seems easy to explain if time actually flows, and thus, has an intrinsic direction. At first, this appears to be an advantage of the dynamic view of time, according to which time really flows, over the static view of time, according to which time does not flow. However, this paper aims to demonstrate that the intrinsic direction built into the dynamic view of time can point in the direction opposite of that in which we believe that time progresses, thereby rendering the dynamic view futile for explaining why attitudes towards the past and the future differ. Therefore, this advantage of the dynamic view of time over the static view becomes invalid.
If, in the history of philosophy, all manifestations of culture were brought before the judgment seat of reason, today it seems rather the other way around, as if reason were on trial. Has reason, the question arises, reached the end of its history and even the end itself? Hardly any thinker before him has undermined, depreciated and dissolved reason as much as Martin Heidegger. The actual main point of Heidegger’s critique of reason is the questioning of the centuries-old understanding of human beings as animal rationale. According to Heidegger, an understanding ofhuman beings as animal rationale prevents the ‘clearing’ [Lichtung] of being. For this reason, Heidegger continues, we must be careful not to resort to any ‘properties’ and ‘capabilities’ of human beings, for example, to reason. This article aims to determine the validity of this warning today and to what extent Heidegger’s thinking of reason and critique of reason can claim current philosophical relevance. First, Heidegger’s engagement with Kant and Husserl will be examined, along with his attempt to reflect on the origin of reason and logic. Subsequently, the focus will be on Heidegger’s critical engagement with the calculating thinking of modernity and the influential figures of thought ‘machination’ [Machenschaft] and ‘enframing’ [Ge-Stell], in order to conclude with a short reference to the present. In doing so, I will comment, in particular, on two central aspects of Heidegger’s thinking on reason and offer a brief outlook.
The constantly changing political circumstances and the expanding structure of civic society forces to search for an alternative to the theory of liberalism whose principles are incapable of mobilizing different groups of citizens for active participation. Moreover, the increasing dissatisfaction in government authorities calls for a solution to contain citizens' emotions and promote a dialogue. The paper argues that Philip Pettit's republican theory of freedom as non-domination is a valid alternative to liberalism to empower citizens for political action. The reason for this is that republican theory focuses on the protection of free agency, the virtue of vigilance encourages observation of political life and, if necessary, the opportunity to get involved, and the principle of non-domination itself imposes an obligation to ensure social justice. However, non-domination theory cannot address the problem of societal fragmentation because it assumes that the citizen is a rational agent and does not search for ways to persuade opposing groups to engage in a dialogue.
The aim of the article is to show how Hans-Georg Gadamer formulates the problem of the 'Oblivion of language' in Antiquity and how, in his search for the inner unity of word and thing, he sought to overcome this oblivion by using the scholastic treatment of verbum interius. Gadamer integrated the 'inner word' into his hermeneutic theory in order to overcome the 'oblivion of language' in antiquity. The article also shows how the Augustinian distinction between actus signatus and actus exercitus for Gadamer, discussed by Heidegger, opened up a hermeneutic approach to the 'inner word' that differs from the apophantics. The article argues that, in analyzing the 'inner word' and linguistic understanding, Gadamer emphasized two distinct but complementary aspects: on the one hand, the identity of thinking and its linguistic expression is emphasized, and the 'inner word' and its 'external' expression are inseparable; on the other hand, it is emphasized that we cannot, in verbal language (logos prophorikos), achieve full expression (logos endiathetos) of what we would like or be required to say in order to be adequately understood. Gadamer linked the lack of semantic fullness of the 'external word' to the experience of the Unvordenklichkeit. In order to explain the correlation between the inner and the outer word, the article interpretatively uses Husserl's phenomenological attitude, which describes the way we know the meaning of some 'thing' as 'thing in itself' through different 'profiles'. The 'inner word', mentioned by Gadamer in the phenomenological sense as 'an object in itself', is always given only in the expression of the 'outer word' as a partial profile and is incomplete in this respect. It is in no other way directly detectable, but only in the external expressions in which it opens. External expressions are not a defect of the full 'inner word', but are the only possible way or form of it, though not always perfect, and which may be expanded in the future. The different expressions of the external word referring to the partial meaning of the subject matter do not in any way provide for the relativization of the expressions themselves, because they all arise from the same 'inner word'. But this identity of the 'inner word' is detected only in the difference of external expressions.
The concept of a person as a monolithic whole that retains its identity over time is a cornerstone of criminal law theory and practice. Derek Parfit's moral philosophy, which is based on a reductionist view of persons, challenges this concept. The article identifies and discusses two forms of depersonalization found in Parfit's philosophy-the reductionist concept of a person and the depersonalization of actions and experiences. Based on critical literature on the implications of scalar identity to criminal law and the uses of this concept in contemporary criminal law philosophy, it is argued that the main criminal law theories can integrate it without denying their core principles. Parfit's denial of the possibility of deserved punishment is rejected based on its inconsistencies. Finally, it is shown that the growing power of neurointerventions to change the person, combined with Parfit's depersonalization, would raise serious moral dilemmas for some utilitarian theories, including the view endorsed by Parfit himself.
