
For the attention that Rosemarie Tong, James Lennox, Tom Beauchamp, and Robert Sade have given to The Foundations of Bioethics I am very grateful. They have provided a careful and useful exploration of many of the ambiguities of that text. In taking account of their reflections, I will indicate how the text they have examined takes a position somewhat different from what they have assumed in the account they give. In that way, I will be able to respond to the issues they have raised as well as suggest how a different interpretation of Foundations can be sustained than the one they have offered. In that the arguments in Foundations (1986,1996) are themselves somewhat lengthy, I will not recall them at length here. Instead, I will only rehearse the positions I have taken in Foundations. The result will be to indicate that, though in general 1 have sympathy with many of the concerns raised by Tong, Lennox, Beauchamp, and Sade in many respects when they are critical of Foundations, they are addressing issues other than those addressed by that work. What they take to be points for criticism of Foundations are rather issues raised regarding positions somewhat different from those advanced in Foundations. This allows me to be grateful for their reflections, while Foundations is not directly touched by their criticisms.
Is the theory that grounds H. Tristram Engelhardt's The Foundations of Bioethics and the practices it suggests compatible with the theory and practices found in feminist approaches to bioethics? Is The Foundations ofBioethics a work that teaches "that the subordination of women is morally wrong and that the moral experience of women is as worthy of respect as that of men?"' Or is it instead a work that cannot or will not teach that gender inequity is wrong that cannot or will not address women's interests in freedom and well-being as forcefully and passionately as it addresses men's? Are there within The Foundations of Bioethics the conceptual and methodological tools to do what Alison M. Jaggar says any feminist approach to bioethics must do; namely, seek "(1) to articulate moral critiques of actions and practices that perpetuate women's subordination; (2) to prescribe morally justifiable ways of resisting such actions and practices; and (3) to envision morally desirable alternatives that will promote women's emancipation ... ?"= Or is The Foundations of Bioethics an essentially nonfeminist treatise? By reading Engelhardt's bioethics through the conceptual lenses of some representative works in feminist bioethics, I hope to show that although feminists, and Engelhardt are not what he terms "moral friends," they are far from being what he terms "moral strangers." Rather, feminists and Engelhardt are what I term "moral acquaintances" who might have more moral assumptions in common than Engelhardt suspects.
I write this criticism of H. Tristram Engelhardt's The Foundations of Bioethics' not fiom the perspective of a philosopher, but fiom that of a physician with a long-time interest in health policy issues as they relate to bioethics. I hold Engelhardt in high regard: among philosophers currently active in bioethics, he is one of the few who are deeply committed to freedom as the primary requirement of social life, and to liberty as its primary political manifestation. In this commentary, I will focus on his view of health services r e f ~ r m . ~
Tris Engelhardtu0027s The Foundations of Bioethics stands out in its field for the amount of sustained attention it pays to the epistemological foundations of ethics. Among those working in the field of bioethics, no one has devoted more attention to those foundations, and in particular to the matrix of concepts associated with medical elassification, diagnosis, explanation and treatment. This is the principal focus of chapter five of Foundations, and will be the principal of focus of these comments.