Mourning is often framed as a sequence of emotions that can be described, experienced, 'completed' and then followed by a return to a previous 'normal' state. In the article, I argue that mourning is a substantially more profound existential experience. I propose that the death of a loved one constitutes an existential rupture, and mourning is a transformation: of the subject's structure and ontological self-awareness. The aim of this article is to explore how mourning affects the perception of time and the connection between body and consciousness. Mourning is not a process to be overcome or healed, but rather a plastic transformation without a guarantee of becoming a better or worse subject. The relationship with the deceased also does not simply disappear; rather, it is transformed, simultaneously reshaping the mourner's ontological self-understanding. The research method is phenomenological reconstruction: an analysis of mourning (published recollections and work by the artist Nick Cave following the death of his son), interpreted through classical phenomenological texts and Catherine Malabou's theory of plasticity. The main phenomenological thinkers referenced are Alfred Schutz, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Saulius Geniu & scaron;as.
The article investigates the Chinese concept of death from the perspective of cosmic transformations (hua, bian), which is almost exceptionally explored only in the studies of its understanding in the classical Daoist thought. The article argues that the view of death as transformation is no less important to other Chinese philosophical-religious traditions, namely, Classical and later (neo-)Confucianism, as well as a 'local' religion and Daoist alchemist tradition; thus, it could be considered as revealing the peculiarity and complexity of a general Chinese understanding of death. Such complexity is comprised by the polysemanticity of the very term 'transformation', stemming from Chinese processual ontology and emanative-recreative-generative (sheng sheng ) cosmogony. The article examines the views of death, as well as their development, co-relation and change according to two aspects-or 'paradigms' - of transformation-the one of human 'souls' (hun-po) and of body/forms (zing ), with the extension of a historical perspective from Classical Confucianism and Daoism (the texts Lunyu, Yijing, Liji, Laozi, Zhuangzi) to Neo-Confucian Zhu Xi and the ideas of Daoist alchemists. It also includes the concept of a dual soul (or souls) in Chinese local religion, formed in the pre-imperial period and later incorporated into the teaching of the latter (Daoist alchemy and Zhu Xi's thought). The analysis is concentrated on the co-relation and comparison of insights on death from those various sources, as well as their relation to ontological and cosmological terms yin-yang , dao , qi , and sheng sheng .
Friedrich Nietzsche's political philosophy, permeated by aristocratic radicalism, challenges contemporary values, but is often smoothed out or depoliticised. In this text, I analyse two tactics by which this is accomplished in Nietzsche's research. I analyse the myth of Elisabeth F & ouml;rster - Nietzsche's alleged falsification of texts as a factually unsubstantiated projection, and Walter Kaufmann's apolitical interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy as meaningfully limited. I show that, despite Nietzsche's anti-antisemitism and critique of German culture, his aristocratic radicalism justifies a hierarchical, brutal politics. I argue that both Elisabeth's myth and Kaufmann's interpretation can be understood as a specific form of interpretation, as domestication. I argue that these forms of domestication contradict the pursuit of 'harsh truths' which is essential to Nietzsche's philosophy. Lastly, I claim that domestication is a serious obstacle to a reconstruction of Nietzsche's political thought.
The paper presents the argument that Spaemann's ecological thought is grounded in his attempt to find an alternative to the problems which he sees as originating in the rejection of teleological understanding of human beings and nature. The paper argues that Spaemann's ethical personalism and reflections on ecological problems are not two separate fragments of his philosophy, which have no clearer relation. A personalist perspective is inseparable from Spaemann's efforts to rehabilitate anthropomorphisms, which he sees as a necessary condition for the establishment of ethical relationship with nature. The paper defends the thesis that philosopher's attempt to rehabilitate anthropomorphisms is the link which connects his ecological and personalist ethics. The personalist perspective marks an attempt to find an alternative to the ever-intensifying domination of modern anthropocentrism, which is characterised by an inability to grasp the reality of person and nature.
Anscombe famously argues that ‘I’ is not a referring expression, otherwise, a ‘Cartesian Ego’ would inevitably appear. She thinks the form of self-consciousness expressed in ‘I’ is ‘subjectless’: it is consciousness that does not involve a self-object (or Ego). Sartre’s theory of consciousness offers a strikingly parallel and mutually illuminating framework. He similarly denies the presence of the Ego within consciousness, arguing instead that the Ego is a transcendent object constructed through reflection. For both of them, the fundamental form of self-consciousness is pre-reflective. I argue that Anscombe’s position encounters two difficulties: (1) how the non-referential ‘I’ can express subjectivity, and (2) how self-consciousness is about an embodied subject. I propose that Sartre’s accounts of (1) the ‘fundamental ipseity’ and (2) the ‘lived body’ offer a phenomenological framework that helps to respond to Anscombe’s difficulties.
